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This dissertation argues that important modes of self-definition in the Renaissance draw on the 
linguistic uncertainty in medieval literary constructions of lovers.  Just as in Renaissance texts, 
medieval lovers such as Tristan and Isolde fashion themselves as a “misticall union”:  a 
conglomerate self that shares one mind and erases all distinctions between sender and receiver as 
well as grammatical subject and object.  This unity expresses itself in the lovers’ inexplicable 
ability to interpret correctly the most arbitrary of messages from one another while misleading 
those around them.  Considering Shakespearean lovers in this context suggests how deeply this 
model of self-definition and self-abnegation – as well as its foundation in language – penetrated 
into Elizabethan England and eventually into the work of John Donne.  This dissertation explores 
the social and theological roots of the idea of mystical connections between lovers, as well as the 
generic conventions that stem from these roots.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
I wish that you knew that when I said two sugars  
I actually meant three.  
– Kate Nash “Nicest Thing” (2007)1 
 
 
“Rið braut héðan, þú ókunni riddari,” segir hún, “ok fá þér  
herbergi ok dvel ekki vára ferð.”  En sem Tristram sá gullit,  
kendi hann ok undirsoóð. 
 
 
[“Ride off strange knight,” she said, “find yourself lodging  
and stop holding up our journey.”  But when Tristram saw  
the ring, he recognized it and understood her meaning.] 
– Norse Tristan (13c.)2  
 
 
 Marie de France’s Chevrefoil opens with Tristan exiled by his uncle King Mark for love 
Queen Isolde.  Missing her terribly, Tristan looks for an opportunity to meet with Isolde.  
Discovering that she will be travelling to Tintagel, Tristan hides in the woods along her route in 
the hopes of meeting with her.  Tristan faces the challenge of communicating his love for her and 
his desire to meet without alerting any of the queen’s travelling companions.  To communicate 
secretly, the knight chooses a code they have used in the past, the carving of his name on a twig.  
From this one word, Isolde gleans a complex message that includes the metaphor of their love as 
                                                          
1
 Kate Nash, “We Get On.”  Made of Bricks. Fiction Records, Cherrytree Records, and Universal 
Music Group.   Release date August 5, 2007.  CD. 
2
 Brother Robert. Norse Romance I:  The Tristan Legend. Ed. and Trans Marianne Kalinke.  
(Cambridge:  D.S. Brewer, 2012), 200. 
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the intertwined branches of chevrefoil and honeysuckle.
3
  How does she make this seemingly 
miraculous interpretive leap?  Is it realistic for him to expect her to understand him that 
completely from such a minimal message?  As only Isolde properly unweaves the message, how 
much meaning is produced by her, rather than Tristan?   How is it that the lovers take advantage 
                                                          
3
 Queunges ot ilex esté 
E atendu e surjuné 
Pur espier e pur saver 
Coment il al peüst veer 
Kar ne pot nent vivre sanz li; 
D’euils deus fu il [tut] autresi 
Cume del chevrefoil esteit 
Ki a al codre perneit: 
Quant il s’i est laciez e pris 
E tut entur le fust s’est mis, 
Ensemble poënt bien deserver, 
Li codres mueri hastivement 
E li chevrefoil ensement. 
“Bele amie, si est de nus: 
Ne vuz sanz mei, ne mei sanz vus.” 
Marie de France. “Chevrefoil.”   Marie de France’s Lais.   (Gallimard, 2000), 53-4.  
Citations are from the edition bilingue de Philippe Walter of Marie de France’s Lais.   
  [He had been there a long time 
  He had waited and remained 
To find out and to discover  
How he could see her, 
For he could not live without her. 
With the two of them it was just 
As it is with the honeysuckle 
That attaches itself to the hazel tree: 
When it has wound and attached  
And worked itself around the trunk, 
The two can survive together; 
But if someone tries to separate them, 
The hazel dies quickly 
And the honeysuckle with it. 
“Sweet love, so it is with us: 
You cannot live without me, nor I without you.”] 
Marie de France.  The Lais of Marie de France.  Trans. Robert Hanning and Joan 
Ferrante.  (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1995).  63-78. 
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of the ambiguity of language to communicate one messate to one another and a different one to 
others? 
The lovers make unrealistic yet correct interpretive leaps – precisely the sort of 
communication that has become such an important way of talking about love.
4
  The queen – 
presumably Isolde – encounters a message from her lover Tristan.  The entirety of the message 
consists of his name carved in the branch of a honeysuckle tree.  None of the others in Isolde’s 
party understand or even acknowledge the message, but Isolde gleans sixteen lines of verse from 
that one word.  Perhaps even more remarkable is that she is correct; one word offers enough 
information to establish a secret meeting in the woods.  This scene will be discussed in detail in a 
later chapter, but for now the important element to take from it is the incompleteness of the 
message and the unrealistic nature of the interpretation.  Within the lai, only two characters 
participate in this elevated communication:  the queen and Tristan.  Even the audience is left in 
the dark as to how the one word became so full of meaning because the text of the lai offers only 
the text and the interpretation without offering any Rosetta Stone.  To some extent, we have no 
evidence that the specifics of her interpretation are correct save the fact that the two lovers do, in 
fact, meet.  Perhaps most interestingly, the lai presents the emotional content that Isolde finds in 
the message without any of the nuts and bolts of how the assignation’s details are established.  
The motivation for excluding these mundane details would seem clear; it makes for bad 
storytelling when the lai is primarily focused on emotions.  The lai’s emphasis on such emotional 
connections at the expense of the actual details of day to day communication, however, teaches 
readers that such details are less important than feelings; in fact, it suggests that a sufficiently 
strong emotional connection will substitute for linguistic clarity. 
                                                          
4
 Marie de France. “Chevrefoil.”   Marie de France’s Lais.   (Gallimard, 2000), 53-4.   
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 What is remarkable about this understanding is not that relational semantics are used.  It 
is now an academic commonplace since Ferdinand de Saussure’s 1916 On the Nature of 
Language that all communication has always been relational.
5
  What is remarkable is that a 
twelfth-century writer has consciously constructed her text in a way that shows a working 
knowledge of what we would call relational semantics.  Exploration of relational semantics in 
early works is limited, perhaps because the Middle Ages offer us few clear examples of 
theoretical articulations such as Saussure’s.  More recent scholars, however, have challenged the 
notion that medieval writers had no knowledge of the relational qualities of language.  Recent 
scholars, including Stephen G. Nichols, have made this point by emphasizing that the lack of a 
formal articulation does not exclude a conscious use of relational semantics.
6
   
Richard Waswo, for instance, in Language and Meaning in the Renaissance (1987) 
argues that Renaissance English writers had a clear sense of the relational qualities of language 
due to the Reformation and the attendant expanded translation of formerly Latin texts into the 
vernacular.
7
  Waswo argues that the dualistic sign/referent model, whereby a sign has a stable 
relationship to the referent, was replaced in the Renaissance by a model where meaning is always 
contextual and triadic – including the signifier, signified, and receiver. Waswo points out that 
                                                          
5
 Ferdinand Saussure, “Nature of the Linguistic Sign.” Course in General Linguistics.  
Ed. Charles Bally and Albert Reidlinger. Trans.Wade Baskin. (New York:  Philosophical 
Library, 1959). 
6
 Nichols, Stephen G.  “Writing the New Middle Ages.”  Neohelicon XXXIII (2006) 1, 141–169. 
7
 Waswo, Richard.  Language and Meaning In The Renaissance.  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1987). 
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Renaissance literary practice raced far ahead of theory, as the rhetorical texts of the period do not 
reflect this change
8
   Waswo’s ideas have come under pressure from Marcia L. Colish, who 
counters Waswo’s assertions on both sides of what she calls a Burkhardtian divide by pointing 
out counter-examples in both periods.
9
  
Elizabeth Eisenstein’s The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (1979) also identifies 
relational semantics in the Renaissance, attributing it, as indicated in her title, to the expanded 
availability of texts due to the printing press.
10
  Eisenstein’s definition of the Renaissance 
extends into the eighteenth century, and she argues that the Renaissance got under way before 
print, but many of its achievements were “reoriented,” if not made possible, by print.  In 
particular, the wider circulation of texts allowed for greater collaboration and clarity in scientific 
endeavors.  Interpretation of the Bible, however, became less clear as more people read Scripture 
in the vernacular and then circulated their opinions in print.  Stephen G. Nichols’ “Writing the 
New Middle Ages” connects medieval explorations of linguistic contingency with similar 
intellectual explorations in the twentieth-century, discussing the idea of a medieval post-modern 
sensibility regarding language.
11
  Building on Howard Bloch’s analysis of Marie de France’s 
                                                          
8
 Ibid., 80-1. 
9
 Colish, Marcia L.  “Review of  Language and Meaning in the Renaissance by Richard Waswo.”   
Speculum. Vol. 63, No. 4 (Oct., 1988), pp. 1008-1011. 
10
 Eisenstein, Elizabeth.  The Printing Press as an Agent of Change:  Communications and 
Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe, Volumes I and II.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
UP, 1979).  
11
 Nichols, Stephen G.  “Writing the New Middle Ages.”  Neohelicon XXXIII (2006) 1, 141–169. 
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Lais and Daniel Heller-Roazen’s analysis of the Roman de la Rose,12 Nichols identifies the 
twelfth century as a period fraught with anxieties about how language could represent truth.  
These scholars trace these anxieties to the conflict between grammar and logic, the conflict of 
which appears in the Nominalist-Realist debate where Nominalists questioned the certainty of a 
Neo-Platonic understanding of the universe.  While literary works like the Roman de la Rose 
address the radical contingency of language implied by the rigorous application of logic, few 
works in what might be called theoretical fields explore the same issues in such depth.  The 
relative lack of exploration in these fields may be because of the Western philosophical 
tradition’s emphasis on the truth, looking for the truth-value.13  Literature, however, needed no 
such connection to the “truth,” and this offered the freedom to explore more radical approaches 
to languge.
 14
    
 Important responses to these anxieties appear in some literary works of the time, as they 
attempt to address the bleak complexities – and radical contingency – of life in ways that, 
                                                          
12
 Bloch, Howard.  The Anonymous Marie de France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003).  Heller-Roazen, Daniel. Fortune’s Faces: The Roman de la Rose and the Poetics of 
Contingency. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
13
 For more on the Western philosophical tradition’s emphasis on truth-value, see Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method.  Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall.  (New York:  
Continuum, 1996). 
14
 This is despite the vigorous defenses of the imporance of literature’s allegorical truth made by 
authors such as Geoffrey VinSauf.  VinSauf, Geoffrey.  “Poetria Nova.”  Three Medieval 
Rhetorical Arts.  Trans. and ed. by James J. Murphy.  (Berkeley:  U of California Press, 1971).   
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according to Nichols, religious texts do not.
15
 Bloch argues that Marie de France responds 
directly to these philosophical concerns about language as she negotiates the formation of 
meaning, authority, and identity – specifically in the vernacular.  Heller-Roazen presents a more 
radical literary device used in the Roman de la Rose: performative mimesis.  Performative 
mimesis occurs when texts create experiences in their flesh-and-blood audiences that mimic the 
interpretive complexities explored by the characters in the texts.  One example of this occurs in 
the English morality play Mankind.
16
  During the play, several devils fail to tempt the character 
of Mankind to commit a range of vices.  In response, the devils announce that they will call forth 
a greater devil to tempt Mankind, but only if the audience pays them.  While appearing to simply 
ask for payment, the devils are asking for the audience to literally pay for the damnation of 
Mankind.  When the audience members pay, they become complicit in an allegorical experience 
of their own.  In this way, audience members help to construct the experience.  Nichols implies 
an affinity between the breaking of the fourth plane in examples like this one to post-modern 
techniques used in the twentieth century.
17
   
  At the heart of linguistic performative mimesis stands relational semantics.  Relational 
semantics explores communications that are contingent, dependent upon how the message is 
received to establish meaning; as such, the listener plays an almost equal role to the speaker in 
creating meaning.  Relational semantics stands in opposition to referential semantics. Referential 
                                                          
15
 Nichols, 154. 
16
 Anonymous.  “Mankind.”  The Macro Plays.  Ed. Mark Eccles.  (London:  Oxford UP, 1969.  
158-184). 
17
 Nichols refers primarily to Heller-Roazen’s analysis of the character Faux Semblant in Roman 
de la Rose. 
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semantics privileges the intent of the speaker in communication; the listener’s job is to find the 
proper reference to determine the speaker’s intent.  Roman de la Rose uses linguistic ambiguity 
in speeches by the character Faux Semblant to force readers to participate actively in creating 
what the words mean.   
 By emphasizing the idea that emotions should make mundane communication 
unnecessary, Chevrefoil relies upon the notion that communication is relational, meaning that 
words’ meanings are essentially arbitrary and dependent upon context.  As such, differences in 
listeners’ biases can lead them to interpret the same word – even when heard at the same time – 
in different ways.  Unlike Roman de la Rose, however, Chevrefoil places readers in a different 
interpretive position.  Rather than establishing the radical contingency necessary to inspire 
performative mimesis in her readers, Marie offers readers a partial glimpse – in the form of 
Tristan’s intent – into the lovers’ process.  Giving the partial glimpse leads to a more 
sympathetic reading of the lovers, as the message emphasizes the elevated parts of their 
relationship.  Withholding the specifics of her decoding process, however, establishes the 
mystical quality of their communication.  This lack of clarity places readers in a position 
somewhere between the lovers and the strangers.   
 My dissertation describes a less radical deployment of relational semantics.  Rather than 
engaging readers in communications informed by relational semantics, the literary 
representations of lovers shows characters engaging relational semantics within the text.  In a 
way, the contingency in these lovers’ communications may be seen as a transition between the 
performative mimesis of works like Roman de la Rose and the relatively unambiguous 
deployment of lovers’ communications by the end of the Renaissance.18  The lovers in these 
medieval and Renaissance romances encounter communications that include ambiguity that is 
                                                          
18
 Discussions of these conventions will be at the heart of the following chapters.  
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seemingly irresolvable.  Literary representations of lovers’ responses to these ambiguities grow 
progressively less complex; early works on Tristan include a range of responses, both positive 
and negative, to represent the lovers, while later works like Twelfth Night, represents appropriate 
lovers using only positive representations. 
In my discussions of language, I would like to expand upon the work of Waswo, 
Eisenstein, Colish, and Heller-Roazen, looking for important precursors to the trends they 
identify in the Renaissance.  An off-shoot of this dissertation’s primary thesis about generic 
conventions of communication between lovers, therefore, will be to extend the observations of 
these scholars to an earlier period, suggesting that a working knowledge of relational semantics 
can be identified as early as the twelfth century in England.  
My work matches well with Nichol’s assertions, by placing a working knowledge of 
relational semantics earlier than previously thought and by examining primarily literary works 
rather than rhetorical texts.  Unlike Waswo, however, I do not want to merely establish a new, 
earlier originating date for this pre-knowledge of Saussurean semantics.  Rather than a break, I 
see a continuity that appears in a relatively distinct manner.  My goal is to identify the wider 
circulation of these ideas in the literature of medieval England and, perhaps, a more aggressive 
approach to language within the relative freedom of literature in contrast to the limitations of 
medieval philosophy.  Within my work, these limitations consistently appear when one considers 
ideas of the divine, wherein all meaning – by definition – resides.  The primary distinction for 
me, then, is not chronology but the specifics on heterosocial communications in an environment 
particularly concerned with the status of women, law, and consent.  In essence, I want to answer 
Eggers Misticall Unions 10 
the question David Quint raises whether medieval and Renaissance men and women were 
capable of conceiving of language in ways they did not articulate.
19
 
 Tristan becomes a central figure as literary representations of lovers’ communications 
form in the face of anxieties about language combine with consent in marriage.  Most 
representations of Tristan include each of the primary discourses about lovers’ communications, 
good and bad; by the end of the Renaissance, these discourses are used singly to identify the 
relative merit of separate potential lovers.   Tristan and Isolde’s communications often include 
elements of each of the following interpretive situations: 
1- The communication is all in their heads. 
2- The communication is miraculously effective, due to their love. 
3- The imagined communication goes contrary to evidence. 
4- The imagined communication goes contrary to evidence in a way that silences and/or 
coerces the beloved. 
Within the character of Tristan, we see a range of responses that anticipate Renaissance literary 
lovers’ communications, some admirable and others troubling:  the solitary imaginings of the 
Old Arcadia’s Gynecia, the miraculous interpretive leaps of Romeo, the self-involved 
ruminations of Twelfth Night’s Malvolio, and the coercive silencing by All’s Well That Ends 
Well’s Helena.  All of these seemingly contradictory conventions appear in the figure of Tristan; 
over time, works tend to show the conventions in different characters.  The characteristics of 
                                                          
19
 Quint, David.  “Review of Language and Meaning in the Renaissance. by Richard Waswo.  
Renaissance Quarterly.  Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn, 1989), 535.   
Eggers Misticall Unions 11 
“Western culture’s epitome of love – heterosexual, adolescent, secret, foredoomed”20 – stem 
from the specific conditions of lovers in twelfth century Anglo-Norman society, hiding their 
interior, private, passionate love from society.  The modes of communication used in these 
condictions increasingly also represent idealized behaviors.  What, in twelfth century versions of 
Tristan and Isolde, is represented as morally ambiguous becomes isolated, with individual 
characters taking on different modes of communication.  Tristan has a privileved connection with 
Isolde, but also one that may be merely in his mind, and may also, in other ways silence her.  In 
later works, the ideal characters have privileged communications while less worthy lovers 
imagine or silence those they claim to love. 
A close look at the literature of the Middle Ages and our modern period shows many – 
perhaps surprising – similarities.  Most surprising may not be that the Renaissance continues to 
use discourses that look back to the previous period only to disappear; instead, the Middle Ages 
actually introduces many discourses we consider modern long before any period we identify as 
“modern.”  The examples at the top of this chapter show a particular discourse about love that 
does not appear in the English tradition before the Middle Ages, specifically the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries.
21
   
The line from Kate Nash’s 2007 album Made of Bricks, when she says that she wants her 
lover to know that she wants three sugars when she asks for two, may seem unremarkable.  In 
fact, it is likely that the line has gone unremarked since its release because it shares – with many 
                                                          
20
 Peter Holland.  The Complete Pelican Shakespeare.  Ed. Stephen Orgel and A.R. Braunmuller.  
(New York:  Penguin, 2002),  1255. 
21
 Like Jaeger, I argue for a shift in attitudes about love starting in the eleventh and the twelfth 
centuries. 
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other love songs of the early twenty-first century – what has become a common-place sentiment 
about love.  “Nicest Thing” expresses a desire for the comfortable intimacy of a beloved who has 
observed Kate closely over time and noticed the disparity between her request for sugar and her 
actual practice of taking more.  Nash places this line within a long sequence of things that she 
wants from her lover, summarizing her list by saying “basically, I wish that you loved me.”  
Within this list, she defines love as the ability of her beloved to know what she wants even when 
her words say something else.  This definition of love – not unique to Nash – sets a dangerous 
precedent that what she says is not what she means, paired with the equally dangerous 
expectation that if her beloved does what she says rather than what she means, it must not be 
love.   
 It is not unreasonable to wish that your loved one knows you so well that you do not have 
to ask for what you want; it is only unreasonable when you expect it to happen.  Despite this, 
modern movies and television shows are filled with examples of lovers who have such insight 
into the ones they love that each pair seems to share a psychic connection.  Seeing relationships 
like these – even in fiction – helps to create the sense that one’s own relationship is lacking, 
assuming the comparative element of Glenn Firebaugh’s studies on happiness and economic 
status can be applied to this situation.
22
  Put simply, happiness is determined in comparison to 
                                                          
22
 Firebaugh, Glenn.  “Relative Income and Happiness: Are Americans on a Hedonic 
Treadmill?”  American Sociological Association Centennial Annual Meeting, August 14.     
Studies have shown that happiness with one’s economic status is relative or relational.  Families 
of similar objective wealth but in different social circles perceive their situations differently.  
These studies show that it is possible to be in a very elevated economic class and still feel that 
one is poor. 
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what we see around us, and seeing others with this kind of insight sets up unrealistic 
expectations.  
Where, then, did these expectations arise?  At the very least, these expectations begin to 
appear in the English literary tradition during the twelfth century, as seen in the translation of the 
exchange between Tristan and Isolde above.  Much like Nash, Isolde tells her lover one thing, to 
ride off, when she wants him to stay and meet with her later.   
  
 The medieval period still serves as the era against which European and American 
modernity is measured.  When, in Pulp Fiction, Marsellus threatens to “get medieval,” he means 
to inflict violent, unthinking, depraved violence on someone.
23
  When one describes another 
person’s attitudes as medieval, one generally means simple-minded, superstitious, and 
outdated.
24
   Even the name medieval stands in for the Middle Ages, suggesting that one 
thousand years of European culture served merely as a holding place for the return of culture 
from the Classical period to the Renaissance – the rebirth of a dead culture – or Early Modern – 
the start of the characteristics by which modern people define themselves.  The attitudes are, 
perhaps surprisingly, perpetuated by scholars, reproducing attitudes inherited from a Tudor 
                                                          
23
 Pulp Fiction. Dir. Quentin Tarantino. By Quentin Tarantino. Prod. Lawrence Bender. Perf. 
Samuel L. Jackson and Uma Thurman. Miramax, 1995. Perf. By Ving Rhames. 
24
 Dinshaw, Carolyn. Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- and Postmodern. 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).  Carolyn Dinshaw’s Getting Medieval extends these 
characteristics to suggest that the phrase invokes a sado-masochistic heteronormative violence 
that supposedly echoes the “ritualized sexual torture” of the Middle Ages. 
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monarchy attempting to justify its political ambitions.
25
  Jacob Burkhardt provides the most 
famous articulation of the differences between the periods, consistently viewing the Renaissance 
in a favorable light.
26
  By portraying the Middle Ages as savage and ignorant, our culture 
effectively colonizes the period, depicting this past using the same discourses that European 
colonists used to represent the tribal people they encountered in the New World.
27
  The 
redoubtable Harold Bloom’s 1999 Shakespeare:  The Invention of the Human articulates this 
position most unequivocally, arguing that the Renaissance – and Shakespeare specifically – 
creates the modern idea and expectations of changeable, individual humans.
28
 
While some scholars continue to work on assumptions about the Middle Ages established 
in the early fifteenth century, others have challenged this position.  My work is hardly the first to 
identify the importance of the twelfth century.  As early as 1927, C.H. Haskins argued that the 
increase in humanism seen in the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth century can be seen 
                                                          
25
 Sharpe, Kevin. Selling the Tudor Monarchy: Authority and Image in Sixteenth-Century 
England. (London: Yale University Press, 2009). 
26
 Burkhardt, Jacob.  The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy.  (London:  Penguin, 1990.  
Orig. 1860). 
27
 Edward Said discusses these discourses in his seminal work on colonialism.  Said, Edward.  
Orientalism.  (New York:  Vintage, 1971).  Stephen Greenblatt notes how similar discourses are 
applied to tribal Americans.  Greenblatt, Stephen.  Marvellous Possessions:  The Wonder of the 
New World.  (Chicago:  U of Chicago P, 1991). 
28
 Bloom, Harold.  Shakespeare:  The Invention of the Human.  (New York:  Riverhead:  1999). 
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as early as the eleventh century.
29
  Haskins’ work has opened the door to a strand of criticism 
that puts pressure on this periodization. John Dagenais and Margaret Rich Greer directly 
question the use of colonizing discourses directed at the Middle Ages,
30
 while other scholars 
indirectly pressure colonizing discourses by identifying important continuities between medieval 
and Renaissance works.  Paul Strohm’s work, contextualizing the discourses of the two periods, 
carefully identifies both continuities and breaks in the way issues were framed.
31
  Simpson’s 
Reform and Cultural Revolution reverses preconceptions about the increasing complexity of 
Renaissance literature by noting how Early Modern works often simplify and codify generic 
expectations from the Middle Ages.
32
  C. Spehan Jaeger’s Ennobling Love  In Search of a Lost 
Sensibility places a key shift in discourses of love in time between the twelfth and fifteenth 
                                                          
29
 C.H. Haskins.  The Twelfth Century Renaissance.  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1927).  
Resistance to Haskins can be found widely, perhaps most famously in Urban T. Holmes, Jr.   
“The Idea of a Twelfth-Century Renaissance.” Speculum.  (Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 1951), pp. 643-
651). 
30
 Dagenais, John, and Margaret Rich Greer.  “Decolonizing the Middle Ages: Introduction.” 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies.   (Vol. 30, Number 3, Fall 2000).  431-448. 
31 Strohm, Paul.  Politique: Languages of Statecraft Between Chaucer and Shakespeare. ( Notre 
Dame, IN:  U of Notre Dame P, 2006).   
32
 Simpson, James.  Reform and Cultural Revolution.  The Oxford English Literary History 
Volume 2: 1350-1547: Reform and Cultural Revolution.  Ed. Jonathan Bate.  (Oxford:  Oxford 
UP, 2004).  Simpson continues to probe the boundaries between the periods in articles such as  
 “The Reformation of Scholarship: A Reply to Debora Shuger,” by The Journal of Medieval and 
Early Modern Studies 42 (2012): 249-68. 
Eggers Misticall Unions 16 
centuries.  Jaeger argues that a previously public, virtuous performance of genrally homosocial 
love for the excellence and virtue of another person changes to a more private, passionate 
heterosocial love.
33
  By identifying how complex generic medieval conventions about lovers’ 
communications become deployed more simply in Renaissance literature, my work follows in 
the tradition established by these scholars.   
It is tempting to view the current emphasis on communication and equality in 
heterosocial love relationships as the result of expanded cultural, legal, and economic status of 
women in modern times, particularly since the latter half of the twentieth century.  A look at the 
literary tradition, however, shows that the idea that lovers have a seemingly mystical ability to 
transcend the difficulties inherent in language begins to circulate widely in twelfth century 
Anglo-Norman England. 
Consent to marry can be fraught with linguistic challenges.  First, verbal consent may be 
forced, using either social or physical coercion. To account for this difficulty, the church 
changed its definition of marriage to include as a necessary component of marriage the inner 
consent of the potential spouses.  Linguistically, this change in policy reflects an awareness of 
potentital disparities between what one says and what one means.  Second, the speaker’s status is 
changed by this speech act from an individual to a corporate – married – identity.34  A lover’s 
relations are determined by this linguistic act.    
As it turns out, the linguistic challenges in establishing consent involve a specific model 
of communication identified now as relational semantics.  Relational semantics can be best 
described in contrast to referential semantics, the model of interpretation circulating most widely 
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in medieval treatises on interpretation.  Referential semantics asserts that communication 
consists primarily of a speaker’s intended message; meaning derives from the intent of the 
speaker.  Meaning is in the hands of the speaker. 
In contrast, relational semantics – appearing in the communcations of the literary lovers 
in this study – highlights the importance the listener plays in constructing – and even 
determining – meaning.  As seen through the lens of relational semantics, the act of 
communication is collaborative.  Relational semantics becomes most clear when a message is 
deeply ambiguous – even radically contingent – and the listener provides meaning by choosing 
to adopt one interpretation by reading in a particular context or contiency.  Literary lovers often 
take advantage of the ambiguity of language to communicate one message to their lovers and 
another to the public.  The disparity between the two meanings highlights a disparity between an 
interior and exterior view of the world.     
A range of influences comes together to influence literary lovers’ communication in 
eleventh and twelfth century England, including the increased importance of consent of lovers,
35
 
the increased notion of private lives,
36
 anxieties about language – brought on in part due to 
increased literacy among laity,
37
 anxieties about gender and particularly about the potential for 
influential women such as Eleanor of Aquitaine to upset traditional gender power dynamics, and 
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an already thriving tradition of literature that Stephen G. Nichols describes as performative 
mimesis, a process whereby audience members and readers are led into experiences that parallel 
those of the characters.
38
  While most of the romances in my study do not manipulate readers 
with the complexity and sophistication characteristic of performative mimesis,
39
 these romances 
offer a model of characters in somewhat realistic settings engaging with relational semantics.   
More specifically, particular twelfth-century permutations of the Tristan and Isolde myth 
establish a series of literary conventions about lovers’ communications.  These initial 
explorations are ambiguous, reflecting cultural ambiguities about the status of communication, 
marriage, and adultery, as these literary conventions form around anxieties about language that 
become prevalent in twelfth century England due in part to changing definitions of consent 
within marriage law.  By the end of the seventeenth century, however, many of these interwoven 
and therefore ambiguous strands have separated into less ambiguous conventions, ones that are 
still in wide circulation today.  The conventions tend to fall into four patterns: 
 
1- Obscure Sender.  The first convention, a contextual critique of language focusing on 
uncertainty about the sender’s identity, includes a lover struggling to interpret a message 
without a clear knowledge of the source of the message.   
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2- Self-involved.  The second convention, a critique of self-involved interpretation focusing 
on discourses, includes a lover struggling to determine whether an interpretation is 
intended by the sender or imagined by the lover.  
3- One mind.  The third convention presents lovers as able to overcome the first two 
challenges due to their often unrealistically privileged knowledge of one another.   
4- Coerced consent.  The fourth convention represents concerns about the idea of lovers 
having privileged communications, raising the possibility that the idea of sharing one 
mind may be merely a means of coercion; this final convention develops into the 
convention that a rake may be reformed, that the lover knows better than the beloved 
what the beloved wants. 
  
Looking at literary representations of lovers in the process of interpreting one another’s 
messages will show the assumptions written into these characters, show how these assumptions 
interact with the assumptions built into other social roles, and show the ideal to which readers 
should aspire.  Literary constructions of social roles are particularly effective barometers and 
mediators of social taste, and the romances in this study, because of their wide readership and 
idealized heroes, are particularly useful in identifying social trends.   
This dissertation argues that important modes of self-definition in the Renaissance draw 
on the linguistic uncertainty in medieval literary constructions of lovers.  Just as in Renaissance 
texts, medieval lovers such as Tristan and Isolde fashion themselves as a “misticall union”:  a 
conglomerate self that shares one mind and erases all distinctions between sender and receiver as 
well as grammatical subject and object.  This unity expresses itself in the lovers’ inexplicable 
ability to interpret correctly the most arbitrary of messages from one another while misleading 
Eggers Misticall Unions 20 
those around them.  Considering Shakespearean lovers in this context suggests how deeply this 
model of self-definition and self-abnegation – as well as its foundation in language – penetrated 
into Elizabethan England and eventually into the work of John Donne.   
 
Chapter One  Introduction 
 The introduction you now read proposes a model of communication in order to explain 
the workings of communications between literary loves in medieval and Renaissance romances 
and places these communications in a broader scholarly context. 
 
 Chapter Two   On the Edge of Reception   
Building on as well as putting pressure upon the ideas of Richard Waswo, this chapter 
raises the issue of relational semantics and just how far it had penetrated into medieval thinking.  
Several fields approached an articulation of relational semantics but were limited in the extent to 
which they could explore the instabilities of language.  The most famous discussion of these 
issues appears in the Nominalist-Realist debate but rhetorical tracts, medieval cognitive models, 
and even definitions of sin draw close to articulating relational semantics. 
 
Chapter Three  Obscure Sender, Obscure Meaning    
This chapter identifies the genre of romance as a site where the linguistic concerns 
discussed in the first chapter can be explored more fully than in the previous chapter’s fields.  By 
focusing primarily on secular human relations, the romance raises possibilities for meaning to be 
determined in negotiation with a sender’s intention.  The medieval debate over consent becomes 
a flash point for uncertainties about language due in no small part to the potential for coerced 
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statements.  Twelfth century romances pick up these concerns and one of the most widely 
circulated of these romances is Tristan and Isolde in its various forms.  Tristan and the works 
that follow in this tradition present situations where intent is inaccessible, leaving receivers to 
construct meaning from available clues.  Works such as Marie de France’s Eliduc, Chaucer’s 
Troilus and Criseyde, and Sidney’s Old Arcadia transmit and explore these anxieties about 
language.  These linguistic instabilities appear at first in the lovers’ own communications; 
presenting uncertainty in lovers – who are assumed to have privileged interpretive insight into 
one another – suggests concerns about language generally.  By the time of Shakespeare, 
however, these interpretive instabilities appear more prominently in suitors who are somehow 
inappropriate as evidence of their unsuitability.  
 
Chapter Four  ‘We Two Being One’: One body, One Soul, One Language       One Mind 
This chapter presents one response to the anxieties about language presented in the 
second chapter.  Lovers are presented as having an almost miraculous insight into one another, 
allowing them to correctly interpret even the most unstable communications between themselves.  
This convention starts to appear at the same time the church begins to emphasize inner consent 
as a defining characteristic in marriage.  The language used to describe the lovers echoes the 
language of the wedding ceremony from the Old Sarum Missal in use since the Norman 
Conquest and continuing unchanged through the Prayer Book of 1552 through the Renaissance.  
These miraculous communications become a defining characteristic of the relationship between 
Tristan and Isolde in its early forms, including Marie de France’s Chevrefoil.  By the time of 
Romeo and Juliet, the idea of lovers sharing one mind is presented as a defining characteristic of 
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proper matches.  This idea of a radical collective identity becomes central to John Donne’s 
poetry. 
Chapter Five  Constructing Senders, Constructing Meaning – Self-involved 
The idea of lovers sharing miraculous interpretive insight into one another is initially 
presented alongside examples of these same lovers – Tristan, for example – clearly imagining 
meanings that have no connection to their beloved sender’s intent.  The fact that Tristan carries 
on entire conversations with a statue of Isolde undermines the certainty of the seemingly 
miraculous communications discussed in the third chapter.  These uncertainties include language 
taken from medieval and Renaissance cognitive models that emphasize a difference between the 
faculties of the fantasy and the imagination.  Works such as Tristan and Isolde and Troilus and 
Criseyde raise concerns about whether the lovers’ miraculous interpretations are merely 
imagined.  Later works such as Old Arcadia and Twelfth Night deploy this discourse differently, 
however, by having proper lovers imagine correctly and improper ones incorrectly.  As such, this 
convention develops from one that destabilizes the convention that lovers share one mind to one 
that reinforces it.  
 
Chapter Six  Willful Misreading   Coerced Consent 
Early works in this tradition, stemming once again from the emphasis on consent in 
Tristan and Isolde, consistently present the idea of attempting to force another to marry in a 
negative light.  Works such as Chaucer’s Franklin’s Tale expand on the legal discourses in 
Tristan as a form of coercion, ignoring a sender’s clear intent in favor of the interpretation 
desired by the receiver.  In later works, however, the conventions of uncertainty and sharing one 
mind come together into the idea that a true lover may know the mind of her beloved better than 
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he knows himself.  All’s Well That Ends Well raises the possibility that the beloved has an inner 
consent not known even to himself.  Later drama continues this in the trope of the rake reformed. 
 
 The overall goal of this work is to explore the development of generic conventions 
portraying extra-linguistic communication between lovers.  As such, it fits within scholarly 
trends that follow the development and transmission of literary conventions and their wider 
societal impact. Any work that attempts to trace how the definitions of love change over time 
owes a debt to Denis DeRouegement’s Love in the Western World and Love Declared:  Essays 
on the Myths of Love.
40
  His discussion of the growth in Western Europe of passionate love 
follows a similar trajectory to my analysis, though DeRougement discusses the Tristan myth 
primarily in archetypal and psychological terms while I will focus more tightly on specific acts 
of communication.   
Lawrence Stone’s Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500-1800 traces the 
development of an ideal marriage that includes compatibility and companionship.  Over time, 
this idea became popular across classes.  Relations in marriage become more egalitarian and 
affectionate.  In fact, one could argue that these new conditions offered the potential for 
importing the discourse of love I discuss in this dissertation into marriage. Given that the 
linguistic conventions used by literary lovers were used to escape the limitations of monogamy, 
it may be surprising that marriage begins to incorporate these ways of speaking.  The potential 
for increased equality in marital discourses opened the potential for much-needed reform.   
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Responding to discussions started by Stone, Frances Dolan’s Marriage and Violence: The 
Early Modern Legacy identifies the roots of unequal modern marital discourses in the early 
modern period.
41
  Dolan focuses on the Protestant and particularly Puritan ideal of the married 
couple becoming one flesh with the male as the head of that collective body.  Dolan then 
discusses the conflicts that arise when one body has two minds, and the subsequent potential for 
violence; after all, “the idea of the self is incompatible with the idea of marriage as fusion.”42   
She identifies connections between Renaissance discourses of marriage as seen in sermons and 
conduct books and the modern Promise Keepers whose men promise to reassume the reins of 
power in their marriages.  Dolan’s analysis provides an excellent companion to this work, as she 
traces the attempts to reconcile the ideal identified in this dissertation with real life practice.  
While using different texts, this dissertation could easily be seen as following in her “presentist 
historicism that attempts to denaturalize present arrangements by identifying their roots in the 
past.” 43   
By tracing the progression of literary motifs across the medieval/Renaissance divide, 
Helen Cooper’s The English Romance in Time: Transforming Motifs from Geoffrey of Monmouth 
to the Death of Shakespeare argues for important precursors to definitions of love that are often 
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discussed as though they originate in the Renaissance or Early Modern period.
44
  Cooper looks to 
romances for these precursors for much the same reason as I do, that the relative generic freedom 
of the form encouraged explorations not often seen in other genres.  She also identifies the 
various Tristan tales as “foundational”45  for female desire.  Cooper’s discussion of love focuses 
primarily on women’s desire rather than communication between the lovers.  As such, this 
dissertation complements her work by expanding the connections that can be traced across these 
periods.   
 
LITERARY TRANSMISSION OF LOVERS SHARING ONE MIND 
 The similarity of modern literary lovers’ experiences to medieval ones is not hard to 
establish, but the transmission between the periods may seem less clear.  Transmission of these 
themes – particularly the central one that lovers share one mind – is not simple or always linear.  
It is not specific tales that are transmitted but the underlying ideas about lovers’ communication; 
manifestations are period-specific.  Attitudes toward the idea of sharing one mind change over 
time as well but the essential ideas continue to circulate.  As such, this model of lovers is not 
trans-historically formalist nor mythic but continues to be reproduced and transformed by the 
cultures that inherit it.   
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 Two qualities of this model for communication suggest that the connection is not merely 
incidental.  First, and most importantly, communication does not work like this on a daily basis.  
Second, these interpretive leaps appear very rarely in literature other than between lovers; when 
they do appear, the abnormality of the insight is highlighted.  Three groups are shown able to 
understand others in this way:  psychics, close family members such as twins or mothers toward 
their children, and lovers.  Of these three types, only one – lovers – is represented as having this 
ability without exceptional psychic powers.   
 By the time of Shakespeare, most of the literary conventions of lovers’ communication 
had stabilized into a few specific forms.  The stabilization of these conventions is important 
because the most widely circulated medieval tales incorporating these ideas are the various forms 
of the Tristan tale, a tale that wanes in importance from Malory’s Morte d’Arthur until Wagner.  
The importance of the Tristan story is not, as Denis DeRougement would have it, that the tale 
itself is foundational to Western European culture.  Rather, I argue that the Tristan tales 
articulate a model of communication between lovers that continues to circulate because many of 
the social conditions that determine heterosexual relations have remained very similar.  Each of 
these conditions helps to form specific literary conventions and will be discussed in later 
chapters. 
 As this dissertation provides a detailed discussion of the formation, transmission, and 
stabilization of these literary conventions up to the poetry of John Donne, this chapter will only 
identify texts that bridge the gap between the literary works of the late seventeenth century 
literature and the late twentieth century.  This chapter is not meant to be exhaustive, either in 
texts or what might be called literary periods.  It merely attempts to provide a plausible case for 
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the continued circulation and popularity of the idea that lovers share a privileged understanding 
of one another.   
 Many eighteenth-century literary works, with their emphasis on rationality, tend to 
deemphasize the miraculous nature of lovers’ communications.  However, the most popular 
romance of the eighteenth century, Samuel Richardson’s Pamela,46 relies upon conventions 
established hundreds of years earlier.  As widely noted, the novel can be seen as Mr. B’s 
education in how to be open to Pamela’s ideas: how to enter into an open conversation with her 
through her letters.  In a passive (perhaps passive aggressive) manner, Pamela convinces Mr. B 
that she is worthy of his love.  More specifically, she convinces him that he is worthy of her 
love; she knows that he will respond to her moral behavior when he doesn’t.  Linguistically, Mr. 
B says he will despoil Pamela and intends to despoil her though he does not.  By showing that 
Pamela knows Mr. B better than he knows himself, Richardson’s novel draws upon the same 
convention that merges power and knowledge in Shakespeare’s All’s Well That Ends Well, where 
Helena convinces Bertram to love her.
47
  As will be discussed in chapter six, All’s Well That 
Ends Well transforms the negative medieval tradition of imposing ones will on another into a 
positive model of reforming the lover by combining it with the idea of lovers sharing one mind – 
or at least with her sharing his.  Rather than drawing on the specifics of Shakespeare’s play, 
Richardson draws upon a shared set of literary conventions still in circulation over one hundred 
years later. 
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 One of the most popular nineteenth-century novels, Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre, 
includes as its climax an act of miraculous communication between Jane and Rochester.  Bronte 
introduces the idea that certain tones should be “audible to the ear of love alone.”48   The 
woman’s failure to hear these words then suggests a failed relationship, a suggestion that pans 
out over the rest of the narrative.  In contrast, Jane notes later in the novel that “Mr. Rochester 
has sometimes read my unspoken thoughts with acumen to me incomprehensible.”49  While this 
example could be explained by a great familiarity, Rochester’s famous cry for her transcends the 
limitations of space and time
50
  Bronte takes great care to establish that this communication 
happens only between two lovers as in tune with one another as Jane and Rochester.   
In fact, one modern television adaptation of Jane Eyre emphasizes the lovers’ remarkable 
communication even more than Bronte.  The 2006 Masterpiece Theater production modernizes 
and expands upon Bronte’s language for Jane in the example above. 
  I do have a friend.  Someone who, when I talk to them,  
they understand everything I say.  They would laugh if  
I told them about Mrs. Reed.  They are so in tune with  
me, they know my thoughts before I think them, certainly  
before I’ve put them into words.51   
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This modern adaptation by Sandy Welch adds the idea that Rochester knows Jane even better 
than she knows herself, much like Helena in All’s Well That Ends Well or Richardson’s Pamela.  
Welch also adds a pair of twins to the screenplay allowing her to introduce the following 
question into the script. “Do you think it so unusual that two minds can be so in tune they can 
communicate across the country?  They can call out to one another across space and time?”52   
 Such idealized, unrealistic representations of love lay the foundation for feelings of 
failure when they are not met, when real people need tell their lovers what they want.  One could 
argue that J. Alfred Prufrock is looking for just the kind of transcendental, extra-linguistic 
connection when he cries out that it is impossible to say just what he means and hopes that he 
will be understood nevertheless.   
 
CIRCULATION OF EARLY ENGLISH TEXTS SHOWING THIS CONVENTION 
 I have chosen the medieval and Renaissance literary works at the heart of this dissertation 
for much the same reason that I have chosen the works above; they were widely circulated and 
therefore had a disproportionate effect upon their culture.  I have worked upon the assumption 
that a wider circulation allowed for a greater impact on society.  Because the patriarchal, 
stratified culture consumed mostly works by white men, most of the works in this dissertation are 
not inclusive in a modern sense.  In no way does this indicate a belief on my part that these 
works of the traditional canon have any more interest than less canonical ones; rather, their wide 
circulation allows me to suggest two things.  First, the values behind the work likely supported 
the dominant discourses of their times.  Second, it is likely that other authors could have been 
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influenced by such widely circulating works even without making direct references to them as 
sources.  
To determine the circulation of these works, I have relied upon the simple method of 
identifying works that have many surviving manuscripts or that we have some evidence of 
continued circulation and/or performance.   Perhaps the best example is the Tristan tale, which 
appears in many manuscripts and many languages.  Thomas’s Anglo-Norman version survives in 
eight fragments from five different manuscripts.  Gottfried’s version survives in eleven 
“complete” manuscripts and in a dozen fragments of others.  The prose Tristan perpetuates this 
circulation, surviving in seventy-five manuscripts as well as eight printed editions from the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.   
 I am generally skeptical when any scholarly work tries to identify specific times that 
themes such as this one – the idea that lovers should share one mind – find their origins.  For this 
reason, I hesitate to identify twelfth century England as such a place and time.  Certainly, 
classical works play an important role in the circulation of ideas about relational semantics.  
Ovid establishes a secret code with his lover allowing them to communicate while she is with her 
husband.  This clearly indicates an awareness of the arbitrariness of communication, but it does 
not move on to suggest an interpretive awareness beyond normal language.   
 Likewise, early Irish tales contain elements that appear in the lovers within later English 
romances.  Early Irish literature placed greater importance on themes of heterosocial love than 
contemporary continental works did.
53
  Great passion is shown in works such as Exile of the Sons 
of Uisliu and well-defined women appear in works such as The Tragic Death of Muirchertach, 
but no communication between the lovers is emphasized.  Even the probable source for the 
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Tristan myth, The Pursuit of Diarmuid and Graine, contains none of the linguistic play between 
the “lovers” that appears in later Tristan tales, nor does it present them as what we would call 
lovers.
54
  Likewise, these works give little attention to the idea of compatibility between lovers 
other than to point out that they should be of similar ages.  Dick Davis argues for an alternate, 
Persian source for the Tristan myth in Fakhraddin Gorgani’s eleventh century Vis and Ramin.55  
In so doing, Davis follows Pierre Gallais’ Tristan et Iseut et son Modèle Persan.56  For the 
purposes of this study, however, the Vis and Ramin does not highlight the same model of 
communication central to the Tristan romances any more than the Irish does. 
 Romances of twelfth-century England, however, devote much time to the communication 
between lovers than either the continental or the Irish tradition even when the tale can be traced 
to an earlier work, as in Tristan from Diarmuid.  Several factors seem to contribute to this shift.  
First, a powerful patroness of the arts comes to power at this time in Eleanor of Acquitaine, 
leading to works with her as dedicatee and, it can be assumed, as a target audience.  Second, 
theologians were beginning to engage in the Nominalist-Realist debates about language.  Third, 
debates over a woman’s consent in marriage began to give greater importance to her wishes.  
These elements combine in the romances, particularly in the communication between men and 
women, reinventing the expectations of love at the time.   
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The expectation that love is private – even to the point of private interpretation – seems to 
gain a foothold in the twelfth century.  As such, these modes of communication anticipate and 
help to form what Anthony Low identifies as John Donne’s reinvention of love.  Donne 
“invented a new kind of private love: idealized, Romantic, mutual, and transcendent in 
feeling.”57  In particular, Low defines this shift as move from “something essentially social and 
feudal to something essentially private and modern.”58  I would like to extend his argument by 
reframing Donne as the realization and epitome of a tradition that has its roots in the twelfth 
century establishment of private, extra-linguistic understanding between lovers.   
Such private communication and its connection to consent in – or outside of – marriage 
also provides an important literary precursor to what Lawrence Stone identifies as companionate 
marriage.
59
  There seems little doubt that, regardless of church ideals of consent, twelfth century 
parents still held greater power than potential spouses in establishing marriages, so I do not take 
exception to Stone’s idea that companionate marriage expands radically in the eighteenth 
century.  I would argue, however, that this change, brought about by shifting economic 
conditions in the eighteenth century, sees important precursors in medieval lovers.  The fact that 
these lovers often stand outside traditional marriage merely reinforces the idea that marriage 
without love is somehow lacking.  Furthermore, I would highlight Stone’s assertion that the 
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transfer of power from parents to spouses had an equalizing effect upon relations between 
husband and wife. 
60
 
The twelfth century romances central to this dissertation give equal importance to senders 
and receivers of messages.  This less-gendered potential equality does not address social 
inequities between lovers but it at least presents equal roles as an ideal.  Such interpretive 
equality complicates the idea that the traditions of courtly love as identified by C.S. Lewis force 
the woman into the position of a passive object of affection.
61
  However, having a privileged 
relationship with only one other person becomes a different form of social containment, 
enforcing emotional – if not necessarily marital – monogamy.   
It is not within the scope of this dissertation to offer an answer as to why these particular 
manifestations of lovers’ communications have continued to exert such a powerful hold for such 
a long time.  My goal is to identify the conditions in the twelfth century that helped produce 
these conventions and the conditions that led to their relative stabilization in the seventeenth 
century.  Other potentially fruitful future explorations of this theme might consider two general 
conditions shared by the twelfth and the late twentieth centuries.  First, both periods are 
produced by cultures where a clear disparity of economic and political power exists between men 
and women, even as the ideal communication between lovers implies equality.  Second, both 
periods reflect anxieties where this status quo is challenged in ways that allow women to be 
heard.  In the twelfth century, women were allowed greater power to withhold consent; in the 
1980’s, women’s greater economic power offered them greater self-determination and political 
voice.  The important characteristic of the change in women’s status is that the change is in 
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relation to men.  It has been a commonplace that the Anglo-Saxon period was a golden age for 
medieval women but scholars such as Jennifer Ward have challenged this position.
62
  If these 
conditions are indeed central to the circulation of discourses of privileged communication 
between lovers, then one potentially fruitful area of exploration might be in American literature 
during the 1920’s, when women earned suffrage, and the 1940’s, when women entered the 
workplace in new ways due to the war . 
Considered together, these discourses define love in ways that are unrealistic and 
mutually exclusive.  If two lovers are supposed to share one mind, how is it possible for the lover 
to know his beloved better than she knows herself?  Since not sharing one mind indicates 
inappropriateness in love, how does one address a “failed” love?  When compared to these 
literary conventions, real life would seem to be an exercise in disappointment.  The lovers in this 
study may provide us with answers, but tragedy is must more appealing on the stage than it is in 
real life. 
 
CONSIDERING OTHER POTENTIAL LENSES 
The discourse at the heart of this dissertation has the potential – both good and bad – to 
obscure important differences in gender, class, race, and religion.  Any discourse that implies 
some sort of equality between people in different conditions opens the potential for such equality 
to be accepted.  But it also suggests that all relationships and the people in them should be 
judged by a model that is now white, middle-class, heterosexual, and Christian.   
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Because this dissertation identifies the literary construction of a mode of communication 
that blurs the relative power available based on gender, it may give the impression that this 
indicates a real shift in power relations between the genders, particularly in marriage.  First, it is 
important to note that although these medieval and Renaissance literary lovers adopt marital 
discourse, they are often not married as they engage in their shared communications.  Second, 
these are literary conventions, and while they convey values and/or ideals, we have little 
indication that they were considered any more realistic than modern movies about love.   
Like modern movies, however, early romances circulate these ideas and help to provide a 
model of love to which one can aspire, defining success or happiness in love/marriage by 
establishing a standard, if an unrealistic one.  David R. Shumway points out, “the fact that 
romance narratives are usually consumed as entertainment and often explicitly regarded as 
fantasy does not limit the degree to which readers are likely to accept them as true,… this 
skepticism may not prevent a repeated pattern found in these texts from functioning as a 
model.”63  One could argue readers are encouraged to engage in a reading process not unlike the 
one the lovers share, whereby one becomes the other.  Shumway describes the reading process 
by noting how readers “will live with and through the characters for the duration of the narrative.  
In surrendering to the story, the reader or viewer typically accepts the point or points of 
identification that the text offers.  So readers, male or female, of Jane Eyre usually identify much 
more with Jane, the narrator and protagonist, than with any of the other characters.”64 When one 
combines this with current scholarship indicating that happiness is relative, it is possible that 
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repeated exposure to these unrealistic discourses of communication might lead to dissatisfaction 
with the reality of one’s relationship.65  The idea that couples should strive for both equality and 
intimacy, as noted by Stephanie Coontz, would seem to find its roots and ideals in the idea of a 
privileged communication between lovers.
66
   
Much as this dissertation does not explicitly trace the real conditions of gender equality, 
it does not explicitly emphasize the real conditions of class.  As with gender, the mode of 
communication I discuss holds the potential for radically leveling members of different classes.  
Rarely, however, is it deployed this way.  Most often, members of different classes are shown to 
be incorrectly imagining insight into the ones they love.  Stone and others associate the linking 
of romantic love and marriage to the rise of the bourgeoisie.  Shumway argues that by the latter 
half of the twentieth century, the bourgeoisie have reverted to aristocratic patterns of marriage 
for financial gain, with romantic love and particularly intimacy being promoted among the petite 
bourgeoisie and professional managerial class.
67
  Such a widely circulating discourse would have 
circulated across class lines both in marriage and in love. 
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Most of the modern American constructions of lovers discussed in this dissertation 
similarly erase or ignore differences in religion.  The differences between Protestant, Jewish, 
Muslim, and Catholic marriage practices are most often represented in the past fifty years as 
problems to be overcome in the face of a couple’s compatibility, such as in My Big Fat Greek 
Wedding,
68
 or simply ignored, as in the largely secular When Harry Met Sally.
69
  One of the 
primary conflicts arises, however, when a particular religious group looks to maintain 
hierarchical relations between the sexes or it seeks to limit interfaith marriage.   
Defining a successful relationship by modes of communication – an extension of the 
consent debate – rather than consummation opens the door to same-sex relationships being 
represented as ideal.  This is a field that I would love to see explored further, looking at same-sex 
courtship in modern cinema.  With no potential for same-sex marriage in the Middle Ages, the 
idea of same-sex mutual consent did not register in the same way.  George Chauncey argues that 
a transformation in how good relationships are defined is occurring in the twenty-first century, 
with increased interest in same-sex marriages.
70
  Despite the potential for a discourse of radical 
compatibility to open doors for same-sex relationships, many of the literary lovers discussed in 
this dissertation are heteronormative, often verging on homophobic.  Applying this literary 
construct to members of the same sex has the potential, however, to simplify or misapply gender 
roles and ignore the discrimination faced by those in same-sex relationships.   
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There is an equal danger when one tries to apply this ideal – an ideal of love with roots in 
twelfth-century England between nobles of largely the same race – to other ethnic groups.  Ann 
DuCille argues that love and marriage appear differently in films and novels by African 
Americans because of the impact of slavery and oppression.
71
  She highlights in particular the 
disparity between the promises of the marriage ideal and the social conditions that make it 
unlikely for many black Americans.  We have to be careful not to merely slap a coat of paint on 
a Barbie and assume that Snow White and “Snow Black” are the same.  Medieval discussions of 
“other races” are in any case vague, such as in Horn when Swedes are referred to as Saracens.   
All of these fields offer vistas for future scholarship, determining how deep – if at all – 
the idea of two people becoming one has penetrated into the various communities above.  Gender 
and class provide the primary backdrops for this analysis, one that brings into the foreground 
language and how it defines how we interact with the world.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
ON THE EDGE OF RECEPTION 
Amor conduce noi ad una morte. 
[Love led the two of us unto one life and death] 
- Francesca in Dante’s Inferno 72 
 
 Changes in the church’s attitudes towards consent and marriage in twelfth-century 
England help establish conditions that highlight the importance of listeners in establishing the 
meaning or meanings of communications.  By placing an emphasis on the inward consent of the 
betrothed rather than the will of his or her parents, church law gave voice to those who might 
previously have been ignored.  Church law, however, did not entirely supplant centuries of legal 
precedents that valued only the voice of the father.  Given the continuing power of the parents, 
the potential for a disparity between the choice of the child and the choice of the father, and 
limited access for the youth to communicate freely, conditions were ripe for the youth to use one 
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phrase to communicate one message – in a clandestine manner – to each other and a different 
meaning to their guardians.   
 Understanding the impact of these changes on language and identity becomes clearer 
once one isolates each step in the process of communication.  Describing the process, however, 
poses some obstacles, as neither medieval nor modern linguistics highlight perfectly the key 
steps.  The problems with applying the theoretical linguistics of the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance stem primarily from an almost universal neo-Platonic understanding of language 
and the search for certainty at the heart of that mindset.   
 The problems with applying modern linguistic models, other than anachronism, stem 
from modern assumptions about communications as being independent of human relations.
73
  
More specifically, the most prominent modern models of linguistics erase important 
interpersonal dynamics in order to present the most broadly applicable model.
74
  Interpersonal 
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dynamics, however, play an inordinately important role in understanding communications in 
these romances.   
 In lovers’ communications, relational semantics are literally relational: defined by and 
defining the relationship.
75
  While every step in every act of communication reflects – perhaps 
determines – the identity of the participants, we will focus on steps emphasizing the importance 
of reception in determining meaning. 
 Looking closely at the development of literary representations of the expectation that 
lovers should share privileged communications with one another offers insight into the 
development of interiority.  Interiority implies a distinction between one character’s interior 
perceptions of the world in contrast to the perceptions of the larger community.  Self-image 
offers one door to interiority.  Literary lovers work with the knowledge that their love offers 
them a shared interiority; they know of their identities as lovers while others do not.   
  
 Establishing terms.  My goal here is to articulate explicitly the tacit assumptions about 
communication that appear in literary works from the medieval and early modern periods.  As 
noted before, no clear articulation of relational semantics exists from the period we are 
discussing, so I would like to propose a vocabulary of modern terms to explain the interpretive 
framework within which I will be considering these literary texts.  This section will expand upon 
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a seven-step model.  While these steps may seem obvious, making sure to isolate each will help 
in the analyses to follow. 
1- Intended speech-act conceived   
2- Articulation or encoding of intention into speech-act 
3- Reception of speech-act (sound or text; assumption of intent –my emphasis) 
4- Decoding speech-act via a shared code (or codes-my emphasis) 
5- Receiver reacts, activating or indicating the message as it was received 
6- Sender confirms meaning(s) to intended audience(s)  
7- (these last steps continue, serving as a continuing series of communications) 
 
Intention.  The working assumption in communication is that the speech-act is intended 
to communicate something to another person.  This step may seem both obvious and certain, but 
considering this element of communication as its own step opens the door to examining 
previously underexplored instabilities.  First, the sender may not know his own mind.  Second, 
the sender’s intentions may change over time.  Third, the sender conceives of his intentions in 
relation to the anticipated response from the receiver. 
Early English literary characters, particularly those in medieval texts, are analyzed often 
in ways that deemphasize these potential instabilities.  Many modern analyses are still informed 
by the notion that medieval literary characters and perhaps even people did not exhibit 
interiority.
76
  Humoral models also suggest a potentially stable self, and these ideas circulate 
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widely from ancient times through the Middle Ages and Renaissance.
77
 Finally, allegorical 
understandings of the self literally make public and exterior the feelings and thoughts that 
modern people consider to be interior.
78
  In contrast, analysis of modern literary works includes 
the commonplace gesture of examining disparities between a character’s conscious actions and 
what might be called his subconscious.  Subconscious motivations can be difficult to detect in 
texts that do not highlight interior thoughts clearly enough to show a disparity between these 
thoughts and actions that run counter to these intentions.  As seen in Abelard’s discussion of 
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intent, there were medieval precedents for such a disparity, and the presence of canon law that 
accounts for a lack of internal consent suggests that ideas of concealed intentions circulated 
outside theological circles as well.
79
   
The expression of an idea is linked to the assertion of self into the world; one articulates 
identity through communications.
80
  One’s self concept filters and frames the desires to be 
articulated, the assertions to be made, and the ideas to explore.  Each speech act becomes an 
articulation of the self.   Each speech act also works with an assumed audience or audiences, 
imagined by the sender.  Targeting this audience involves anticipating how to best communicate 
the desired message, including the best code or codes.  Most importantly, imagining how to best 
communicate one’s ideas to these audiences requires the sender to define a relationship between 
him- or herself and the audience(s).  As such, each speech act is an act of attempted self-
definition.   
Articulation into a code.  As noted before, the sender must choose a code into which he 
or she wishes to convey the intended message.  The code must be known by the intended 
audience.  For a broader audience, a widely used code should be used.  Many of the 
communications between lovers must be clandestine, however, and therefore a private code 
would allow particular readers to understand while others do not.  The adoption of a particular 
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code, as seen in Robert Le Page’s discussion of code-switching,81 is an act of self-representation 
that conveys group identity.
82
  In addition to including the desired audiences, this adoption of a 
code may exclude outsiders.  Basil Bernstein’s discussion of restricted codes as a means of 
excluding outsiders and establishing personal identity, while originally used to define differences 
in language was used by different socio-economic classes, offers a lens for considering how 
presented to consider the formation of identity through specific modes of speech. 
83
  The use of 
public and private codes applies within the context of lovers in that a message can carry one 
meaning in the commonly accepted, public, elaborated code while at the same time carrying a 
different message in the privately adopted, restricted code.  The primary difference is that the 
community established by the restricted code numbers only two members.   
Decoding of intended message via a shared code or codes.  The audience for any speech 
act assumes that someone is attempting to convey an intended meaning; essentially, it is not 
meaningless noise.  The attempt to determine intent appears centrally in medieval discussions of 
language.  Determining the sender’s identity  – and the inherent assessment of character  – plays 
an important role in interpreting any messages.  Determining the intended audience is also 
paramount, particularly if the intended audience is not the one attempting to interpret the 
message.   
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In addition to allowing for communication, the ability to decode correctly the message 
from another suggests the potential for a shared group identity, though such an identity-group 
may be so large as to be the entirely of those who speak English.  This identification helps to 
establish one’s status in society.  Merely decoding and replying can be, on a minor scale, an 
inexplicit performative in the sense that the statement’s truth-value judgment may be less 
important than how, generating a response, it changes one’s status in society.84  As identified by 
J.L. Austin, the most famous of performative speech-acts is when a celebrant announces “You 
are now husband and wife.”  This statement changes the status of the betrothed but is not 
essentially true or false in that this status may eventually change.  In this case, the response is the 
key, making the perlocuationary act itself performative.    
Even an almost uselessly large group such as “English speakers,” however, has subsets; 
vocabulary and accent may differentiate Nigerian English from Jamaican English, for instance.
85
  
For the purposes of my argument, an even more limited group identity would be indicated by a 
vocabulary shared by two.  This decoding, however, may be partially or entirely unrelated to the 
intended message.  This disparity (the term “error” seeming to go against the model of linguistics 
seen in the romances) can have at its root either an incompleteness in the message or the 
application of a code other than the one that was intended.   
Any message includes some incompleteness or imprecision.  As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the medieval thinkers identified this contingency.  The modern framework for 
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discussing such imprecision draws heavily on Derrida’s notion of difference (with an a).86  
Differance combines the two notions of difference, where one word’s meaning can only be 
established via opposition to other words (rather than to any essential presence), and deferral, 
where meaning is always in a process of establishing differences and therefore can never truly be 
stable or certain.
87
  Derrida critiques, however, the idea of certainty rather than exploring real 
world communications; as such, he makes philosophical observations.    
In contrast, the literary works in this study explore attempts to bridge these interpretive 
gaps.  The most useful vocabulary for exploring this process comes from Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and Wolfgang Iser.
88
  Gadamer’s model incorporates the imprecision of language by stating that 
one must first accept the idea that the result of a true conversation is unknown.  “No one knows 
in advance what will come out of a conversation.”89  This involves the acknowledgment that the 
speaker does not know everything, and that there is a “horizon” beyond which the speaker’s 
knowledge does not extend.  “In order to be able to ask, one must want to know, and that means 
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knowing that one does not know”,90  or that there is a horizon beyond which one’s knowledge 
does not extend.  A conversation, then, involves “fusing the horizons” of the two participants to 
form a larger, single “horizon of interpretation,”91 that of the conversation.  “The fusion of 
horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language.” 92  This 
fusion is not immediate.  Rather, it is on ongoing process of encountering the other person’s 
ideas and growing gradually closer to that intended meaning even as that meaning may change as 
the person’s ideas shift.  “All writing is a kind of alienated speech, and its signs need to be 
transformed back into speech and meaning.  Because the meaning has undergone a kind of self 
alienation through being written down, this transformation back is the real hermeneutical task”.93  
In this way, Gadamer provides a vocabulary for the deferred nature of language as well as the 
uncertain, negotiated qualities of communication. 
The process of fusing these horizons may best be described as using the imagination to 
fill interpretive gaps, as described by Wolfgang Iser.  Iser discusses primarily the reading of texts 
in absence of a physically present sender and the ability to receive direct signals as to the 
similarity between the sender’s intent and the receiver’s interpretation.  “The activity of reading 
can be characterized as a sort of kaleidoscope of perspectives, preintentions, recollections.  Every 
sentence contains a preview of the next and forms a kind of viewfinder for what is to come; and 
this in turn changes the “preview” and so becomes a “viewfinder” for what has been read.94  
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Particularly when texts present us with gap, “the opportunity is given to us to bring into play our 
own faculty for establishing connections - for filling in the gaps left by the text itself.”95   We fill 
in the gaps using our knowledge of generic and linguistic conventions but there exists the 
potential for disparities. 
Confirmation or denial of interpretation. The last three steps outlined above involve the 
continuing process of attempting to determine how closely the receiver’s interpretation matches 
the sender’s intention.  This can occur in a few different ways.   
a- Silence implies consent.  Lacking any indication that the receiver’s response was 
wrong, the receiver will continue as though the message were transmitted clearly. 
b- Reply clarifies code.  In a conversation, the receiver replies to the message; if there 
has been any misunderstanding, the sender can then clarify the original intent.   
a. Public or private code.  Troubles may arise when one person assumes a 
private meaning and another assumes a public one. 
c- Extra-linguistic signal gesture toward a meaning.  If the sender is not present, then 
one is limited to other signals, either within the text or in the broader context.  If these 
do not match, then one should alter one’s interpretation. 
The tools we use to anticipate the text are “first, a repertoire of familiar literary patterns and 
recurrent literary themes, together with allusions to familiar social and historical contexts; 
second, techniques or strategies used to set the familiar against the unfamiliar.”96   
 One of the important contexts at our disposal is that of the literary conventions that teach 
readers how to anticipate readings and then alter them in the face of new evidence.  When one 
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does not alter in the face of contradictory evidence, interpretations grow further from an act of 
communication and grow closer to a narcissistic act of imagination.  This acknowledgement of a 
disparity between an outer reality and an interior one has been seen as the characteristic of 
interiority, and it will appear in many of the literary works in this study.  Described in medieval 
cognitive terms, imaginary intended messages overwhelm contrary evidence available to the 
sense (processed by the fantasia).
97
   
  
Not surprisingly, each of these steps holds the potential for disparities to arise between 
sender and receiver(s).  Perhaps more surprising is that many of the widely circulating early 
English texts explore these disparities in the communications between lovers.  Each remaining 
chapter in this study highlights one potential for misinterpretation as seen in the literary lovers.  
The third chapter focuses on the absence of a sender and how this can affect interpretation.  The 
fourth chapter explores the literary fiction of a privileged interpretive relationship between lovers 
that bypasses all of the imprecision in language.  The fifth chapter focuses on filling interpretive 
gaps and then failing to reassess in the face of new information.  Finally, the sixth chapter 
focuses on the dangerous idea that it is romantic for one person to coerce another into consent 
despite a clear rejection.  
 
Lovers provide an excellent testing ground for communications because love is 
contingent and performative.  It has become a commonplace notion that lovers have privileged 
insight into one another.  Relationships between lovers are emotionally contingent, both in 
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courtship and in maintenance.  In courtship, one looks for signals of acceptance or rejection, and 
these signals may involve an ongoing process of negotiation.  Despite the fairytale convention of 
living happily ever after, attaining consent is not the end point for this process; while the default 
position becomes consent within a relationship, this consent may be withdrawn in the face of 
other events or feelings. 
The performative element of communication becomes more prevalent between lovers 
when one is trying to move the other into consent.
98
  If consent is offered, the lovers’ statuses – 
and identity – change, even if only privately.  In some cases, no clear response is interpreted as 
consent, when a lover sees a desired answer.  In other cases, wishful thinking colors a lover’s 
response to clear rejections, leading to misinterpretations.   
 There is some evidence that suggests people in love are more sensitive than non-lovers to 
those they love (or, perhaps, desire).   When feeling desire, the body produces a variety of 
chemicals that help the lover to bond to the beloved.
99
  The combination of dopamine, 
norepinephrine, and phenylethylamine inspires feelings of bliss and encourages the lover to 
imprint all of the tiniest details of the beloved in the mind of the lover.  In addition, the pupils 
dilate, allowing for greater reception of details.  One benefit in communication between lovers 
would be in paralinguistics, the indirect element of communication conveyed through gesture 
and tone.  A greater sensitivity to minimal signals would allow lovers a code to consider when 
trying to interpret message.  One potential hindrance to lovers would be the chemical 
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reinforcement from a neutral or negative verbal response perceived as a confirmation; this would 
encourage wishful thinking.   
 Early English literary texts present lovers as behaving as though under the influence of 
these reactions even though the medical reasons were unclear.  Sidney expresses an awareness of 
heightened sensitivity in his Old Arcadia, noting that “Desire holds the senses open, and a 
lover’s conceit is very quick” (101).100  The behavior of Tristan and Isolde after they take the 
potion follow very closely the symptoms of an influx of dopamine, norepinephrine, and 
phenylethylamine.  The fading of the potion’s response shows astute observation of human 
behavior, in that a different set of chemicals takes over – often around seven years – for long-
term commitment.  Oxytocin, released in orgasm, and vasopressin seem to encourage monogamy 
but also interfere with the neural pathways of dopamine and norepinephrine.  This leads to a 
lessening of the emotional highs, replaced by a more chemically sedate response and perhaps, 
less attentiveness to paralinguistic detail.   
 These discussions of language overlook the differences that the status of men and women 
bring to the table in their interpretations.  Linguists such as Robin Lakoff have tried to identify 
modern linguistic trends and the impact of gender on those trends.
101
  Studies of the Asantee 
(Ashanti) tribe in Ghana, however, seem to confirm these assertions as the men adopt more 
passive roles as they attempt to curry favor with the matrilineal powers-that-be.   
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 More specific to the early English romances, however, is that the linguistic patterns of the 
ideal relationship support an equal role in creating a message and in receiving it.  Leveling the 
interpretive power of the sender and the receiver offers more control to those who were 
traditionally forced to listen and accept rather than assert.  This equality comes to a head in the 
notion of a shared linguistic group of two and will be discussed in the chapter on “one mind.” 
 Despite the lack of a clear theoretical framework or vocabulary, the early English literary 
works in this study indicate a working knowledge of the mind, the body in love, and even 
relational semantics.  While most of the early English theoretical thinkers were engaged in the 
search for stable certainties, the literary tradition moved in the opposite direction, exploring 
presenting interpretive fissures in ways that may have predated our modern understandings of 
language and love. 
 
MEDIEVAL ANXIETIES ABOUT LINGUISTIC INSTABILITY 
La bufera infernal, che mai non resta, 
Mena li spirit con la sua rapina;  
Voltando e percotendo li molesta. 
Quando giugon davanti a la ruina, 
Quivi le strida, il compianto, il lament. 
 
[The hellish hurricane, which never rests 
Drives on the spirits with its violence; 
Wheeling and pounding, it harasses them. 
When they come up against the ruined slope, 
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Then there are cries and wailing and lament.] 
- The fate of lovers in Dante’s Inferno102  
 
 The intellectual climate in twelfth-century England was primed for the articulation of 
relational semantics, but no clear articulation of these ideas was made.  Thinkers in various fields 
approached the topic in ways that if followed to their logical conclusions would lead to the idea 
that language is inherently unstable.  Rhetoricians took great pains to account for different 
receptions from different audiences.  Sign theorists acknowledged that human language relies 
upon socially agreed upon conventions.  Translators debated whether translations should be 
word-for-word or sense-for-sense.  And, in the Nominalist-Realist debate, theologians explored 
Biblical language in ways that raised potentially radical conclusions.  Each of these fields drew 
perilously close to what is now called relational semantics – the understanding that a reader or 
listener contributes to the meaning of any writing or speech.  As we will explore in this chapter, 
however, none of these fields took this extra step and articulated what might be described as a 
modern understanding of relational semantics. 
 Drawing close to relational semantics could literally be perilous in the period discussed 
because the punishments available to medieval authorities were impressively intimidating, as 
seen in the description from Dante.  The selection from Dante portrays frightening – eternal – 
fates believed to await those like Francesca who had sinned against God.  In addition to lovers 
like Francesca, who are punished for placing their individual perspectives above all, abusers of 
                                                          
102
 Alighieri, Dante.  Inferno.  Trans. Allen Mandelbaum.  (New York: Bantam, 1980), V.31-35.   
While the specifics of Dante’s vision of Inferno were not circulating until, of course, he 
composed the poem, similarly grisly images were associated in earlier visions of Hell as well. 
Eggers Misticall Unions 55 
language, most notably flatterers, spend an eternity face down in excrement, deep in the eighth 
circle of Hell, The price for transgressions might easily have deterred those who wanted to raise 
orthodox positions such as the potentially destabilizing notion that speakers do not control the 
meaning of their words.
103
  Institutions, after all, function primarily as speakers and hope to have 
listeners accept intended meanings.   
 Deterrence is not the only explanation, of course.  Some ideas become so widely accepted 
in societies that they are rarely, if ever, examined closely.
104
  Anselm of Canterbury’s 
exploration of the nature of sin in Cur Deus Homo provided the theological foundation for a 
radically expanded role of the individual in his or her salvation, yet his Ontological Proof of the 
existence of God is limited by widely shared assumptions.    
1. God is a being than which no greater can be thought. 
2. The idea of God exists in the mind. 
3. A being which exists both in the mind and in reality is greater than a being that exists 
only in the mind. 
4. If God only exists in the mind, then we can conceive of a greater being—that which 
exists in reality. 
5. We cannot be imagining something that is greater than God. 
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6. Therefore, God exists.105 
This argument depends on several widely held social assumptions, all of which were attacked by 
Gaunilo Marmoutiers.
106
  The first assumption is that something exists beyond the collective 
experience of humans.  Here, Anselm works with the socially accepted idea that individually 
faulty perceptions mean that collective perceptions are equally faulty.  The second socially 
accepted assumption defines that which is outside human experience is greater.  The third 
socially held assumption is that if something is outside human experience and therefore greater – 
both unproven – then that greater outside thing is “God.”  While the proof does not state 
explicitly the characteristics of God other than greatness, using the word God carries 
connotations that match socially constructed ideas of God as revealed in the Bible and other 
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religious texts.
107
  Anselm’s argument is not flawed because he is concerned about punishments; 
rather, his argument seeks to reaffirm an internalized, foundational notion of his society.   
 Deterrence and the affirmation of social ideals, however, do not fully explain the absence 
of relational semantics in all of these fields.  When one considers the goals of these thinkers, it 
becomes clear that few were interested in exploring the idea that language itself is a negotiation 
between sender and receiver.  For one, each thinker was using language to convey an intended 
meaning; if language was a negotiation between sender and receiver, this would open their own 
texts to unintended interpretations.  It is more important to consider the goals of these texts.   
Philosophical explorations on language sought to explore the nature of God (or reality) rather 
than to question the idea of certainty in God.  Texts on translation considered how best to convey 
one’s ideas or those of the one’s religion.  Rhetorical texts were designed to teach how to 
effectively convey meaning, not to consider the idea that meaning might be a negotiated process.  
Medical discussions of the mind were more interested in explaining how it worked, how it could 
be flawed, and how to repair these flaws.  If these thinkers could meet their goal without 
extending the logic of their arguments beyond these goals, we can hardly fault them for it.   
 
 By asserting the position that none of these traditionally scholarly fields fully articulates 
the importance of the receiver in determining meaning,
108
 this chapter enters into a debate over 
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the relationship between nominalism and literature.  Most participants in what is called the 
Nominalist-Realist debate can be split into two camps.  In their simplest forms, Nominalists 
argued for the importance of individual instances of all things, while Realists argued that the 
physical properties of individual things were mere accidental qualities, flawed realizations of 
Platonic ideals.  Scholars in one camp have proposed that nominalism had profound effects on 
English literature, particularly in the fourteenth century works of Chaucer since a direct 
transmission of nominalist ideas could be traced from Chaucer’s nominalist-leaning friend, 
Ralph Strode.
109
  Sheila Delany exemplifies this position, arguing that Chaucer abandons 
allegory for individuated characters because he knows nominalist ideas on the radical 
contingency of the universe.
110
  A more radical position has been staked out by scholars such as 
J. Stephen Russell, who describes both Ockham and Chaucer exhibiting knowledge of language 
that nearly approximates what we would now identify as Saussurean linguistics.
111
  This position 
often identifies nominalism as a radical interpretive split from the neo-Platonic Realist position 
on language.  Holly Wallace Boucher explicitly applies the split term of signifier and signified as 
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well as the idea of an infinitely regressing signifier in her analysis of the subject.
112
  Frederic 
Jameson also connects this understanding of nominalism to Derrida in Postmodernism:  or the 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.
113
 Daniel Heller-Roazen applies a similar mode of analysis to 
the Roman de la Rose, tracing elements of scholastic ideas about contingency within the text.
114
 
 Another camp is more cautious about the direct application of radical nominalist ideas to 
the interpretation of medieval literary texts.  Richard J. Utz identifies three potential relationships 
between nominalism and literature:  direct nominalist influence, late-medieval Zeitgeist, and 
modern interpretations that seek to equate medieval nominalism with modern theories, arguing 
that the second is most promising.
115
  Utz is particularly critical of what he sees as an 
anachronistic application of modern linguistics to these medieval literary texts .
116
  Stephen Penn 
argues that many analyses suffer from a misinterpretation of nominalism, particularly the notions 
that nominalism was a radical break from previous medieval philosophers and that this radical 
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break was almost as thorough a critique of language as Jacques Derrida’s.117  As Stephen Penn 
notes, Paul de Man argues that rhetoric, because it was concerned primarily with language itself, 
“was always a potential threat to the stability of the medieval system of knowledge… Provided 
[rhetoric] was kept subordinate to grammar and logic, knowledge remained secure.  When, 
however, discourse itself became the focus of inquiry, all claims of certainty were lost.”118  Penn 
acknowledges the radical potential of these ideas but emphasizes that medieval thinkers such as 
Ockham explore not the limitations of God but of human action.  
 I enter into this debate with a foot in each camp.  Like the second camp, I am not 
convinced that the theoretical models from the twelfth to sixteenth centuries articulate a clear 
understanding of what we would identify as relational semantics and its extension, 
deconstructionism.  However, the medieval literary tradition does adopt a radical position in 
relation to language and contingency due to a range of sociopolitical influences that become 
more prevalent from the twelfth century on in England, including changes in marriage law on 
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consent as wells as wider literacy amond the laity.
119
  As such, these literary texts articulate and 
circulate a cultural skepticism in anticipation of theoretical articulation.
120
  As I will discuss in 
the next chapter, literary texts are more open to radical explorations of language because they do 
not have as their goals the explanation of contingency, the establishment of provisions to limit 
misunderstandings, or the assessment of truth-value.   
  
  Relational semantics is the understanding that any act of communication involves more 
than merely decoding the intent of the sender; meaning is at least partly constructed by the 
listener as well.  “What a text means,” therefore, does not reside solely in the sender’s intent.  
This is more radical than it might at first seem, since it does not mean merely that the listener has 
partly or wrongly interpreted a message; it is more like Schrodinger’s cat, living in two (or more) 
states at once.  This is far more indeterminate than having one text that has different encoded 
messages within it.     
A clear articulation of relational semantics did not appear until Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
On the Nature of Language in 1916.  Relational semantics defines language as the interaction 
between a speaker, code, and listener.
121
  Meaning comes from the interaction of all three 
                                                          
119
 Clanchy, M.T. From Memory to Written Record:  England 1066-1307.  (Oxford:  Blackwell, 
1979). 
 
120
 As such, I will be tacitly agreeing with the methodology of Richard Waswo, if not his precise 
conclusions or representations of medieval philosophers.  Waswo, Richard.  Language and 
Meaning In The Renaissance.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1987. 
121
 For clarity, I will use the term speaker and listener though the ideas apply equally well for 
written texts. 
Eggers Misticall Unions 62 
elements.  The speaker chooses specific words within a code to convey his intent.  Assuming the 
listener shares this code, she then uses her understanding of the code to form an interpretation of 
the speaker’s words.  The goal in this simple scenario is for the listener to understand what the 
speaker intended.
122
   
As noted earlier on page 42, a more comprehensive model for effective communication 
would involve seven steps rather than the three implied by Saussure.  The third step – reception – 
opens the door to variant interpretations.  The potential inherent in using dual codes offers dual 
meanings, often to different audiences; this is characteristic of how many of the lovers in 
medieval romances communicate their affections secretly.  This is also the first kind of multiple 
interpretations that usually come to mind, as they are really just a variation on understanding the 
sender’s intent(s).   
The fourth and fifth steps are only possible if the sender and the receiver are in each 
other’s presence or if the two engage in a sustained correspondence.  These steps build upon 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s idea that a true conversation is interactive, with all participants being 
open to alternate interpretations and potential corrections.
123
  Mikhail Bakhtin incorporates a 
similar understanding of the interactive qualities of communication, noting that speech-acts are 
inherently responsive, and made with the expectation of a response.
124
  The sender’s 
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confirmation is usually only mentioned when there is an interpretation that differs clearly from 
the sender’s intent; silence in the face of a receiver’s response is generally considered consent.  
Within the tradition of lovers sharing one mind, responses that silence the beloved are most often 
portrayed in a negative light. 
 The fourth and fifth steps are not often considered when discussing communications, but 
they provide an especially important framework for understanding the kinds of variant 
communications seen in medieval romances and how these early fictional works explore – and in 
some ways define ways of thinking about – relational semantics.  Each speech act is both 
performative – confirming or denying the status and identity of the sender – AND perlocutionary 
– proposing a continuation or change in status.  The consent of a beloved is both performative 
and perlocutionary. 
 Because of its impact on all future speech-acts, a speech-act considered as continuum has 
greater potential for being what J.L. Austin defines as performative, changing one’s status in 
society.  When combined with the implied consent in silence (stage five), this kind of 
communication becomes potentially important in relationships that are both performative and 
require consent:  marriage or affairs.  Both are central to medieval romances and will be 
discussed in greater detail throughout this dissertation.
125
  Desire – important in romances – 
colors reception of speech-acts and highlights the potential conflict between what different 
participants want particular texts to mean.    
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Sometimes, however, situations arise where that intent cannot be confirmed by the 
listener.  The most common situation is with the written word, where the speaker (writer) is 
absent.  One popular example of this is if we encounter a piece of paper with only this one word: 
POLISH.  Without external clues of syntax, context, or clarification by the writer, the intent and 
therefore meaning is unavailable.  Any meaning therefore is determined by the listener/reader.  
This is not strictly speaking communication.  A sense of connection between the sender and the 
receiver may be imagined but any match between the imagined meaning and the intended 
meaning is coincidental.
126
   
At the time the medieval romances were written, society was making the transition to a 
more widely literate culture,
127
 a transition that would be accelerated by the printing press.  With 
a greater percentage of the population encountering the textual difficulty of determining the 
intent of an absent writer, a greater interest in linguistic uncertainty appeared in the literature.   
  
The modern debate whether intent or reception is more important has penetrated so 
deeply into the popular discourses that some comedians address the issue directly.  Richard Pryor 
and George Carlin took opposing positions on the issue regarding the most prevalent pejorative 
word for African-Americans.  Carlin argued that meaning should be determined primarily from 
the speaker’s intention; according to Carlin, one can use the word if the speaker’s intention is not 
derogatory, citing instances where African-Americans use the term to refer to one another. The 
fact that Carlin is a Caucasian-American leads him to adopt this position in relation to language; 
not only is he spared the negative connotations of the word, but he is part of the group that has 
for so long been the primary determiner of meaning in American society.  Richard Pryor was 
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more sensitive than Carlin to the reception of the word.  Pryor argues that, due to its long history 
and wide usage, the word always carries with it dehumanizing, hostile associations, particularly 
for African-American listeners.  I liken this to a situation where you trip and drop a brick on 
someone’s toes; it still hurts even if you didn’t mean it.  This debate has expanded into, among 
other things, court cases involving the teaching of Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn.  While both 
sides generally agree the Twain’s intent was anti-racist, those who focus on reception argue that 
the frequent use of the word carries so many racist connotations for readers that it may 
undermine any anti-racist intent by Twain.   
The modern, non-specialist public debate over how language works has become even 
more relevant when addressing the language of oppression.  enacted between two comedians, 
which is important to the overall agenda of this work for three reasons.  First, it is a popular 
forum for debate and not necessarily theoretical; this means that the ideas are in wide circulation.  
Second, the terms of their debate nearly parallel similar debates by specialists in linguistics.  
Talbot J. Taylor discusses this issue in Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, who asserts that a word 
means “just what [he] choose[s] it to mean – nothing more and nothing less” before raising the 
question of whether the sender or the social system – broadly conceived receiver (Saussure’s 
langue) – has mastery over meaning.128  Talbot traces to the eighteenth century this shift in 
linguistic analysis from a voluntaristic concept of signification to an institutionalist one.
129
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Third, their debate is motivated not by the traditional goal of philosophical thinkers on language; 
these philosophers generally search for truth-value or attempt to explain the nature of contingent 
language in order to better understand truth-values.  Linguistics is not the goal; their linguistic 
positions serve other purposes.  Carlin hopes to make listeners who hear that word less sensitive 
to its painful impact while Pryor hopes to make speakers of that word more sensitive to its 
painful impact.  Both positions, however, note the importance of both sender and receiver in 
establishing meaning; they merely place the importance on different sides of the process.   
 More radical theories of interpretation have become prevalent since the twentieth century, 
arguing that one should consider to a greater degree the importance of the receiver in 
constructing meaning.  In one of the most reader-centric texts, Stanley Fish’s Is There a Text in 
this Class? expands the idea of linguistic instability to the level of text rather than merely a 
single word.
130
  Fish leaves a set of random words on the board for a graduate class on modern 
literature and asks them to unpack it.  The students then form interpretive bridges between 
unrelated words and concepts.  In this case, meaning is determined – created – entirely by the 
listeners, as there is no intent to discover.
131
  Fish’s goal was to explore the workings of within 
interpretive communities, where a group determines meaning based on a shared set of 
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assumptions and practices, but his work also raised the issue of linguistic instability given a text 
without intent.   
In contrast, medieval treatises on rhetoric, theology, and translation do not move beyond 
the description of contingency because they have specific goals, each interested in limiting 
uncertainty.  Most widely-circulated medieval thinkers on language would have encouraged 
readers to read like Fish’s students, interpreting the words with the assumption that they were 
meant to communicate something.  Like these students, most medieval thinkers worked on the 
assumption on an intended meaning. In medieval rhetoric, theology, and translation, the search 
for meaning is the search for intent.  That meaning could be the intention of the speaker, the 
intention (not cognitive) of an animal’s cry, or, as perhaps above, a natural sign of the intention 
of God.  Within this medieval framework, a human’s search for certain meaning will never be 
resolved fully, but no speech-act is devoid of meaning.   
A clear articulation of relational semantics is not made by medieval and early 
Renaissance thinkers for two reasons.  The first reason is that medieval and Renaissance thinkers 
consistently consider their discussions of the nature of language within the context of its relation 
to an omniscient divine.
132
  By definition, all meaning resides in God.  While human perspective 
is relative, God’s meaning is not.133  Any resemblance to relative meaning is merely the product 
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of faulty human perception, as God knows the true meaning of any speech-act.  The second 
reason is that the various texts have agendas that sought to limit interpretive instability.  As 
discussed later in this chapter, these medieval thinkers are hardly alone in their reluctance to 
embrace indeterminacy; as Hans-George Gadamer points out, the largest portion of the Western 
philosophical tradition is a search for a stable, certain truth; his ideas, however, place pressure 
upon that idea.
134
 
 
As noted earlier, the fourth and fifth in the process of communication steps – the 
decoding and response to the original message – place the receiver in a position to help 
determine the meaning of any speech-act.  Placing this interpretive power in the receiver 
undermines the idea of a stable meaning tied to the sender’s intention.  As such, these 
communications do not follow a Platonic, referential pattern.  Key components in a listener-
based, almost relational, model of communication include a shared set of perceptions and a 
shared context for the speech – including the identity of the sender.  Identity in this case is not 
limited to a name, but also the sender’s self-image in dialogue with his or her public image.  The 
chapters of this dissertation tie specific anxieties about language, from philosophy and 
translation to medicine and rhetoric, to specific literary conventions.   
Philosophers questioning a Platonic understanding of the world raise questions about 
referential semantics, opening the door to an alternate understanding.  Likewise, concerns about 
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translating from one language to another raise more specific questions about differently applied 
discourses.  The larger questions raised by philosophy and translation lead to more specific 
explorations of how discourses will be received, including different identities and how individual 
perception matches with collective perceptions.  The chapter on the obscure sender critique of 
communications focuses on the importance of the sender’s – perhaps imagined – identity in 
interpretation.  The chapter on the critique of self-absorption of communications focuses on the 
importance of individual perception and imagination in interpretation.  The idea that lovers share 
one mind provides an alternative to both anxieties, bypassing questions of both identity and 
misperception.  Finally, the final chapter on coerced consent presents problems with the 
assumptions built into the model of lovers communicating as though with one mind.   
 
THEOLOGY/PHILOSOPHY 
  Medieval anxieties about linguistic certainty extend back at least as far as Patristic 
writers such as Augustine.  The Platonic foundation of many early Christian philosophers came 
under increased pressure in the face of the Nominalist-Realist debate raised in the twelfth century 
by Abelard and extending through the fourteenth century most famously by William of Ockham.  
Theologians such as Augustine, much earlier, also appear to approach the idea that meaning may 
not be wholly determined by the speaker but do not press the radical conclusions suggested by 
this thinking.  In the thinking of thirteen-century rhetorician Geoffrey Vin Sauf, the intended 
meaning of the sender seems to take on a stable role in what Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana 
defines as the res (thing) signified by a signa (sign).
135
  Ross G. Arthur’s Medieval Sign Theory 
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and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight explores four potential relationships prevalent in the 
Middle Ages between the word and the thing, two of which are particularly relevant to the matter 
at hand.
136
  Arthur describes medieval discussions of how signs cause different ideas to appear in 
the mind of listeners, adding that these discussions all agreed that “key poetic symbols have 
often quite different effects on the minds of people.”137 Arthur also mentions medieval thinkers 
debated whether the “word signifies the thing itself or the mental image, which then signifies the 
thing.”138  While Arthur suggests that the relationship in either case is one of simple equivalence, 
the fact remains that the debates to which he refers – centered around William of Ockham in the 
Nominalist-Realist debate – raise serious questions about that simple equivalence.  Combining 
these two ideas suggests that the relationship between the signifier and both its signified and its 
received signified are potentially unstable and therefore should be examined in relation to a 
truth-value.
139
   
 In this way, the philosophers are limited by their goal of searching for stable knowledge 
or, more precisely the truth-value of assertions in relation to an omniscient divine.  The search 
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Eggers Misticall Unions 71 
for truth-value can be traced to the continuing circulation of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.  As 
described by Heller-Roazen,  
‘Spoken sounds… Aristotle explains, are signs of impressions on the soul, which 
in turn, are the images of things.  Speech is thus tied, in two steps, to the world of 
things…  De Interpretatione determines the canonical form of speech as 
‘meaningful utterance’… and, more precisely, a ‘proposition’… bearing truth or 
falsity, and once it situates truth and falsity in the composition of autonomous 
elements, the conclusion is inevitable:  the paradigmatic form of speech must be 
that of a ‘statement of one thing concerning another thing’.140 
The meaningfulness of the utterance comes from the producer of the speech, much as the 
meaning in the world comes from the utterances of God.  Mavis G. Fionella describes the 
medieval reception of Aristotle’s position, asserting  
God’s immediate, transparent speech articulated material reality and formed the 
basis of its intelligibility.  In consequence, meaning and being flowed from the 
Outside, and the sensible, temporal world became a system that, rightly read, 
signified divine intentionality or Providence.
141
 
As the divine producer of speech/reality, the omniscient God contains all meaning, leaving 
humans the responsibility to “rightly” read divine intent.  Given these assumptions, Fionella 
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concludes that “Christian subjects do not produce meaning but receive it.”142  God not only 
produces meaning that is ultimately inscrutable to humans but, in contrast to humans with 
limitations, has “effortless transcendence of the boundaries that frustrate human knowledge.”143  
Boethius’ commentaries on De Interpretatione expand on Aristotle’s ideas of 
contingency, placing pressure upon the appropriateness of assessing the truth and falsity of 
statements about an indeterminate future.  Boethius’ emphasis is that meaning stems from the 
necessity of the thing (event) and that a future contingent is not necessary.  Heller-Roazen argues 
that Boethius’ position suggests that language itself becomes contingent when describing 
potential futures; language does make actual statements until it has a definite referent and 
therefore is “not yet itself.”144 
The early medieval philosophers do not develop the radical logic and linguistic 
consequences implied by Boethius’ analysis of future contingents.  When Anselm 
of Canterbury, for example, considers what it means to predicate the future of a 
thing (futurum dicitur de re), his concern is to establish that divine omniscience, 
although necessary, in no way compromises the freedom of the will (libertas 
voluntatis).  He does not call into question the specific truth value of statements 
concerning future contingents, for he supposes that, insofar as they are known by 
God, future contingents are in some sense necessary.
145
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Given divine omniscience, no statement can be truly contingent; each event is known beforehand 
and will necessarily occur.  This conclusion obviates the need to explore how receivers help 
construct meaning.  Anselm does not pursue the logic of this argument to its radical conclusion 
because his goal is not to explore human’s contributions to meaning. 
 Abelard begins to explore the radical elements of Boethius’ argument.  Intention becomes 
the final determiner of meaning in the medieval debate over signs, even eventually in the case of 
a dog’s bark which is likened to the wail of the infirm.146  Describing human speech in his 
Dialectica, Abelard uses the term institutio, a decision which precedes the speech-act and 
“meaningfulness and could be defined as quite close to “intention.”  In fact, words are 
meaningful by virtue of the institution of the human will
147.”   The bark of the dog, however, 
derives its insitutio from God, of a more natural order.  In both cases, the interpretive act 
becomes an attempt to uncover the institutio at the heart of a communication, one human and the 
other divine.  Abelard’s goal is to consider the most difficult acts of communication to discover 
how communication itself does work, not how it fails or involves negotiation.   
 The nominalists of the fourteenth century, referred to by Ross G. Arthur, aggressively 
probed the limits of language, questioning the very Platonic assumptions of their philosophical 
traditions, but never fully articulated relational semantics because these thinkers retained as their 
goal the search for truth-value, and more particularly the idea that such truth-value was held/ 
known by an omniscient God.  The moderate Platonism we see in Anselm, Abelard, and Aquinas 
is built on the idea that universals – Platonic Ideals – exist, but do so beyond the clear 
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recognition of human beings.  The bracketing off of universals from human perception stems 
from the debates over realism and nominalism in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  Realists, 
following a Platonic model, held that universal concepts in the mind have strict parallels with 
universal things in nature.  Nominalists held that only particular objects – called accidentals – 
exist; general ideas are only names or words used to make connections between individual 
objects.
148
  Moderate realism – the idea that universals exist but that humans have limited access 
to them – was the widely accepted solution to this debate.   
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 Nominalism was initially a debate over language and did not imply a position in relation 
to the realists at all.  Rather, the nominalists argued that nouns and verbs in different tenses and 
moods held a unitary significance, which could lead to the conclusion that what was true once is 
always true.
149
  Other “modern” scholastics followed Abelard by noting how different terms 
signify in different propositional contexts, thus gaining the name of “terminists.”  One of the key 
distinctions made was between signification – which we could describe as referential semantics, 
in that a word refers to a specific object – and supposition, which involves the connotations as 
well as the denotations of the term.
150
  Supposition can describe classes as well as the individual 
members of a class. While not relational semantics, supposition does allow interpretive 
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flexibility by including a variety of connotations, not all of which will be understood by all 
readers.   
 Taken to its logical conclusion, this definition of supposition sets the stage for the 
nominalist-realist debate, or the debate over universals.  Rather than merely a minor semantic 
debate, the theological questions raised are far-reaching; after all, what is God, if not a universal?  
When one debates whether universals have an existence separate from particulars, then one 
questions whether God is external to humanity and reality – both composed of accidents – as we 
perceive it.
151
  Such a conclusion is defused of its radical potential by moderate Platonism’s 
bracketing off from humans the realm of Forms, a realm available only to God.  By definition, all 
meaning is contained in an omniscient God.  Even natural signs’ meanings find their institutio in 
God and it is man’s job to correctly interpret God’s intent. 
 The primary means of understanding Gods’ will in the natural world was by means of 
analogy, and the nominalist critique made such understanding contingent.  Utz argues that, in a 
“visible world [that] no longer had analogical signifying power to point towards the invisible 
ideas of the Creator,… the cause and effect of things would have to be attributed to human 
action.”152   
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THE PROBLEM OF TRANSLATION 
Anxieties about translating the Bible raise questions about how best to construct the 
meaning of a text.  The translator constructs one meaning for a text and then articulates it in a 
different code, or discourse.  In a similar way, lovers’ communications rely on disparities in 
interpretations based upon different discourses in order to communicate in a clandestine manner.  
Jerome’s discussions of translation, while still privileging the intent, or sense, of the sender, 
explicitly comment on how the same word in two languages – codes – can convey different 
meanings.  Jerome’s ideas on translation suggest the uncertainty to be found in human language, 
even when expressing the divine word.  Jerome’s Letter to Pammachius raises the possibility of 
interpretive contributions from the listener by emphasizing the need to translate the sense of the 
original rather than following it precisely word-for-word.
153
    
Jerome’s defense of his translation responds to an unnamed critic who claims Jerome, “in 
translating another man’s letter [… has] mistakes through incapacity or carelessness…either an 
involuntary error or a deliberate offence.”154 Rather than admitting to either error or offense, 
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Jerome acknowledges minor changes like using “‘dear friend’ in place of ‘honourable sir’.”155  
Instead, when Jerome ‘render[s] sense for sense and not word for word,”156 he emphasizes first 
the importance of attempting to understand the intention of what was said, and second the 
potential for misinterpretation due to differences in language.  Logically, then, the translator has 
some control in determining the sense of a passage.  Despite this, Jerome holds the ideal that 
connotation matches the intent – what Abelard might call the institutio – more than a referential 
denotation of the words.  Interpretation for Jerome, then, also finds its foundations in 
intention.
157
 
Given the religious framework of these medieval thinkers, it is not surprising that they 
encountered a point beyond which their assumptions would not reach, no matter how strong the 
logic.  The assumption of an omniscient God precludes the kind of interpretive instability 
implied by these ideas and, as the proper goal of all these fields was to explore the relationship of 
man to God, none explored much further.  At the heart of all these analyses is the idea of a true 
meaning linked to the speaker’s intent because, even when this intent is beyond human grasp, 
that intent is still available to God.   
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RHETORIC 
Following the classical tradition, medieval rhetoricians come very close to implying that 
listeners help to construct meaning, most specifically by highlighting potentially different 
receptions based upon how different discourses are interpreted in different contexts by different 
receivers.  Lovers consider a word within a different context than members of the public hearing 
the same speech-act.  Anxieties about how a listener interprets messages inform these works on 
rhetoric; concerns about how a listener defines the sender play into the romances within the 
obscure sender tradition.  Rhetorical arts such as Geoffrey de Vin Sauf’s Poetria Nova devote 
most of their time to describing the impact that tropes will have on listeners; he is particularly 
sensitive to using a style appropriate for the material and audience.
158
  Handbooks on sermon 
writing like the Fasciculus Morum are careful to point out that one must take into account the 
interpretive abilities of one’s audience in order for the message to be properly received.159  
Books on letter-writing are careful to delineate different means of address for different estates 
and requests.  Perhaps most indicative of the awareness that listeners might not interpret works 
as the speaker intended are the wide range of literary works with direct addresses to the 
audience; like Chaucer, many authors of the time instruct readers as to the desired response.
160
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Priority in establishing meaning in each case, however, is given to the speaker; readings 
that deviate from authorial intent are presented as error.  Widely circulating Ars dicitiminis of the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries often follow Ciceronian rhetoric in highlighting the importance of 
determining the sender’s intent in communication, particularly letters.  One anonymous twelfth 
century Bolognese Rationes dictandi defines a letter as 
…a suitable arrangement of works set forth to express the  
intended meaning of its sender.  Or in other words, a letter  
is a discourse composed of coherent yet distinct part  
signifying fully the sentiments of its sender.
161
 
The most significant element in this quotation is its emphasis on the sender’s intent and 
sentiments as the final determiner of meaning.  Providing that the writer has effectively 
constructed the text coherently, these sentiments are “fully” available to readers, making any 
disparity an error on the reader’s part.   
The rhetorician Geoffrey Vin Sauf also presents an understanding of language that places 
meaning in the sender’s intent; despite this, he offers somewhat more interpretive freedom to the 
reader.   
  The speaker wished his point to be compared to the exemplum.   
And since he cleverly gave only part of his meaning to the ear,  
he saved part for the [listener’s] mind …162 
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Geoffrey quickly follows up, however, by noting that this “is the method for a man of skill – to 
compass in half a speech all the force of a whole speech.”163  It is not that the listener contributes 
half of the meaning, merely that he must work to finish what the speaker intends.  Vin Sauf’s 
goal, then, is to instruct his readers in how to cleverly give enough information to lead the reader 
to the proper, intended conclusion.   
 In the thirteenth century Summa dictaminum, Ludolph von Hildesheim likewise promotes 
the idea that letters express what the “intellect, having composed… in the mind, express 
vocally,” which explicitly links  meaning to the writer’s intent (qtd. in McKinnell 77).164  
Ludolph continues,  
The discovery of letters originated from those who wanted their wishes to be clear 
to those who were absent from them, and because they could not speak aloud to 
them without an intermediary, it was necessary for them to speak by some other 
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means.  However, the cause of the discovery of letters was the negligence of oral 
messengers and the (need for) concealment of secrets.
165
 
Like the other authors of artes dictaminis, Ludolph emphasizes the importance of the wishes of 
the writer in establishing meaning, adding the potential for an intermediary to interfere in 
conveying these wishes, perhaps coloring the words with the intermediary’s bias.  The greater 
privacy afforded by letters also provides some protection from discovery.  
While Vin Sauf and the other authors of the artes dictaminis raise issues with 
transmission and reception of the sender’s intent, the goal of these texts is to provide practical 
means to clarify the sender’s meaning and limit ambiguity.  Meaning is not in the hands of the 
receiver or the intermediary; any ambiguity is either a failure in the receiver’s interpretation or 
on the sender’s message. 
 
MEDIEVAL COGNITION AND INTERPRETATION 
Medieval understandings of the mind’s workings likewise suggest a system of linguistic 
instability, but this instability is generally represented as an individual, self-involved interpretive 
failure by the listener rather than a failure in language itself.  While medieval cognitive models 
made a clear distinction between things perceived in the senses and things occurring only in the 
mind, this distinction becomes less clear upon closer inspection.  Such a blurring might lead 
logically to questions about the importance of the receiver in creating meaning. 
                                                          
165
 Ibid., 77.  For the original source, see Ludolph von Hildesheim.  “Summa dictiminum I.”  
Breifsterlle und formel bücher.  Ed. by L Rockinger.  (New York:  Quellen un Erörterungen zur 
Bayerischen und Deutschen Geschichte, 1961).  For a contemporary English rhetorician, see 
John of Garland. 
Eggers Misticall Unions 83 
In theory at least, the “fancy” addressed those things physically present, while 
“imagination” addressed those only in the mind.  The traditional progression is as follows: 
1- Communis sensus  OR 1- imaginatio 
2- Fantasia 
3- Cogitivia  
4- Memoria 
Fancy played one of the most important roles in medieval understandings of human 
cognition.  In scholastic psychology, fancy – a contraction of fantasy or phantasia – took the raw 
information gathered by the senses and brought them together into a pattern recognizable to the 
viewer.  “Þat place [þe brayn] is propre instrument of ymagynacioun þe which resceyveþ þinges 
þat comprehendiþ of fantasie [res a phantasia comprehensas]”.166  Fancy comprehends or 
perceives things and this perception is then passed on to the imagination.  Fancy allowed the 
consideration of raw sensory data by the intellect.  This late fifteenth-century manuscript 
represents the primary medieval model of cognition.  The information from the common senses 
passes through the imagination, fancy, and cogitative power on its way to the memory.
167 
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The distinction between fancy and imagination is a fine, but important one.  Trevisa notes 
“The þridde hat ymaginacion:  þerby þe soule biholdeþ þe liknesse of bodily þingis þat beþ 
absente.”168  In contrast with fancy, which forms images from sensory data, the imagination 
forms images of things in absence.  This explains its presence before the fancy in this illustration, 
as the pattern that emerges from the imagination – either imagined from nothing or recalled from 
memory (“þingis þat beþ absente”) – serves as the raw data in cognitions involving the 
imagination.  These medieval cognitive models use the fancy and imagination to account for 
disparities between an inner reality and an outer (commonly accepted) one. 
Despite this clear theoretical distinction, in practice the distinction between the fancy and 
the imagination is muddier due to potential overlap and interaction.  In the above quotation, the 
fancy formed the image of the bodily thing.  In the thing’s absence, the imagination recalls an 
image formed initially from the fancy.  In even the simplest observations, this cognitive model 
emphasizes how the mind (fancy) must form a pattern from the sensory impressions (common 
senses).  While the common senses are shared (common), the patterns formed by each reader’s 
fancy need not be the same.  At what point does the act of forming a pattern begin to overtake 
the actual perceptions?  This is precisely the question that these literary texts raise regarding 
remarkable lovers’ communications:  at what point is the communication all (or primarily) an act 
of imagination?   
 Confusion between the fancy and the imagination appears frequently among medieval 
theorists and non-experts.  An entire branch of the field worked on a four-tier model, essentially 
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lumping together the fancy and the imagination into one function or, as in other examples, 
replaced the communis sensus with the fantasy.  Despite a theoretical blurring that eventually 
equates fantasy with imagination in English, medieval and Renaissance thinkers are reluctant to 
let go of the idea of a sensible reality outside the mind.  While Descartes touches upon the issue, 
it is not until Emmanuel Kant that such a radical position is circulated widely.  Much like earlier 
thinkers discussed here, however, Kant refuses to follow his thinking to its logical conclusion.  
Instead, he adds to his model the noumenon, an outer reality.  In this case, both the medieval 
thinkers and Kant hold onto the cognitive model that matches with their senses, not their logic.   
The English tradition of debate over these issues was vigorous and sustained, with John 
Blund (1175-1248), Robert Kilwardy, Archbishop of Canterbury (1215-97), and Walter Burley 
(1275-1344).  Burley’s De Sensibus (1337) discusses explicitly the relationship between the 
senses and cognition, asserting that “the common sense distinguished the information [the 
senses] supplied; cognition distinguished the accidents – colour, number, and shape.”169  Debates 
arose over “how the sense organs worked, the functioning of the common sense – that is the 
internal sense that the received the information from the external senses – and how the 
information was transmitted to them, as well as how the imagination and memory created or 
recalled sensations.”170  The broadly understood imagination, on the other hand, “allowed 
medieval man to conjure before him and create the reality of the events of the past,” or of things 
never seen physically.
171
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 Once again, these discussions of cognition do not fully explore the instabilities inherent 
in language that lead to an articulation of relational semantics.  These treatises’ primary concern 
is to provide a model of how the brain does work in ways that are predictive, hopefully allowing 
for accurate diagnosis or spiritual guidance.   
 The idea that outward appearance and inward reality may not match extends as far back 
as pre-Socratic philosophers.
172
  The agenda of these previous philosophical explorations, 
however, “are designed to address disparate philosophical problems;” the Aristotelian tradition 
focusing on appearance and essences, the Stoics on inward virtue isolated from inessential 
externals, and Christian thinkers focusing on the soul over the body.
173
  None of these models 
focuses primarily on inter-human communication, instead attempting to define reality or virtue.   
 Twelfth-century England, however, brings together a series of influences that expand the 
population for whom these observations are relevant.  “The twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
brought new opportunities for speaking in public and a rise in professionals whose task this 
was…, [whereas] previously public speaking had been confined to bishops, abbots, monarchs, 
and a few members of the aristocracy.”174  Private communication in absentia, likewise, begins 
to appear more frequently in the literature, suggesting another realm of “speaking” where 
potential errors in communication may be found.  Communication via intermediaries and letters 
between lovers, of course, will be the primary concern of this work, particularly how they 
contrast with direct communication with all the attendant physical cues available to receivers. 
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More specific to my analysis and as will be discussed in the chapter on sharing one mind, 
placing a greater importance on mutual consent in marriage raises many of these same issues but 
does so with an emphasis on humans understanding the inner consent of others even though 
outward acts may not accurately represent true feelings.  The romances that form the object of 
study in this dissertation, then, anticipate many of the issues of inwardness that appear in 
Renaissance drama, as noted in Maus’ Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance.  
  
DESIRE AND COGNITION 
 Even the earliest literary works note a disparity between inward and outward realities of 
lovers due to the impact of desire, both physical and mental.  Gerard of Berry’s Glosses on the 
Viaticum (c. 1236) describes the disease of love as a cognitive failure of the estimative faculty, 
that which “makes ‘instinctive’ judgments about what is to be pursued or avoided.175  Gerard 
asserts that lovesickness is 
error uirtutis estimatiue que inducitur per intentiones sensatas ad apprehendenda 
accidencia insensata que forte non sunt in persona.  Unde credit aliquam esse 
melioram et nobiliorem et magis appetendam omnibus aliis… [prompter] aliquod 
sensatum aliquando occurrit anime ualde gratum… unde si qua sunt sensata bib 
conueniencia occultantur a non sensatis intentionibus anime uehementer infixis.
176
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[A malfunction of the estimative faculty, which is misled by sensed  
perceptions into apprehending non-sensed accidents that perhaps are not in the 
person.  Thus it believes some woman to be better and more noble and more 
desirable than all others…[because] some sensed object appears very pleasing… 
Any unfitting sensations are, as a consequence, obscured by the non-sensed 
intentions [i.e. that the person is more noble, better, etc. – emphasis by Wack] 
deeply fixed in the soul.]
177
  
As described by Wack, Gerard’s position is that in  
lovesickness the estimative faculty malfunctions because it is misled by an 
excessively pleasing sense perception, so strong that it eclipses other sense 
impressions that might contradict it… Because the estimative faculty is working 
too hard, innate heat and spiritus rush to the middle ventricle where the faculty 
resides, leaving the first ventricle, the site of the imaginative faculty too cold and 
dry – melancholic, in fact… The image adheres abnormally strongly on the 
”screen,” so to speak, of the first ventricle; as Gerard puts it, the imaginative 
faculty becomes fixated on the image.
178
 (Wack 56) 
Marion A. Wells adds that the phantasm that inspires affection should become “increasingly 
abstract, losing its materiality by the time it passes through the estimative faculty – a process 
Avicenna aptly calls denudation.  This process of sublimation is disastrously interrupted when 
the estimative function is overwhelmed by the pleasing power of the phantasm conjured by the 
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imagination and recalled by the memory.”179  Wells continues that the “derangement of the 
melancholy lover’s ability to judge the world correctly (according to reason) draws attention to 
the fundamental ontological instability of the subject.”180  I would add that this instability plays 
out in a number of ways in the romances, most notably in the construction of a collective self 
that incorporates lovers.  Gerard’s description of the impact that desire has upon perception and 
cognition becomes important when applied to communication for several reasons. 
 First, any interpretation must consider the source of the message.  Without a clear 
indication of the sender, the receiver will often imagine a sender.  If a man has a fixed image of 
the sender as being in love with him, then he will interpret all messages with this idea as a 
starting point.  Only strong contrary signals will counter this assumption.   
Second, these contrary signals may be ignored in favor of the fixed image of a loving 
sender, eliminating the important interpretive step of objectively reconsidering textual signals in 
the light of new signals from the original sender (step 5 as described earlier in this chapter); the 
listener hears what he wanted to hear.  Using medieval cognitive terminology, the listener places 
a greater importance on the imagination and “non-sensed intentions” than on those grounded in 
the fantasia and sensed signals.  Such interpretation is self-referential and any literary work that 
shows a character interpreting in such a manner suggests that the relationship may be all in the 
head of the lover. 
 Third, this discussion makes irrelevant whether the lover’s feelings are reciprocated.  
Those who are loved are subject to the same interpretive errors as those that are not loved, 
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namely, that the image inside their minds may replace the actual words.  Gerard is concerned 
with whether the outer reality as noted by the communis sensus matches with the inner reality as 
(re)constructed by the fantasia and compared to images in the memoria.  The specific 
information of a previous mutual consent is only of a secondary interest to Gerard. 
 Gerard’s cure for love-melancholy is “coniunctionem” or intercourse.181  This might 
suggest that if the lovers have consented to join themselves together and then consummated their 
love, they would be free of the disease; this might, however, serve to reinforce the faulty 
estimation of these mental images.  After all, Gerard also recommends “consorcium et amplexus 
puellarum, plurimum concubitus ipsarum, et permutation diuersarum” [consorting with and 
embracing girls, sleeping with them repeatedly, and switching various ones].”182   This sexual 
variation, combined with listening repeatedly to disparaging remarks about the beloved is 
supposed to restore the reason to the love-stricken subject, returning the lover to an acceptance of 
communal assessment over individual judgment.  Within this model, communal assessment is 
assumed to be the truth.   
  
  The medieval fields of theology, translation, rhetoric, and cognition tend to focus on 
truth-judgment in order to assess meaning; in other words, each looks to stabilize meaning in a 
specific truth.  The search for a stable truth does not match well with relational semantics, given 
the fluid nature of the relationships that forge meaning in a relational setting.  While the logic 
behind each of these models might lead to an articulation of relational semantics, the goals of 
each eventually move discussions in different directions.   
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Literature, however, by trying to express truth through lying (fiction), had far fewer 
limitations placed upon it.  For a variety of reasons, to be explored in the next chapter, romances 
began to explore these anxieties in ways other genres did not.  Since romances explore 
relationships between humans, the communications in these poems often reflect the fluidity of 
meaning between people of different relationships or as relationships change.   
 The following chapters will explore how communications between literary lovers address 
anxieties about language seen generally in theology and translation, as well as specifically in 
rhetoric and medicine.  Issues about interpretive context and discourses inform the obscure 
sender tradition, issues about individual interpretive bias and discourses inform the self-involved 
tradition, while the one mind tradition attempts to address these concerns even as it raises new 
issues of coerced consent.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
OBSCURE SENDER, OBSCURE MEANING 
 
Le blanc siglë unt amunt trait… 
Quë hum se puise aparcever 
Quel ço seit, le blanc u le neir… 
Vent sa femme Ysolt devant lui, 
Purpensee de grant engin… 
  Tristran…dit a Ysolt: “Amie bele, 
  Savez pur veir que c’est sa nef? 
  Or me dites quel est le tref.”   
  Ço dit Ysolt: “Jol sai pur veir, 
  Saches que le signle est tut neir. 
    -Thomas’ Tristan, 12th c.183 (2969-3023) 
 
[[Kaherdin and Yseut] hoisted aloft the white sail… 
So that people could distinguish  
which one it was, the white or the black… 
Yseut [aux Blanche Mains] came before him, 
With a cunning scheme in her mind… 
Tristran…said to Yseut [aux Blanche Mains]: “Fair companion, 
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Do you know for certain that it is his ship? 
Tell me now, that kind of sail it has.” 
Yseut replied:  “I am certain indeed 
I’ll tell you why: the sail is completely black.”] 
  
Literary explorations of lovers’ communications often work on the assumption that 
communication becomes difficult, if not impossible, without a clear knowledge of who sends a 
message. Knowing the sender of message is vital in clandestine communication, indirect 
communication, and consent, elements important to many medieval romances.  Absent, falsified, 
disguised, or distorted senders create expections in readers that lead to faulty interpreations.  
Linguistic concerns about being unable to determine meaning from a sender’s intended meaning 
appear in medieval romances as well as medieval theology and rhetoric.  The conditions in 
medieval romances, requiring both secrecy and communication, explore situations where 
knowing the identity of the sender – not merely the name of that person but how that person 
identifies him- or herself, whether the sender is a lover, a patron, or, as is often the case in 
romances, both.  Early works in what I will call the obscure sender tradition highlight how even 
the closest of lovers struggle to properly interpret one another without clear signals, suggesting a 
systemic problem.  Later works in the tradition present only flawed lovers interpreting 
incorrectly.  In these later obscure sender works, the ability to interpret correctly is no longer 
presented as systemic but as a litmus test for potential lovers; one’s inability to properly interpret 
indicates a flawed potential lover.  
Knowing the sender of a message can make a large difference to how one interprets a 
message.  In the 1999 comedy-drama set in a sports news show, writer Aaron Sorkin uses the 
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uncertainty of interpreting without a clear sender in an exchange between the two anchors on the 
show.   
Casey:  Suit yourself, but you should know I play squash three times a  
week and my calves have been called shapely. 
Dan:   Casey? 
Casey:  Yeah? 
Dan:   Who's been calling your calves shapely? 
Casey:  My mom. 
Dan:   Okay. Don't talk to me for the rest of the show.
184
 
Withholding the identity of the mother allows for a wide range of meanings, but choosing a 
sensual word such as “shapely” suggests a sensual appreciation of his calves.  The absence of a 
clearly identified sender leads the listener, Dan in this case, to imagine a person admiring 
Casey’s calves in a romantic manner.  Discovering that the source is a mother radically alters the 
meaning, both by minimizing the sexual content and the potential for an unbiased opinion.   
 The medieval example is doubly uncertain because Tristan is ignorant of the true sender 
of this message.  Tristan, though longing for his beloved Yseut, has married a different Yseut – 
called Yseut of the White Hands.  Facing death, Tristan has sent a message asking his beloved 
Yseut to come heal him.  In order to keep the communication secret, Tristan establishes a code:  
his love Yseut will raise a white sail if she will come and a black sail if she refuses.  His wife 
overhears the secret code and transmits to Tristan the wrong message, essentially falsifying the 
sender and intent.  The information – a black sail – shows awareness of the secret code he has 
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established with his beloved Yseut.  His wife, Yseut aux Blanche Mains – the transmitter – offers 
no clue that she understands the secret meaning; because of this, Tristan assumes the 
transmission is transparent.  The second level of uncertainty arises from Tristan’s ignorance of 
Yseut aux Blanche Main’s anger; he does not know she wants to hurt him with a “cunning plan.”  
Tristan is willing to die in the face of a rejection from his beloved Yseut in a way that he would 
not be for his wife.  Yseut’s message – or more accurately, Yseut aux Blanche Mains’ message – 
remains beyond his reach because of his limited knowledge.   
 Jacques Derrida’s terminology would seem to illuminate this passage.  Meaning in this 
message never has presence for Tristan.  He has a desire for – and perhaps assumption of – 
linguistic presence as discussed in the chapter on “one minds” but such presence is shown to be 
an illusion or, at the very least, dependent upon paralinguistic details available to lovers that 
others do not have the information to decode.   
 While medieval literary works address instabilities in language in a manner that leads to 
conclusions reminiscent of Derrida, they focus less on paradigms of language and more on 
specific, contextualized speech-acts.  Despite the remarkable similarities, we must be cautious 
not to identify the Tristan poets and Shakespeare as providing a direct path to Derrida’s ideas.  
McDonald asserts that  
many critics have yielded to the temptation to see in Shakespeare the radical kind 
of linguistic skepticism that would appear in the work of Thomas Hobbes in the 
middle of the seventeenth century; others go so far as to turn the Renaissance 
playwright into a proto-modernist who happened to anticipate our own (sensible) 
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opinions by some four centuries. We should not allow ahistorical errors to go 
unchallenged.
185
   
McDonald’s historicizing of Shakespeare’s attitudes toward language is well-grounded and 
encourages us to consider carefully any similarities we may find.  There are important 
differences in goals and methodology that separate these early writers from modern theorists.   
Put simply, Derrida explores the relationship between words and things and follows 
directly on the trajectory that Augustine and those interested in the Nominalist-Realist debate 
explore in depth.  The goal of these theorists is to consider certainty and contingency in 
language.  Derrida critiques language as a medium for certainty.  Likewise, there is a tendency to 
focus on Renaissance rhetoricians who seek models of language in order to teach the skills 
necessary for clarity.  In an effort to explore these notions in depth, these thinkers adopt 
methodologies designed to form an abstract relationship between words and things or words and 
God. 
The romance authors, in a parallel trajectory, explore the relationship between words and 
people.  Relationships are contingent and as such any attempt to communicate within them is 
shown to be uncertain.  As noted by Russ McDonald, Renaissance linguists including George 
Puttenham also emphasized the play of language, using a complex system of classifying 
ambiguity to discuss a signifier’s ability to point toward multiple signifieds.  McDonald notes 
how Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew emphasizes the affinity of Petruchio and Katherine in 
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their similar use of linguistic ambiguity.
186
  Linguistic skepticism is incidental to the primary 
concern over relationships.  These acts of communication are performative as described by J.L. 
Austin, as each attempts to define, redefine, or reaffirm one character’s status in relation to 
another.
187
  The absence of one participant raises serious questions about a relationship with an 
absent participant, and a remarkable number of early English romances include scenes where one 
participant is not only physically absent but completely unrelated to particular speech-acts.  
There are two levels of potential instability: first, speech-acts without intent (no sender, for 
instance) and second, speech-acts from characters who do not know their own intentions.  Both 
of these lacks highlight a potential disparity between inner reality (consent, for instance) and 
outer reality (words, actions, etc.).  By presenting speech-acts with absent senders, these 
romances raise skepticism about language, critiquing the idea of defining oneself as a collective 
entity with another person.  
 
 As seen in the previous chapter, twelfth-century anxieties about language appear in a 
range of scholastic fields.  Each of these fields is limited, however, in its explorations by 
modeling all language primarily on the relationship between God and man.  Working from this 
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assumption leads to a model of interpretation where determining meaning comes from 
discovering a “speaker’s” intent (what Abelard calls institutio).  Within heterosocial 
relationships, intent grows in importance during the twelfth century due to the debate over 
consent in marriage.
188
  The church, in particular, begins to emphasize consent as one of the 
defining components in deciding whether a marriage is valid.  While consent of the family head 
played an important role in Roman law, the twelfth century begins to define it as the mutual 
consent of the potential spouses.  Determining consent for someone in a subordinate position, 
however, is notoriously tricky.  A young woman, for instance, may be coerced through physical 
or social pressure into saying the words of the ceremony and even of consummating the 
relationship without giving her inner consent.
189
  This potential disparity led to the adoption of a 
definition of consent as an “internal disposition of the will,”190 a definition that continues to 
circulate through the eighteenth century.  Twelfth-century romances build on this idea of self-
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determination and establish literary conventions of love that become central themes in a wide 
range of Renaissance genres, including Shakespeare’s drama and Donne’s poetry.191   
  Romances, more focused on human relations and “argu[ing] for the legitimacy of secular 
concerns” (Elizabeth Leigh Smith 13), are not as constrained by theological concerns as are the 
genres of theology and cognition discussed in the previous chapter.
192
  Many of the early 
romances – what Matilda Tomalyn Bruckner identifies as romans d’antiquité – focus on -
justifying Anglo-Norman conquest (35).
193
  Despite being initially deployed to justify patrilineal 
rule, the hero’s relationship to a woman quickly becomes a site for exploring private concerns.  
As “romances contemplate the place of private identity in society at large” (Crane 11), it comes 
as no surprise that romance lovers’ language reflect this concern at a linguistic level, setting the 
lovers’ private codes in dialogue with more widely adopted – public – codes.  The secular 
emphasis of the genre and its subsequent freedom from neo-Platonic assumptions allow 
romances to explore the instabilities inherent in language more fully than logical scholastic texts.   
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 Some of the early romances are either informed by scholastic ideas or express parallel 
evolution of ideas; specifically, Beroul’s Tristan seems informed by Abelard.194  Sahar Amer 
argues that Beroul attempts to redefine marriage in such a way that, according to consent theory, 
Tristan and Isolde have a stronger claim to marriage than Mark and Isolde.
195
  This consent is 
complicated by the potion and its role in controlling the lovers’ feelings.196  The Anglo-Norman 
Thomas’s Tristan also owes a debt to scholastic thought, as seen in the lengthy self-examination 
Tristan inflicts upon himself before marrying the second Isolde.  Tristan is not sure why he is 
marrying the second Isolde and even considers the possibility that he is marrying the second one 
only as a substitute for the first.  In both Beroul’s and Thomas’ versions, Tristan’s consent and 
therefore his intent is uncertain.  
 Scholastics such as Abelard had also considered the idea that our conscious intent may 
not match with our inner consent; in essence, we may not know our own intentions.  The idea 
that one may not know one’s own intent can be gleaned from Abelard’s definition of sin, 
circulating at the time the early versions of Tristan were being written.  Similar to his position on 
nominalism, Abelard’s definition (see below) centers on the idea of intent.197  The idea that one 
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human can never fully know another human appears in theological debates over the nature of sin 
that come to a head at the same time Tristan was composed.
198
  Abelard constructs the most 
skeptical model of sin circulating in the twelfth century.  He wrestles with the problem that 
events may appear moral or virtuous depending on the context or the person judging them.  At 
the heart of his attack on Platonism is the idea – seen in medieval cognition – that human 
perception is inherently faulty and therefore has little practical access to the stable meaning that 
Platonic ideals afford.  This definition of sin argues for the essential unknowability of another 
person.  
Abelard’s idea that sin is defined by inward consent places definitive judgments of 
people’s behavior beyond human perception.  According to Abelard, sin is when we “are 
inwardly ready, if given the chance, to [commit the sinful action].  Anyone who is found in this 
disposition incurs the fullness of guilt; the addition of the performance of the deed adds nothing 
to increase the sin.”199  The “inward” readiness determines whether the soul “earns damnation or 
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is made guilty before God.”200  It is no sin to desire to sin if “he represses his desire; he does not 
extinguish it, but because he is not drawn to consent, he does not incur sin.”201 Abelard’s 
definition of sin clearly delineates between divine judgment and human ones, because only God 
can know the inward readiness of a person.  The human inability to perceive the inner workings 
of another’s mind means that people can never really know another person’s guilt.  In this way, 
every person’s actions have an indeterminacy that resembles the workings of a relational 
semantics.  “People do not judge the hidden but the apparent, nor do they consider the guilt to a 
fault so much as the performance of a deed.”202 An action can signify guilt within the context of 
human justice and law at the same time it signifies innocence within a divine context, and vice 
versa.
203
  The disparity between two interpretations of the same sign (in this case, an action) 
suggests the kind of interpretive instability at the heart of relational semantics even though 
Abelard’s discussion builds upon the assumption of a concrete, perhaps Platonic, truth 
determined by inward readiness.  This truth, however, is beyond human ken, which means that 
people interact with the world (and the signs therein) as though in a relational context, even 
though the greater, divine frame holds a stable – if inaccessible – meaning.  Non-divine 
observers are left to respond to people’s actions as though to a sign without a clear, stable 
meaning.  Abelard’s definition of sin, therefore, by sequestering observers from clear referential 
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meaning, forces observers to interpret events in the same way that referential semantics forces 
readers to interpret signs
204
. 
Abelard’s definition of sin raises the possibility that one may not know one’s own 
intentions.  Key to this is Abelard’s idea – attacking the notion of sin as an act of the will – that 
sin need not be voluntary.
205
  “There are people who are wholly ashamed to be drawn into 
consent to lust or into a bad will and are forced out of the weakness of the flesh to want what 
they by no means want.”206  Without being in a position to act on one’s consent, however, one 
may not know whether one has given inner assent.  In Abelard’s example of the servant who is 
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inwardly ready to kill his lord, the servant himself may not know until the moment of truth 
whether he has previously – and perhaps unwillingly – given his inner consent. 
Thomas consciously explores the issue of unknowability – and therefore undecidability – 
when Tristran contemplates marriage to Yseut aux Blanche Mains.  Tristran’s tortured 
exploration of his decision to marry Yseut aux Blanche Mains has its foundations in the fact that 
he does not know her feelings.  He asserts at one point that “she has forgotten me entirely, for 
her feelings have changed”207 and she must no longer love him.208  Immediately afterward, 
Tristran expresses the opposite, suggesting “she has the wish [to do my will] if only she has the 
means.”209  Both times, he states that he would know if her feelings had changed, but his doubts 
about her reflect his uncertainty.  These observations end with the assertion “if she does not do 
my will, I do not know how much that irks her” (my emphasis).210  Yseut’s feelings, in absence, 
are unknowable – even undecidable – to Tristran.  Tristan seems to be ruminating on the issue in 
the hopes that he will gain more insight, insight that will be discussed in the next chapter on how 
the lovers share “one mind.”   
 The fact that Thomas’s Tristan does not know his own motives for marrying the second 
Yseut can be seen in the number of reasons he offers.  First, he justifies his marriage by stating 
“since I cannot have the object of my longing, / I can but take what is in my grasp.”211  
Following an inconclusive discussion of whether the first Yseut has forgotten him, he suggests 
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that it is the noble position to withdraw from the field when she chooses another.
212
  He 
considers the possibility that he will learn to love the second woman,
213
 coming to the position 
that it might make him forget the first.
214
  Finally, Tristram says that he does it to “try the life 
[the first Yseut] leads.”215  After this long monologue, the narrator offers another motive, that 
Tristram marries the second Yseut because she shares “…pur nun d’Isolt” [that very name 
Yseut].
216
  As noted, she becomes a substitute for his true beloved.  Most importantly, Tristran 
does not propose this to himself, suggesting that he does not know one of his motives, perhaps 
the most important one.  In this way, meaning is even bracketed off from Tristan himself. 
 Intent is bracketed off, in fact, from almost all of the communications in the relatively 
short extant fragments of Thomas’ Tristan.  The romance’s climactic episode – where Yseut aux 
blanche mains lies to Tristran – is built around a message where intent is obscured by making 
unclear the sender of the message.  Tristran asks Kaherdin to go to Yseut with his ring “Ço sunt 
enseignes entre nus”217 [as a token of recognition] and ask his lover to come and heal the wounds 
no one else can heal.  If she is to return with him, Kaherdin is to unfurl a “Blanc siglez”; if not, a 
“nëis siglë” [white sail” and “black sail,” repectively].218  When Yseut returns with Kaherdin, 
they do unfurl a white sail. Unfortunately, Yseut aux Blanche Mains has overheard Tristran’s 
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instructions to Kaherdin, “Ben ad ente-ndu chaüm mot”[understanding each].219  When Tristran 
– who cannot rise from his bed – asks her what kind of sail flies above the ship, Yseut aux 
Blanche Mains concocts a “grand engine” [cunning scheme], telling him “Le sigle est tut neir” 
[the sail is completely black].
220
  The sender of this message is best thought of as Tristan’s wife 
Yseut aux Blanche Mains, intending to fool Tristran, but from Tristran’s perspective it is sent by 
his beloved Yseut.  While the role of the imagination will be explored in a later chapter, the key 
for now is that intent is bracketed off from Tristan because his knowledge of the message’s true 
sender is concealed from him. 
While not entirely empty of intent, Yseut aux Blanche Mains’ willful intrusion into the 
original Yseut’s message via the sail indicates how the same words can be have their intent 
changed from an original message, particularly when the sender is unknown.  The original Yseut 
unfurls a white sail to let Tristran know she is coming to heal him and Yseut aux Blanche Mains 
tells Tristran that the sail is black, leading to Tristran’s death.  Tristran assumes that the sender is 
the original Yseut, leading him to conclude that the intent is to make a clear denial.
221
  The 
original communication, however, has been replaced by Yseut aux Blanche Mains’ opposite one; 
her intent is to hinder the lovers.  The same message has no inherent meaning therefore, meaning 
different things within different contexts to different people along its transmission.  Intent in this 
case is completely bracketed off from Tristran, as he mistakes his wife’s intent for his beloved 
Yseut’s.  The message no longer signifies what the original sender meant, nor does it signify 
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what the receiver expects;  neither the first sender nor the eventual receiver control the meaning 
of the message. The message has been rewritten in transmission.
222
 
 The statue sequence – seen only in the Turin fragment and Brother Robert’s Norse 
translation of Thomas – presents Tristran “communicating” with the statue of Yseut.  Later 
chapters will address this episode again, considering respectively the ideal of unrealistic 
interpretive leaps in lovers and the role of the imagination, but for the purposes of this chapter, 
we will focus on how these “messages” are divorced from any meaning outside Tristran’s mind.  
Unlike the monologue mentioned above, this scene presents Tristran responding as though 
engaged in conversation with the actual Yseut.   
Thomas’ references to the hall of statues in the Turin fragment become particularly 
poignant – and unsettling – when one considers the interpretive absence of a sender.  Given that 
there is no intended meaning from the statue to Tristran, all meaning is determined by the 
imagining Tristran.  All meaning is a supplement.  The statue – and the responses Tristran 
imagines for Yseut – replaces the absent Yseut.    
Por iço fist [Tristran] ceste image 
Que dire li volt son corage, 
Son bon penser, sa fole error, 
Sa paigne, sa joie d’amor, 
Car ne sot vers cui descovrir 
Ne son voler ne son desir.
223
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[Tristran] made that statue  
because he wanted to tell it what was in his heart 
His good thought, and his wild misconceptions, 
The pain he felt, and the joy of love, 
Since he knew not to whom to disclose 
His longing and his heart’s desire. 
Here, Thomas substitutes the statue for the original Yseut.  The statue becomes a physical 
substitute for his love as well, even physically as he “Molt la baisse” (946) [kissed it often].224  
He imagines her as an active participant that makes him jealous by forgetting him or finding 
some other lover.
225
  This jealousy prompts Tristran to “muster a l’image haiur” [vent his hatred 
on the statue].
226
  Looking at the expression on the statue’s face, however, he “Hidonc plurïe e 
merci crie” [crie[s] and beg[s] forgiveness].227  Clearly, the statue’s expression means nothing; 
without any sender, the implied communication here is totally empty of intent.  One could 
describe the statue scene as infinitely open or perfectly closed.  Keeping in mind the medieval 
attention to intent, the messages are infinitely open because there is no intent behind the traces.  
In contrast, the messages are closed; they are best understood as messages from Tristan to 
himself.  Both understandings of the statue scene erase the sender, negating the presence implied 
by intent.  Thomas’ representation of how Tristran creates meaning where there is none will be 
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addressed in a later chapter, but the final scenes further emphasize the importance to 
interpretation of knowing the sender.   
It is important to note that these difficulties in communication occur 1) after a previously 
indicated form of consent between lovers and 2) between the romantic leads.  Even the fragments 
of Thomas’ version include a scene that indicates a mutual consent to love.  The Cambridge MS. 
D.D. 15.12 fragment of Thomas’ Tristran shows Yseut offer a ring to Tristran “Por m’amor, 
amis, le gardés” [to remind [him] of [her] love].228  Later renditions of Thomas’ Tristan – 
Brother Robert’s Norse translation and Gottfried’s freer adaptation – include earlier episodes that 
indicate mutual affection.  The first instance – when the lovers first admit their love – introduces 
the difficulty in determining the intent of another person.  Tristan sees her troubled and asks 
what ails her and she responds l’ameir.  As these texts note, she could have meant any of the 
three homophones love, bitter (as in poison), or the sea.
229
 When asked, Isolde clarifies that she 
does not mean the latter two.  Gottfried expands on this notion of consent with a lengthy 
discourse on how the two shared one heart and mind,
230
 an idea to which he returns frequently.
231
  
The idea of lovers sharing one mind will be discussed in another chapter on its centrality to 
lovers’ communications, but for this chapter the key is that it helps to establish mutual assent.   
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The fact that these difficulties occur between the romantic leads suggests that the 
difficulties are in communication itself rather than the lovers.  As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, lovers in these tales are presented as the best interpreters of one another.  If, as the tale 
suggest, the most privileged of communications – between lovers – is challenged, then by 
extension so are all messages.  The difficulties, then, arise from the communication itself.   
 
Thomas’ Tristan is not alone in linking the difficulties of communication to lovers and 
consent.  The Anglo-Norman Romance of Horn addresses similar issues several times, with the 
clearest episodes centering around a ring the lovers exchange.
232
  Rymenhild offers Horn a ring 
in language that suggests marriage.  The later King Horn uses language that, as Felicity Riddy 
notes, sounds remarkably like “consent which, if followed by intercourse, constituted a legal 
marriage according to medieval canon law –even if the declaration is private.”233  Despite the 
intimate knowledge this suggests, Rymenhild does not recognize Horn when he returns dressed 
as a beggar.  As Rymenhild fails to recognize Horn when he returns, she is unable to correctly 
identify the sender, which prevents her from seeing the intent that is specific to her.  While the 
specific process by which she creates meaning will be discussed in a later chapter, the key 
relevance can be found in how many specifics in the scene parallel Tristan and in the way that 
the poet makes the communication undecidable without a clear knowledge of the sender.  Like 
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Tristan, Horn dresses as a “beggere”234 and “makede him[self] unbicomelich”235 in order to 
approach Rymenhild publicly in a manner that would reveal himself only to her.  Also 
paralleling the Tristan episode, one lover uses a ring to activate the intended message; Horn 
hopes it will help to establish his identity for her by tossing it into her drink.
236
  The humor of the 
situation arises from readers’ greater knowledge of what Horn is trying to communicate.  Horn’s 
message carries a balance of signals that confirm and contradict his identity as Horn.  While 
Horn tries to suggest his identity to Rymenhild by mentioning shared experiences, he balances 
this by stating and confirming his own death, eliminating “Horn” as a potential sender.   
Following generations of romances present lovers facing similar interpretive difficulties 
before they have expressed their mutual consent and/or affection; in fact, these communications 
begin to be used to in the process of establishing consent.  In these early works, it is still the 
primary lovers – such as Tristan and Isolde – who must navigate these difficulties.  In these 
situations, the lovers have even less information to determine the sender in that the sender’s 
attitude is unknown as well.   
Roughly fifty years after Thomas’ Tristan and the Romance of Horn, Marie de France’s 
Eliduc brings together the romance themes of communication, consent, and the idea that one may 
not even know one’s own intent.  The lovers’ difficulty communicating seems to come from the 
fact that Eliduc explores the role of communication in courtship, before mutual consent has been 
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established between the lovers.  Unlike the lovers in Tristan, Eliduc’s lovers can not fall back 
upon an assumed consent to help determine intent.   
Eliduc tells the story of two women who loved the same knight, Eliduc.  Eliduc marries 
and lives happily with the first until he is banished unfairly by his lord.
237
  Eliduc leaves his wife 
behind and goes to another nation, gaining favor for his successes.  He falls in love with 
Guilladun, who likewise loves him.  When Guilladun sends messages indicating her love as well 
as clear love-tokens, Eliduc returns responses that could indicate mere loyal affection or more 
passionate love.  Eliduc’s former lord sends a message calling him to return, forgiven.  Before 
leaving, the knight admits his love to Guilladun, who begs to go along.  He does not bring her, 
but they exchange rings.  He is distant with his wife as he helps to win the war, then returns to 
Guilladun in order to bring her with him.  On the return trip, they encounter a difficult storm, 
leading a sailor to threaten throwing her overboard because he already has a virtuous wife.  
Guilladun faints upon hearing he is married.  Eliduc throws the sailor overboard and comes to his 
home shore with a comatose Guilladun.  He visits her daily, growing ever more sad, until his 
wife discovers the woman.  Thinking more of their happiness than her own, the wife revives 
Guilladun with a magic flower then takes the veil as a nun to free their path to marriage.  Later in 
life, Eliduc gives himself up to serve God, and places Guilladun with his wife in the convent, 
where the two women live as sisters. 
Marie places a great emphasis on communication between lovers in Eliduc as the 
Guilladun tries to clarify his feelings for her.  As Robert Hanning notes, many of Marie’s lais 
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complement one another, and Eliduc is often discussed as a companion to Chevrefoil.
238
  
Chevrefoil provides an example of the privileged communication that idealized lovers share, 
showing Isolde understand a complex message and establish a tryst based solely on one word 
carved in wood,  Tristan’s name.  Marie spends the bulk of the lai on the act of communication, 
glossing quickly over even the lovers’ evening together.  Marie’s Chevrefoil indicates that she 
was familiar with the Tristan tales and sensitive to the importance of communication.  In Eliduc, 
Marie inverts the generic expectations of ideal communication between lovers seen in 
Chevrefoil.  Interpretation in Eliduc is hampered by Eliduc’s lack of clear intention in his 
responses to the woman who loves him.  Writing one lai that lionizes privileged communications 
between lovers, and another lai that questions those conventions, Marie follows in the same 
tradition as Tristan, ambivalent and anxious about lovers’ communications.    
 Marie’s Eliduc emphasizes even more aggressively than Thomas’ Tristan concerns about 
the lack of certain intent in lovers’ messages.239  Eliduc presents the loving Guilladun with 
messages that are undecidable because they lack subtext and therefore the potential to determine 
intent.    In contrast to Chevrefoil, Eliduc shows characters that love one another but do not gain 
any privileged understanding.  Guilladun, in particular, gains no insight from her affection.  
Eliduc’s responses to Guilladun’s advances retain their undecidability by erasing any indications 
as to the role he is adopting in his response: servant of the king or lover.  For purposes of 
determining meaning, she does not know who accepts her gifts. 
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 Guilladun tries to indicate clearly her affection for Eliduc through her gifts.  She clearly 
states “S’il ne m’aime par amur / Murir m’estuet a grant dolur”  [if [Eliduc] does not love me 
with real love, I must die in great sorrow].
240
  To show that she wants him “par amur, amer” 
[with love, to love], Guilladun sends to Eliduc via her chamberlain seemingly clear traditional 
symbols of affection, a belt and a ring.
241
  Guilladun offers a belt which, strapped around the 
waist, implies physical intimacy and suggests an embrace.  She also gives Eliduc a ring, which 
carries several associations with intimacy:  it can imply an embrace, the female genitalia, and 
even betrothal or marriage.  All of these associations ask Eliduc to define himself as Guilladun’s 
lover, and the fact that so many are deployed makes her desire for him to acknowledge and 
accept this role almost over-determined.  
Precisely because Guilladun’s gestures are over-determined, Eliduc’s refusal to respond 
clearly to any of her cues introduces ambiguity into their communications.  Eliduc puts on the 
ring and belt
242
 but says “nothing more.”243  The fact that Eliduc accepts the items suggests 
interest, but Eliduc’s silence is unusual enough to pointedly undermine the acceptance.  Faced 
with an unusual response, Guilladun must consider other possibilities.  Marie forces Guilladun to 
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consider the same ambiguity that Isolde uses when trying to mislead others with the ring (as 
discussed in the first chapter).  By refusing to acknowledge the context of her gifts, he erases any 
implied subtext.   
The chamberlain’s presence highlights the abnormality of Eliduc’s responses in two 
ways.  First, Marie makes it clear that Eliduc’s reticence is not a character trait – of rudeness, say 
– but a conscious choice; after all, the knight engages in normal relations with the messenger.  
Elidic thanks the man
244
 and makes the appropriate offer for service.
245
  In contrast, Eliduc does 
not send his thanks to the lady nor does he convey a sense of obligation.  Second, Marie 
emphasizes the failed communications by having Guilladun discuss the matter with her 
chamberlain.  Following the chamberlain’s advice, the princess notes optimisitically that “Mes 
nepurquant pur lesemblant / Peot l’um conustre li alquant” [by a reaction, one can know 
something].
246
  Guilladun presses the chamberlain to answer the salient question, whether Eliduc 
“Nel receut il pur drüerie?”  [accepts it as a love-token]247 but the chamberlain admits that he 
doesn’t know.  All he can say is that Eliduc’s acceptance is a good sign248 and that Eliduc seems 
to be of good character.
249
  In order to establish the intent, the chamberlain looks to establish the 
character of the sender, therefore substituting context (Eliduc’s apparent character) for content.   
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The uncertainty of Eliduc’s response prompts Guilladun to probe for the context of his 
acceptance in an effort to determine a clear intent.  She knows he likes her but wants to know the 
extent of this affection, so she meets with him in person.  Direct communication offers 
potentially a variety of indirect signals that might make clear his response.  While he is 
physically present, Eliduc does not offer any signals of his intent.  Who is speaking?  Is he 
speaking as Eliduc the loyal subject or as Eliduc the lover?  Both lovers are afraid to speak until 
Eliduc finally thanks her and tells her he’d “Unques mes n’ot aveir si chier” [never had anything 
more dear].
250
  This response, however, keeps his intentions inscrutable: “chier” can mean both 
emotionally dear or financially dear.  In an effort to force his hand, Guilladun’s response to 
Eliduc makes her position even clearer, saying she  “l’amat de tel amur … [et] Jamés n’avra 
humme vivant” [loved him with such love… [and] would never have a living man] other than 
him.
251
  When it is time to reveal his desire,
252
  Eliduc begins with an expression of gratitude that 
her love “grant joie en ai” [gives him great joy],253 but ends with the statement that he will leave 
once his years’ service to her father is over because he doesn’t wish to remain.254  Eliduc’s 
communications are ambiguous about the role he is adopting in relation to her; because of this 
ambiguity, his communications are as unclear as messages with an absent, unclear, or falsified 
sender. 
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Marie has Guilladun press the issue a second time, making these failed communications 
centerpieces for the lai.  Guilladun clarifies that the ring is an expression of a lover’s love and in 
so doing attempts to clarify how Eliduc understands the item’s meaning.  Eliduc, however, 
continues to emphasize the potential ambiguity of the items by choosing words that are flexible 
enough in meaning to account for both a lover’s lover and for a vassal’s love of a lord’s 
daughter.  This ambiguity also appears structurally in his speech.  He spends the first six lines 
expressing his gratitude and joy and the last seven describing his obligation to her father.  
Concluding with his desire to leave also suggests a reluctance to consent to be with her 
exclusively.  While the scene concludes with the two lovers making pledges to each other,
255
  
Eliduc’s pledge merely agrees to “decide… what to do with [Guilladun].256  He refuses to adopt 
a stable position in relation to her.  The lack of a clear relationship undermines the clarity of the 
responses.  The inability to know what role he is adopting in relation to her obscures the 
message.   Unlike in the examples from Tristan, Guilladun’s love gives her no insight into the 
priority of roles: loyal servant or lover.  
 Furthermore, Eliduc’s reticence can be understood as an accurate reflection of his own 
ambiguous feelings; if so, then two intentions are likeliest.  The first is that he wishes to avoid 
committing – a form of consent – in order to perpetuate the status quo.  The second is that he is 
truly undecided on the issue.  These two intentions coexist perfectly well with one another, so 
one does not need to choose one in order to emphasize the deep undecidability in these 
communications.  In fact, Marie has constructed these communications so that even Eliduc’s 
undecidable intent is itself undecidable.  In Abelard’s terms, Eliduc does not even know his own 
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mind.  These communications, at their foundation, have no meaning.  Meaning does not fall 
apart merely at the linguistic level but at the level of composition, in the mind itself.   
 
These themes continue to inform relationships within medieval romances throughout the 
late Middle Ages.  Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde brings together anxieties about 
communication and intent in the primary lovers, complicating the generic expectations he has 
inherited.  Troilus and Criseyde, however, includes communications that lack clear indications of 
intent both pre-consent and post-“consent”.  The expanded use of letters in the later Middle 
Ages to convey messages between lovers allows writers to expand the critique of an absent intent 
by emphasizing the difficulty of interpreting without all of the non-verbal clues that a present 
sender would communicate.  Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, in particular, emphasizes the 
difficulty of establishing intent in the absence of a sender by having letters – and Troilus’ 
interpretation of them – play pivotal roles in the romance.  The indeterminacy of Criseyde’s 
assent makes the intent behind her letters even more unclear to Troilus. 
 Chaucer’s portrayal of the first letter Criseyde sends Troilus highlights the absence of 
clear intent and the importance of interpretation in such a case.  Troilus has finally written to 
Criseyde, declaring his love in the most passionate and unmistakable terms.  Criseyde’s letter in 
response is so ambiguous that even the hopeful Troilus registers its mixed messages.    
But ofte gan the herte glade and quake    
  Of Troilus, whil that he gan it rede, 
  So as the wordes yave hym hope or drede.
257
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As he reads, Troilus encounters some words that give him “hope” and others that cause him to 
“drede” and his heart begins to “glade or quake” in response to these different messages.  
Whatever meaning Criseyde intended – and this is left unclear in the section describing her 
composition of the letter – Troilus has no access to it, because she hides her meaning as though 
hidden “under [a] sheld”.258 Chaucer makes it clear that Criseyde’s letter withholds information 
important to Troilus in establishing what the letter means.  Unambiguous signals of Criseyde’s 
interest in Troilus are absent.  Making the matter worse, Criseyde’s absence also eliminates any 
non-verbal clues Troilus might “read” to clarify her words.  Instead, Troilus is left with a gap 
where her answer might be.  Without a clear intent and sender, Troilus is forced to construct 
meaning where there may be none.   
 Chaucer echoes Criseyde’s absence as a sender in the final book as well, signaling the 
connection with the phrase “hope and drede” in relation to his “herte.”259 The phrase reappears to 
describe Troilus’ feelings on the tenth day of waiting for Criseyde to return.  The only judgment 
Chaucer’s narrator offers is that Troilus’ “hope alwey hym blente.”260  Chaucer’s source in 
Boccaccio, on the other hand, offers readers much clearer signals about how to read the absent 
Criseida, both at the gates and in her initial letter.  Boccaccio’s narrator describes Troilo’s hopes 
at the gate as “foolish.”261  Similarly, Boccaccio presents her first letter to Troilo in less 
ambiguous terms.  Boccaccio provides a heading that makes clear both the ambiguity and her 
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intent.  “Criseida replies to Troilo in a way which, while neither committing herself nor releasing 
herself from obligation, cautiously lets him suspect her love.”262  Her intent is clear and an 
explanation for her ambiguity is offered.  In contrast, Chaucer’s indirect presentation of the 
material, combined with the lack of clear narrative assertions about her intent, emphasizes the 
importance of Troilus’ reception of the material, a reception that has been colored by the 
romanticizing lens of Pandarus   
 Several times, Chaucer presents Troilus speaking to an absent, imagined Criseyde, much 
as Tristan spoke to his statue.  Having just fallen in love, Troilus says to himself a thousand 
times  
Good goodly, to whom serve I and laboure 
As I best kan, now wolde God, Criseyde,  
Ye wolde on me rewe, er that I deyde! 
My dere herte, allas, myne hele and hewe 
And lif is lost, but ye wol on me rewe!
263
   
Troilus’ cries for mercy here and later are, as Chaucer notes, seemingly for nought, as “she herde 
nat his pleynte.”264 Pandarus, however, does overhear Troilus’ complaints.  It is one of these 
seemingly misdirected messages that leads Pandarus to instigate the affair.  In fact, Pandarus is 
witness of several of Troilus’ complaints to an absent Criseyde.  After Criseyde fails to appear at 
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the gates and Troilus has his dream, Troilus calls out for Pandarus.  Troilus addresses the absent 
Criseyde by name three times, asking “whi leet I you from hennes go?”265  
 Chaucer explicitly raises the issue of intent in Troilus’ final speech to an absent Criseyde.  
Once again, Troilus calls for Pandarus to witness his speech.  Troilus asks the absent Criseyde, 
“was ther non other broch yow list lete/ to feffe with youre newe love…/but thilke broch that I 
yow gave as for remembraunce of me?”266  Despite his love, Troilus does not have any insight 
into Criseyde’s mind.  He answers his own question using the process of elimination.  The only 
answers that Troilus can imagine are spite and to openly show her intent.
267
   
The connection between intent, interpretation, and sin comes together in Chaucer.  
Chaucer’s interest in the role of entente and sin is clear in The Friar’s Tale. Chaucer’s definition 
of sin in this tale is determined about one’s inner consent more than one’s words.  In the story, a 
corrupt human summoner encounters a travelling devil and, seeing a kindred spirit, agrees to 
travel with him.  When they pass an angry cart driver cursing his horses, the summoner asks why 
the devil does not take them.  The devil replies that the driver’s words did not accurately reflect 
what he really desired; rather, the driver was merely indicating frustration.  Later, the summoner 
attempts to extort money from an old woman who calls for him to be taken to Hell if he does not 
repent.  The summoner indicates no willingness to repent, and he is taken to Hell.  Her words, 
unlike those of the driver, accurately reflect her inner consent.  This definition of sin, taken from 
the tradition established by Abelard, presents a situation where one’s intent is revealed more 
through one’s thoughts than one’s words.  This definition of intent, as noted before, may 
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sometimes be unclear to the speaker.  The cart driver is merely angry when he curses his horses 
and, as the devil notes, “he spak oo thing, but he thoghte another.”268  A more accurate 
assessment might be that the driver withheld his inner consent to damn the horses, even though 
he meant to say what he said.  While the supernatural devil correctly sees this, the driver’s inner 
intent is unknown to the human summoner.
269
   
Troilus’speeches are best understood as general statements about his emotional state 
rather than as messages he expected Criseyde to understand.
 270
  Unlike Tristan, Troilus does not 
imagine specific responses for Criseyde.
271
  Troilus does, however, perform these speeches for 
Pandarus, which raises issues that will become important in the Renaissance about declarations 
of love being overheard by non-lovers.  Like many of the other texts using relational semantics 
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to question the ideal of collective individualism, Troilus and Criseyde presents as problematic 
the construction of an imagined sender in the mind of the receiver.
 272
     
 As the tradition of lovers’ consent and communication continues into the Renaissance, 
the idea that lovers have an affinity that shows in their communications even before they have 
consented to love one another allows it to serve an additional function.  As we have seen, the 
early works have the lovers show consent first; as will be discussed in the next chapter, any 
misinterpretation by non-lovers therefore serves primarily to reinforce the lovers’ compatibility.  
Before the lovers have mutually agreed to their role as lovers, the ability to determine intent 
becomes even more difficult.  This difficulty is made even more important due to the fact that, 
used before lovers have given mutual consent, the interpretive process becomes the means of 
establishing compatibility and consent rather than merely reflecting these qualities.   
 Because of their wide influence, Sidney’s Old Arcadia and its subsequent versions 
become the means of transmitting into different genres the convention linking consent and 
communication between lovers.
273
  In addition, Sidney includes the newer practice of showing 
unrequited prospective suitors misunderstand the messages from those they love.  These 
misinterpretations are understandable and will be discussed in greater depth in the following 
chapters, but for the purposes of this chapter, the key is that lovers and non-lovers are being 
shown in the same – difficult – interpretive position.  The lovers’ greater insight, then, sets them 
apart from those whose affections are not returned.  Rather than critiquing language, these later 
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texts set the lovers’ communications outside traditional language.  The error is in the individual 
rather in than in language itself.  One could argue through extension that Sidney’s Old Arcadia 
establishes the convention that one mind communication is the condition that defines true 
lovers.
274
  
Sidney’s romance obscures linguistic intent by obscuring the sender in disguises.    These 
disguises introduce taboos of class and/or gender, further obscuring communication.  Musidorus 
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is forbidden to Pamela because she thinks Musidorus is a shepherd and Pyrocles/Cleophilia is 
forbidden to Philoclea because she thinks that Pyrocles is a woman.
275
  Another complication 
that Sidney adds to the communications between lovers is that the characters’ poems are often 
composed as though to the poet himself or to an absent, general audience.  Especially when 
combined with an unknown sender but even when the author is known, this generalized intent 
opens up the range of potential interpretations radically.  Sidney erases the sender by confusing 
the issue of whether declarations of love are general, gnomic observations or are directed to an 
individual.  
One of the most destabilizing interpretive moments in OA occurs when Pyrocles – 
dressed as the Amazon Cleophila – overhears a plaintive poem called aloud in a cavern.  The 
unknown poet (Gynecia) has no way of knowing that Pyrocles – the object of her affection – will 
overhear her laments.  Gynecia directs her first lament toward “ghosts” and “furies.”276  Here, 
Sidney highlights the absence of Gynecia’s literal audience (spirits never appear in the work) and 
her desired, but seemingly absent, audience (Pyrocles).  It is this lack of a specific audience that 
opens the poem up to alternate responses, such as the two that Pyrocles experiences.  From 
Gynecia’s perspective, this is a poem with a missing receiver, but when Pyrocles reads it, he 
receives it as though from an absent or obscured sender.   
Pyrocles experiences Gynecia’s poem first as a general connection that holds the 
potential for a personal one, and then as a personal one where he withholds his consent.  Hearing 
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these verses, Pyrocles calls out “who is this so well acquainted with me, that can make so lively a 
portraiture of my miseries?”277  As the poet’s miseries are the same as his, Pyrocles implies that 
the poem indicates some meaningful connection between the unknown poet and himself, a 
connection that may be similar to the conventions of a mystical connection between two lovers.  
At the very least, Pyrocles believes the two are “fellow prentices to one ungracious master.”278  
Here, the language suggests a shared experience similar to the ones described in previous 
romance.  Pyrocles’ emotional connection to the poet is severed when he discovers that the poet 
is Gynecia.  Gynecia, the mother of his beloved Philoclea, has repeatedly and aggressively 
pursued Pyrocles – even when he is dressed as a woman.  Pyrocles never consents to accept 
Gynecia’s love,279 telling her that granting the woman’s pleas is a “direct impossibility.”280 
Unknown, the author of these verses is a kindred spirit; known, the singer of these verses is an 
object of irritation.  Pyrocles’ interpretation of the verses, therefore, hinges on his knowledge of 
the sender.  Most importantly, Pyrocles responds to the verses in a manner resembling collective 
individualism even though, at the start, he does not know whether he shares a love for the 
speaker.   
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In addition to having his primary lovers assuming a privileged relationship without 
mutual love/consent, Sidney shows Philoclea unable to determine with any certainty the object of 
a verse composed by her beloved Pyrocles.
281
  One barrier to her understanding is due to 
confusion over the sender.  Even though she knows the speaker, she does not know that Pyrocles 
is truly a man.  Philoclea has mused over her “unlawful desires” for Pyrocles/Cleophila and 
“wish[ed] to herself (for even to herself she was ashamed to speak it out in words) that Cleophila 
might become a young transformed Caenius,” an Ovidian character that is transformed from a 
woman into a man.”282  Philoclea senses a compatibility that is hindered only by the fact that the 
sender is – she thinks – a woman.  An intended, specific declaration of love, even one hidden 
within a general declaration, would be improper coming to her from another woman.    
The second barrier to Philoclea’s understanding stems from the fact that it is impossible 
to determine whether she should respond as though the poem were composed about love 
generally or about her specifically.  Pyrocles directs his laments to a stream
283
 but also introduces 
the idea that he composed the poem solely for himself, adding that his words “with echo’s force 
rebound / and make[s] [him] hear the plaint [he] would refrain.”284  The “echo” makes this 
literally a “song to [himself].”285  Despite the private nature of this composition, Philoclea feels a 
connection between herself and the poet.  Hearing him, Philoclea is “content to hear words 
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which she thought might with more cause have been spoken by her own mouth.”286  She views 
her experience as one shared with the poet but nothing seems to set apart her connection to 
Pyrocles from the one Pyrocles has assumed in relation to Gynecia.  In both cases, the idea of a 
privileged relationship seems constructed in the mind of the lover; how the lovers construct 
meaning will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  Since Pyrocles does not know he is 
overheard, his declarations have no communicative intention.   
  Sidney introduces the idea that the beloved will know a lover’s intent from a general 
declaration of love without any specific clues, prior consent, or even the intention for the beloved 
to hear.  Lovers are expected to understand secret inner monologues that their beloveds may 
never have intended to be heard.  Sidney, here, then flirts with the idea that making correct 
interpretive additions to a lover’s words is what sets apart lovers from non-lovers, even before 
mutual consent.   
In contrast to the carefully balanced undecidability of earlier medieval examples, OA 
provides the transition into an error-based model.  Instead of two coexisting interpretations, one 
meaning is clearly correct while the other is in error.  Given the idea that proper interpretation 
defines proper lovers, those suitors that believe erroneous meanings, therefore, are shown to be 
unsuitable.   
Perhaps the best example of a handbook that explores the importance of establishing 
meaning through the identity of the sender is Buoncampagno de Signa’s Rota Veneris.287  This 
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handbook describes the necessity of conveying lovers’ identities through “hidden signs in their 
salutations, to represent, in symbols, their names […] should the letter end up in someone else’s 
hands.”288  While this distinction is made in a section directed toward clerics who wish to send 
love-letters, Buoncampagno states that this applies to “women and men of whatever station”289 
who need to remain anonymous because of social limitations or taboo.   
The ability to correctly interpret the secret object of another person’s affection returns us 
to the idea expressed in handbooks of love-letters – such as Buoncampagno’s – that a letter, 
particularly in its salutation, should convey enough information to inform the beloved while 
appearing general enough to conceal specifics from others.
290
  Sidney seems to present a 
situation where even a message without such specific clues declaration will reach the beloved.   
One key distinction between the communications in the medieval romances and Sidney’s 
OA is that Sidney gives the audience/reader access to the “proper” meaning rather that having 
that meaning withheld.  Sidney offers the inner emotional states of his characters at each of these 
moments, while the Anglo-Norman Thomas and Chaucer do not present definitive 
interpretations.  As such, Sidney seems to be working within the framework of moderate 
Platonism, with a stable meaning that may be beyond humans. Meaning in Sidney and the 
following Renaissance writers is not essentially relational; it is merely relational for the 
characters.  Readers, like God, have access to the truth.  Looking closely at Sidney’s OA in this 
light reverses Waswo’s and others’ assumptions that Renaissance language is characterized by 
having greater contingency than medieval language.   
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Sidney’s presentation of lovers in OA, therefore, shows true lovers having that access, 
even when they do not trust it.   One of the key elements that separates true lovers from selfish 
ones is that the instinctual connection of true lovers has to overcome skepticism rooted in taboos 
of gender or class.  Two components set true lovers apart:  inner consent and openness to the 
other’s consent.   
Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella presents Astrophil as thinking he has a privileged 
knowledge of Stella’s consent when he does not.  Sidney raises the issue of Astrophil’s clouded 
judgment when he reads Stella’s actions.  In sonnet 67, he addresses Hope, concluding, “Well, 
how so thou interpret the contents,  I am resolv’d thy error to maintaine,  Rather then by more 
truth to get more paine.”291  As it turns out, Astrophil consciously chooses to read her actions 
through the lens of his hope (or desire).
292
  After 85 sonnets, it comes as quite a shock when we 
finally hear Stella’s responses to Astrophil’s declarations of love, which turn out to be, “no, no 
no, no, my Deare, let be’” (6th line of each stanza).293  In the Ninth Song, Astrophil seems to 
acknowledge the gap between her loving words and what he finally concludes is her intent, that 
“she hates [him].”294 By the Eleventh Song, Stella’s pragmatic and singularly unsympathetic 
response does not match whatsoever with the impression Astrophil has conveyed of her.  First, 
she offers the advice that “in absence [his love] will dy”295 and ends with her saying “be gone, be 
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gone, I say, lest that Argus’ eyes perceive you.’”296  Astrophil’s education would seem to be 
complete when he once again addresses his “false, flattering hope”297 in sonnet 106, this time to 
reject it.  His new-found acknowledgment of their different opinions of one another appears here, 
as well, when he responds to her advice in the Eleventh Song and he addresses the sonnet to his 
“absent presence,”298 Stella.  Just as in OA, the model is based on error and correctness, rather 
than on uncertainty.  In both cases, error stems from an inability to determine the sender: more 
specifically, whether the sender consents to be a lover. 
The debt that Sidney owes to romances such as Tristan sets his sonnets apart from their 
Petrarchan roots.  Sidney’s poems do not merely reflect an inner state.  By acknowledging 
potential responses to his poems, Sidney’s Astrophil turns his sonnets into messages to Stella.  In 
the first sonnet, Astrophil announces the desired response of the cycle.  Key to this progression is 
that it ends in Stella’s consent to love him.  Also key is that Stella herself never offers this 
consent; Astrophil has written her response, erasing her ability within the poem to deny consent.  
The character of Stella is absent from the process. 
Shakespeare explores communications that likewise seem to involve absent, constructed 
senders.  Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night places Malvolio in an interpretive situation where not 
knowing the sender of a letter makes a letter’s intent unclear.299  Love-letters rely upon their 
ability to conceal from others while transmitting messages between lovers.  Twelfth Night clearly 
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echoes the conventions – established in works such as Troilus and its precursor Tristan – of 
messages where no clear meaning is available to the reader.  The letter is clearly constructed to 
encourage Malvolio to interpret the letter as though he were a lover with a privileged interpretive 
connection to Olivia.  Like the works discussed in this chapter, however, the letter’s real intent – 
to make a fool of Malvolio – is obscured from Malvolio.  Much like the statue in Tristan, the 
person Malvolio imagines has written the letter – a loving Olivia – doesn’t exist.  The letter is 
written by an imaginary character that declares her love for no one.  The sender here is absent, 
but more importantly, the sender’s identity is a constructed deception, which raises different 
questions.   
The letter to Malvolio and his response to it draw on a tradition of salutations seen in 
letter-writing handbooks from the twelfth century and extending deep into the nineteenth 
century, such as Buoncampagno de Signa’s Rota Veneris, that explore the importance of 
salutations in establishing the identity and intent of the letter-writer, particularly for taboo or 
clandestine messages.
300
  Certainly, the difference in class between Malvolio and Olivia would 
make a relationship between them equally taboo and necessarily clandestine.  Malvolio’s 
knowledge of this convention adds fuel to fire his imagination with visions of an Olivia who 
loves him but can only reveal herself to the one person who can understand. 
 Shakespeare here uses the convention of communications without a clear intention to 
identify Malvolio as a bad lover.  Malvolio’s encounter with the letter is undecidable for him 
because his knowledge of the sender is obscured.  Even more than in Sidney’s OA, 
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Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night offers the audience clear indicators of how Malvolio avoids a 
correct meaning.  This roots the message’s uncertainty in moderate Platonism rather than in the 
nominalist tradition prevalent in earlier texts.   
 The troubling scene of Malvolio’s incarceration makes more sense when one considers 
his actions in the context of his self-involved communications: Malvolio’s interpretation is 
presented by Shakespeare as flawed, but a common sense reading of the play suggests that 
Malvolio’s reading is sensible, particularly given the fact that Maria has constructed it to appear 
real.  The letter’s extended salutation to a secret, forbidden lover concludes with by stating that 
“M.O.I.A. doth sway my life.”301  Malvolio then proceeds to unpack the clues that will lead him 
to think he is loved by his mistress, Olivia.  Malvolio quickly leaps to the connection between 
the first letter and the first letter of his name, but becomes frustrated by the fact that A should 
come next.  Rather than accepting the evidence suggests he is not the object of affection, 
Malvolio notes that if he “crush[es the letter] a little, it would bow to him, for every one of these 
letters is in [his] name.”302  Given the other references, particularly to a “steward,”303 his 
assumptions make sense.   
Malvolio’s error becomes clearer when considered in the context of the emphasis on 
contingency in communications.  He leaps to “crush” the letter before he encounters the 
reference to a steward.  The overtly sexual references seen in Malvoio’s interpretation of  
“Olivia’s” writing provide a signal of this self-involvement, as he is blinded in part by his desire.  
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When he does reassess his interpretation, Malvolio never refers to any evidence outside himself; 
in this way, he relies on his imagination rather than his fancy, creating a “sender” that matches 
his preconceptions.  After the initial letter, this “communication” – if it can be called that 
properly – is entirely contained within his head.  As will be discussed in the chapter on the 
imagination, once he gets it into his head that she loves him, Malvolio no longer compares his 
interpretation to external evidence such as Olivia’s responses.  In this way, Malvolio’s fixation 
parallels that seen in those suffering from “lovesickness” which is, as described by Gerard of 
Berry, as 
 
error uirtutis estimatiue que inducitur per intentiones sensatas ad apprehendenda 
accidencia insensata que forte non sunt in persona.  aliquod sensatum aliquando 
occurrit anime ualde gratum… unde si qua sunt sensata bib conueniencia 
occultantur a non sensatis intentionibus anime uehementer infixis.
304
   
 
[A malfunction of the estimative faculty, which is misled by sensed  
perceptions into apprehending non-sensed accidents that perhaps are not in the 
person.…[because] some sensed object appears very pleasing… Any unfitting 
sensations are, as a consequence, obscured by the non-sensed intentions]. 
 
                                                          
304
Mary Frances Wack. Love-sickness in the Middle Ages:  the Viaticum and its Commentaries.   
(Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1990), 198.  Translated by Wack. 
Eggers Misticall Unions 135 
Malvolio’s self-involvement can be seen when he presents evidence of his love in the form of 
yellow stockings to Olivia.  Rather than offering any confirmation, Olivia expresses confusion 
and identifies as madness what modern readers might identify as a delusional state.   
  
 Shakespeare also emphasizes more clearly the privileged relationship of true lovers when 
interpreting messages from those who love them.  Viola, in particular, embodies the ability to 
correctly interpret a message because she properly identifies the sender.  Viola, dressed as the 
youthful man Cesario, correctly ‘reads’ a ring that Olivia has sent to ‘him’ as a clandestine 
declaration of love.
305
  Olivia obscures both herself as the ring’s sender and her intent by 
claiming that she received it from Viola and wishes to return it as a rejection.  When Viola 
refuses it, Malvolio finishes delivering it, stating, “Come, sir, you peevishly threw it to her, and 
her will is it should be so returned.”306  Malvolio then tosses the ring on the ground and departs.  
Confused, Viola notes that neither she nor her lord sent Olivia a ring.
307
  In direct opposition to 
the meaning she has been offered, Viola very quickly – and correctly – comes to the conclusion 
“she loves me, sure!”308     
 Viola’s correct conclusion, given the conflicting signals of this message, suggests that 
lovers’ openness to others – not merely to one another – allows them greater access to a 
sometimes obscured truth.  Olivia’s assigned message is built on a lie:  that she was given the 
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ring.
309
  Despite this, a simple, referential ‘reading’ of the ring’s message either takes Olivia (via 
Malvolio) at her word, accepting that the ring is a rejection, or sees the error, rejecting the 
message outright.  Rather than accepting either option, Viola asks “What means this lady?”310and 
looks for contextual clues.  Viola’s first hypothesis is that her appearance might have “charmed 
[Olivia].” 311This interpretive leap depends upon knowledge of the tradition – traced in this 
chapter – of lovers exchanging objects as clandestine expressions of affection, with all the 
association of lust and marriage.  Working from this initial assumption, Viola then tests her 
hypothesis against evidence rather than working from an a priori assumption, thus using 
induction rather than deduction.  Armed with the knowledge of Olivia’s affection, Viola 
reassesses when Olivia “made good view of [her]” (2.2.14) and “[spoke] in starts, distractedly” 
(2.2.16), seeing these now as signs of love confirming her hypothesis.  Viola, then, follows the 
conventions traced throughout this chapter and negotiates what would seem to be an undecidable 
text, linking her to the lovers discussed in the first chapter who make remarkable interpretive 
leaps.  Viola’s experience does not follow the tradition of lovers interpreting each other 
effectively; rather her lover’s empathy, combined with an openness to consider the evidence 
skeptically, leads her to make correct conclusions about the messages in the play. 
                                                          
309
 Viola’s response, acknowledging that “[Olivia] took the ring of me” (2.2.8) may also be a lie.  
One popular performance of this line has Viola presenting as a question, asking incredulously, 
“she took the ring of me”?  This alters the line’s punctuation and eliminates the causal 
relationship with the second half of the line, which might be paraphrases as “She took it, 
therefore I won’t have it.” 
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 Returning to Malvolio’s interpretive progress, we see that – from his perspective – his 
progress follows closely that seen in Sidney’s OA.  The primary exception is that Malvolio 
misses an entire interpretive level, that of the pranksters.  Considering Malvolio within the 
context of the messages without clear intent clarifies both the assumptions that inform his 
mistaken interpretation and the specifics of his transgression.  Malvolio has been written to show 
that he considers it more likely that his mistress would cross class lines in order to love him than 
for someone to pull a prank on him.  The specifics of how he makes this leap will be discussed in 
the chapter on cognition, but it is enough for now to point out that he considers himself to be 
interpreting insightfully when he is truly in error.   
 Shakespeare consistently shows characters not living up to the ideal of love by having 
them misinterpret – often due to a lack of generosity – texts that are unclear because the sender is 
unknown.  Bertram has no way of knowing that Helena controls the ring’s meaning in All’s Well 
That Ends Well.  Posthumus has no way of knowing certainly the reason that Imogen gives the 
ring in Cymbeline.  Othello has no way to properly interpret the exchange of the handkerchief 
because, much like Isolde of the White Hands, Iago has substituted an imagined figure to reject 
Othello and replace the previously shared consent.  Each of these cases presents the audience 
with a correct reading and shows characters “misreading.”  Such texts emphasize the failure of 
the individual rather than the failure of language; Malvolio is wrong, even sensibly so, but the 
audience does not share his confusion.   Given the frequency with which he deploys this 
technique and the popularity of his work, one could argue that Shakespeare is central in 
stabilizing the conventions of communication and consent as an error-based model. Shakespeare 
has taken this technique, seen in Sidney’s Old Arcadia, and translated it into drama, expanding 
its circulation. 
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 Redirecting the focus of the critique from post-consent lovers to pre-consent non-lovers 
reflects a shift in attitudes toward language, at least within the romance tradition.  As discussed 
in this chapter, earlier, medieval works undermine the very foundations of communication in 
relation to intent and knowledge of the sender.  No one – not even the best of lovers – is exempt 
from this uncertainty, as intention is changeable and difficult to recognize.  In contrast, later 
versions betray an error-based model, where one understanding is clearly marked as correct.  As 
such, the problem lies not with language or even with the idea that lovers have privileged 
interpretive access to one another, but with the individual who fails to understand properly.  
Meaning is stable, tied to intent, and essentially referential, if ambiguous.  This implies that the 
problem then is individual, not systemic. Looking at these romances leads to the unexpected 
conclusion that medieval texts can commit more fully to a deeper contingency and indeterminacy 
than Renassance texts.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“WE TWO BEING ONE”:   
ONE BODY, ONE SOUL, ONE LANGUAGE 
 
Together.  Yes.  Transplant my brain into your body. 
The two of us, together.  Fused.  We’ll be one complete person. 
Isn’t that what love is? 
- Cyberwoman, Torchwood312   
 
…in beiden 
   nie mê wan ein herze unde ein muot; 
   ir beider übel, ir beider guot, 
ir beider tôt, ir beider leben 
diu wâren alse in ein geweben;  
swaz ir dewederem gewar 
des wart daz ander gewar; 
swaz sô dem einem sanfte tete, 
ses des empfant daz ander an der stete. 
sie wâren beide under in zwein 
mir übele und mit guote al ein. 
                                                          
312
 Russell T. Davies and Christ Chibnall.  “Cyberwoman.”  Torchwood.  BBC.  Television.  Nov. 
5, 2006.  DVD. 
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     - Gottfried von Strassburg’s Tristan, 12th c.313 
 
[There was but one heart and soul between them.  Their  
pleasure and their pain, their life and their death were as if  
woven into one.  Whatever troubled either, the other grew aware  
of it.  Whatever gratified one, his partner sensed it immediately.   
For pleasure and for pain the two were as one.]
314
 
 
Prince Edward (singing):   You were made… 
Giselle (singing):    … to finish your duet. 
- Disney’s Enchanted (2007)315  
 
  How do you know 
  Everything I'm about to say? 
- Ashlee Simpson Pieces of Me (2004)316   
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 The humor in the opening quote from a current BBC science fiction series relies upon the 
widely understood assumption that lovers become one person and more specifically that their 
two brains come together in a meaningful way.   The writers of the show use the cyberwoman’s 
inability to understand the metaphorical nature of this description as a sign that she is no longer 
human; rather, she interprets literally, which is the common assumption of how computers work 
(AI research notwithstanding).  In addition, the primary assumption is that computers are unable 
to make the imaginative leaps necessary for such interpretive insight.  In a perhaps unintended 
fashion, however, the Torchwood writers highlight the oddity of defining love as a melding of 
two minds into one whole.   
 As seen in the quotation from Gottfried’s Tristan, the literary convention of two lovers 
sharing one mind can be traced at least as far back as the twelfth century.  This chapter will 
identify radical collective individualism as the defining characteristic of many literary lovers in 
texts from the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries.  The lovers define themselves as having one 
mind, one soul, and one language – as essentially a collective individual that stands apart from 
the rest of society.  These are lovers who share a profound knowledge of one another that others 
– particularly those who would keep the lovers apart – can not comprehend.  The clearest 
examples of this collective individualism appear in John Donne’s poetry, but Donne draws on a 
tradition that extends back through Shakespeare to the Anglo-Norman Thomas’ twelfth-century 
version of Tristan and Isolde.  Thomas’ idea of a collective individual grows from medieval 
debates over language and marriage, where consent appears indirectly in the form of remarkable 
interpretive leaps by lovers.  This construction does not remain constant in its transmission, 
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however.  While medieval versions of collective individualism include serious reservations about 
language and marriage, most Renaissance versions present the lovers’ private communications in 
a more favorable light.  By the time of Donne, showing how the lovers share “one mind” 
becomes an important characteristic in defining ideal lovers.   
 The connection between Renaissance texts and medieval ones is analogous rather than 
specifically referential; the Renaissance texts work with a cultural construction of lovers that 
draws on elements seen in medieval lovers such as Tristan and Isolde.
317
  The cultural 
construction of lovers in both groups includes an almost mystical, privileged understanding 
between the lovers that separates them from others in an act of radical collective individualism.  
Some, including Donne, take this mystical understanding beyond the realm of language and into 
an almost psychic ability of lovers to know the thoughts of each other.
318
  Like the medieval 
                                                          
317
 As quintessential lovers, Guinevere and Lancelot might seem to offer the potential for sharing 
one mind, but representations of them, such as in Mallory, include few examples of the kind of 
communication discussed here.   
318
 DeRougemont argues against a mystical union of this sort, identifying it, as I discussed in an 
earlier chapter, as communion, rather than union (the ability to achieve “essential union with 
God” (Love 157)).  Denis de Rougement. Love in the Western World. Trans. Montgomery 
Belgion.  (Princeton:  Princeton UP, 1983).  DeRougemont clarifies these terms in his discussion 
of the difference between Eastern and Western approaches to the divine.  He works with 
Rudolph Otto’s assertion that Eckhart describes “a mysticism of exaggerated emotion where the 
“I” and the “Thou” flow together in a unity of intoxicated feeling” (qtd. in deRougemont Love 
154).  Otto can be found in translation in Mysticism East and West.  Trans.  Bertha L Bracey and 
Richenda C. Payner.  (New York:  Quest, 1987).    In contrast, DeRougemont defines Master 
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texts, the Renaissance texts in this tradition share a concern with consent in marriage.  In 
addition to analogical connections, both periods share potential influences:  a shared wedding 
ceremony, stories of lovers from medieval romances using miraculous communication that are 
still read, and a working knowledge of relational semantics.  Renaissance England builds on 
lovers’ almost mystical relational semantics to create a radical collective individualism wherein 
lovers define themselves as one mind.   
 This chapter will have three primary goals.  First, it will identify the late Renaissance 
version of lovers’ collective individualism in John Donne’s poetry and Shakespeare’s Romeo and 
Juliet.  These works define lovers as sharing an ability to understand correctly one another that is 
privileged over those who would oppose the lovers.  The two elements important to this 
construction are privileged understanding akin to sharing one mind and a concern with marital 
self-determination in the form of consent.  Second, this chapter will show how lovers’ collective 
individualism occurs in language and arises as a response to twelfth-century concerns about 
consent in marriage.  Adding the idea of mutual consent to definitions of marriage alters the 
original, legal meaning of spouses sharing one flesh.  Originally, this standard places control in 
the hands of the husband, but adding the woman’s power of consent allows literary works to 
apply this definition more broadly, suggesting the merging of two minds into one.  Some 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Eckhart as communion (Love 155), quoting “the soul escapes from its nature, its being and its 
life, and is born into the Divinity, no distinction remains but this:  the Divinity is still God, and 
the soul is still a soul” (qtd in deRougemnt Love 155).  This quotation is originally from 
Eckhart’s sermon Nisi granum frumenti.  For more information on medieval mystics’ responses 
to the erotic, romantic Song of Songs, see Bernard McGinn’s multi-volume The Presence of God:  
A History of Western Mysticism (New York:  Crossroad, 1991).   
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romances then use this marital language to highlight how elevated extramarital relationships can 
better embody marital ideals than marriage itself.  This second section will identify the roots of 
this privileged understanding in medieval literary representations of lovers’ clandestine 
communications, perhaps the most prevalent example of which appears in the various versions of 
Tristan and Isolde.  Tristan and Isolde’s communications reveal a working knowledge of 
relational semantics, where the lovers’ words have one meaning for themselves and a different 
meaning for others.  While the lovers’ understanding may seem magical, the versions of Tristan 
and Isolde consistently highlight the interpretive, rather than the mystical, nature of the 
messages.  Third, this chapter will discuss the difficulties faced by the lovers as they face 
intrusions into their private communications, and how the lovers’ private meaning comes to be 
given greater importance than public meaning.  The conflict in each of these works centers 
around who determines consent and therefore controls meaning.  Much of this chapter will be 
spent on the Tristan myth, as this tale best establishes and – through its wide circulation – 
transmits the conventions of collective individualism.  
 
 John Donne’s poetry provides the most explicit representations of one lover defining 
himself – and an ideal lover – as a collective individual.319  The conceits in “A Valediction:  
Forbidding Mourning” illustrate the narrator’s statement to his beloved that “our two souls 
therefore … are one.”320  Donne illustrates this unity by comparing the two as one thinly beaten 
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sheet of gold and as a compass.  The compass, in particular, takes two units – the legs – and 
shows them combined into one unit.   
The Canonization’s narrator refers to “we two” lovers as “being one” (24), extending this 
reference to include the idea that the lovers combine “both sexes” into “one neutral thing” (25), 
much like the mythical phoenix.  Donne’s description of the lovers as a collective phoenix is 
particularly striking because it stands in contrast to the Petrarchan analogue in Rime Sparse 135, 
where Petrarch describes the solitary lover “con la fenice” [like the phoenix] (15),321 making 
explicit the image from a few lines earlier:   
  Là onde il dì ven fore 
  Vola un augel che sol, senza consorte, 
  Dì volotaria morte 
Rinasce et tutto a viver si rinova.  
[There whence the day comes forth flies 
A bird that lives alone, without consort, after voluntary death, is  
reborn and all renews itself to life.] 
322
 
Silvia Ruffo-Fiore notes that in this case Donne “exceeds Petrarch’s idealism… Donne’s love 
here is mutual, rational, transcendental, and confidently self-immortalizing.”323   
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 Petrarch, Franceso.  “Rime Sparse 135.”  Petrarch’s Lyric Poems:  The Rime Sparse and 
Other Lyrics. Trans. and edited by Robert M. Durling.  (Cambridge:  Harvard UP, 1979), 15. 
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In “The Ecstasy,” love mixes the lovers’ souls and “makes both one,” 324 even “abler” 
than those souls apart.
325
  Donne’s “Good Morrow” presents a similar model of shared self when 
he proposes to his beloved “Let us possess one world, each hath one, and is one.”326  This line 
uses ambiguous grammar to suggest a collective.  Donne begins with a collective imperative to 
share one world before introducing the two – “each” – encompassed in this collective.  The motif 
continues in the two hemispheres
327
 – each one half of a collective whole, and in the assertion 
that their love should be mixed in equal parts, with each half combining into a whole.
328
   The 
singular verb in the final phrase refers grammatically back to “each,” describing potentially two 
different worlds that become one by the end of the line.  The repetition of “one” also creates a 
sense of unity between the lovers;  this repetition echoes the language of older romance texts that 
describe lovers as sharing one heart and one mind, a trend that will be discussed at length later in 
this chapter.  Donne presents the idea of collective individuality most simply in “A Valediction: 
of my Name, in the Window,” when his narrator declares to his beloved “Here you see mee, and 
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I am you.”329  In addition to clearly equating the two, the image of his name and the reading 
lover’s reflection in the window overlap and merge, visually becoming one.330 
 This desire for extra-linguistic communication echoes the desire to achieve perfect unity  
with another person.  Lacan describes this desire as an attempt to reclaim a perceived loss of 
unity once the subject passes the mirror stage and enters into the symbolic order.  Donne’s 
immediate “knowing” would allow access to what the Other desires (denoted by S(A) in his 
1960 text “Subversion of the Subject and Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Subconscious” – 
note the slash through the A indicates how the A (big A Autre or Other) is unavailable according 
to Lacan).  Within the symbolic order, language has the fundamental property of being separable 
from the object it represents.  The one object that, in the mind of the subject, escapes this 
alienation of speech Lacan identifies as objet a (or petit a).  Within the concept of romantic love, 
objet a is the other lover within a pair, which builds from the idea generally that “a man relates to 
a woman only as the missing “objet a,” a phantasm of wholeness or totality.” 331  As will be 
discussed in another chapter, this illusion, despite the idea of wholeness, establishes a 
relationship within the mind of the lover, with the lover playing both parts.  Lacan asserts that 
“The Other is, therefore, the locus in which is constituted the I who speaks with him who 
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hears.”332  The desire for the Other described in this relationship is both the desire for the Other 
and experienced as the Other’s desire.   
 DeRougmont’s discussion of Tristan and Isolde builds on a similar set of assumptions, 
suggesting that the lovers 
do not love one another… What they love is love and being in  
love.  They behave as if aware that whatever obstructs love must  
ensure and consolidate it in the heart of each and intensify it  
infinitely in the moment they reach the absolute obstacle, death.
333
 
 DeRougmont’s analysis relies on the assumption that the “full possession” of each other would 
destroy the intensity of their relationship.  As such, he portrays the lovers as self-destructively 
searching for that which harms them most.  DeRougmont’s description of the lovers focuses on 
negative constructions, painting their experience as individual and imaginary, including the self-
destructive “preference for whatever thwarts passion, hinders the lovers’ ‘happiness,’ and parts 
and torments them.”334  
Donne’s language, however, does not focus on the self-involved elements potential in 
such a relationship, nor does it suggest that the lovers’ passion is predicated on its transgressive, 
self-destructive properties.  The Good Morrow presents this love not as the return to a missing 
whole but as a move forward into a perfectly balanced collective adulthood.  The image that 
Donne’s narrator desires before he encounters his beloved suggests the realization of a Platonic 
ideal or, as Donne describes it, an expansion, rather than an essential lack.  
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 Ilona Bell, in Elizabethan Woman and the Poetry of Courtship, argues that Anne More – 
rather than a male coterie – should be considered Donne’s primary audience.335  In this case, 
More’s eventual consent to marry Donne indicates her consent to accept a definition of herself as 
laid out in part by John, specifically to be part of a collective whole.  In so doing, More adopted 
a definition of herself – or allowed herself to be defined – outside class and station, since she was 
of aristocratic upbringing and he was not.  Their love can also be considered in contrast to social 
standards as her father never approved of the marriage and, in fact, withheld her dowry.  By all 
accounts, the two remained loyal and loving despite financial and personal hardships.   
 Karl F. Morrison argues that the primary audience for these poems may be Donne’s 
fellow religious student Edward Tilman.   According to this reading, the sense of a collective self 
is then primarily a religious one.  Morrison’s reading does not necessarily contradict the more 
romantic one introduced in this chapter.  The two discourses certainly play off one another in 
these poems; the primary difference is whether the religious or the romantic is to be read as 
primary.  Donne, even in his early poetry, uses religious language to enrich the descriptions in 
what are generally considered his secular love poetry.  This chapter will place Donne’s secular 
poems within a tradition extending back at least to Gottfried von Strassburg’s Tristan that 
elevates secular love through the use of religious discourse. This elevated discourse serves to 
ennoble the lovers’ experience in comparison to those who do not love in this particular way. 
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 In John Donne’s poetry, lovers are judged by their ability to understand one another as 
though sharing one mind.  Donne often uses the lovers’ willingness to accept a definition of 
themselves as a collective individual to determine a lovers’ worth.  “Good Morrow” makes this 
explicit, presenting the collective individualism as a condition to be met; the narrator states that 
none can die only “if our two loves be one” (my emphasis),336 or that they both choose to 
conceive of themselves as a collective individual.  In “A Valediction:  Forbidding Mourning,” 
Donne’s narrator describes those who “cannot admit absence” as “dull sublunary lovers.”337  In 
fact, it is the acknowledging of absence that shows their love to be inferior; dull lovers would not 
need to admit absence if they were part of a collective individual like beaten gold expanding or 
like two legs making up one compass.
338
   
Non-lovers – particularly those who oppose the lovers – are shown to be different from 
the lovers because the lovers share a deeper understanding than the non-lovers.  The narrator of 
“A Valediction:  Forbidding Mourning” states that is would be a “profanation of our joys to tell 
the laity of our love.”339  The lovers are here elevated to saints because they can understand such 
a deep love.  Telling other, “dull, sublunary lovers” is profanation because the non-lovers would 
not understand.  This lack of understanding by non-lovers relies on the notion that humans only 
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have access to shadows of ideal, Platonic forms,
340
 while the lovers see and/or embody the 
Platonic ideal.  A similar strategy of othering the non-lovers while elevating the lovers because 
of the lovers’ shared understanding appears in “The Canonization.”  When the lovers “die and 
rise the same,” they appear “mysterious by this love” to those who do not understand.341  As 
Jesus’ resurrection proves incomprehensible to earthly humans, the lovers’ relationship proves a 
mystery to those not touched with a divine love.  In the “Canonization,” those non-lovers 
eventually grow to understand and therefore “shall approve [the lovers] canonized for love.”342   
The one who previously would not “hold [his] tongue, and let [the narrator] love”343 ends the 
poem recognizing in the lovers a pattern of love from above, much like a neo-Platonic form or 
ideal.  In “The Ecstasy,” “weak men” may look only on “love revealed,”344 the outward 
manifestation of the lovers’ mystical unity; in contrast, the lovers share a deeper understanding 
of this unity.  The characteristics that Anthony Low identifies when he asserts that Donne 
“invented a new kind of private love: idealized, Romantic, mutual, and transcendent in 
feeling.”345  In particular, Low defines this shift as move from “something essentially social and 
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feudal to something essentially private and modern.”346  Shullenberger discusses images of 
spectatorship in Donne’s poetry, presenting the idea that for Donne’s narrators, the private must 
be observed by a member of the social order in order to contrast the lovers.  The lovers reflecting 
in each others’ eyes “seems to crystallize the erotic wish that motivates the poems:  a moment of 
loving intensity that takes the loving self outside itself.”347  Poetically, however, the connection 
cannot be shown unless an outside perspective is offered, usually in the form of a friend, but 
sometimes appearing as objects like the sun.  Donne articulates this definition of love as a 
transcendent connection, but in so doing, he builds upon a tradition of communication extending 
back at least as far as the first extant Tristan tales as transmitted through writers like 
Shakespeare. 
 
 Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet relies upon a similar othering of non-lovers by showing 
how characters other than the lovers do not understand properly.  Whereas in Donne, one 
narrative voice describes the mystical unity shared by the lovers, Shakespeare shows the lovers’ 
mystical understanding by having the lovers interpret correctly each others’ assertions on a first 
meeting.   
 
 ROMEO: If I profane with my unworthiest hand 
    This holy shrine, the gentle sin is this: 
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   My lips, two blushing pilgrims, ready stand 
    To smooth that rough touch with a tender kiss. 
 JULIET: Good pilgrim, you do wrong your hand too much, 
    Which mannerly devotion shows in this; 
   For saints have hands that pilgrims’ hands do touch, 
    And palm to palm is holy palmers’ kiss. 
 ROMEO: Have not saints lips, and holy palmers too? 
 JULIET: Ay, pilgrim, lips that they must use in prayer. 
 ROMEO: O, then, dear saint, let lips do what hands do! 
    They pray; grant thou, lest faith turn to despair. 
 JULIET: Saints do not move, though grant for prayers’ sake. 
 ROMEO: Then move not while my prayer’s effect I take. 
   Thus from my lips, by thine my sin is purged. 
   [Kisses her.] 
 JULIET: Then have my lips the sin that they have took. 
 ROMEO: Sin from my lips?  O trespass sweetly urged! 
   Give me my sin again. 
   [Kisses her.] 
 JULIET:    You kiss by th’ book. 
 NURSE: Madam, your mother craves a word with you.
348
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 Romeo and Juliet’s spontaneously composed and broken double sonnet embodies the best 
of “Western culture’s epitome of love – heterosexual, adolescent, secret, foredoomed.”349  The 
play presents these two characters as so completely in tune with each another that they can create 
a perfectly formed sonnet despite the fact that they have never met before.  As Edward Snow 
points out, Romeo and Juliet “are tuned to the same imaginative frequency, and imply the 
existence of a single world of desire encompassing the two lovers’ separate longings.”350  
Snow’s observation is borne out on an even broader scale than perhaps intended; Romeo and 
Juliet share not merely a single world of desire, but a single set of preconceptions that allows 
them to make interpretive leaps that defy easy decoding.  As such, the lovers require some 
contextual knowledge outside the words themselves – a characteristic of relational semantics – to 
make these interpretive leaps.  These leaps indicate an exceptional connection between the 
lovers, setting them apart from non-lovers.  In this sequence, then, Shakespeare provides a 
concrete example of what Donne describes:  how this kind of privileged communication elevates 
the lovers’ connection.       
 It is important to note that the construction of love in Romeo and Juliet is firmly 
grounded in the time and place of its composition.  As Dympna Callaghan correctly points out, 
we must be wary of any construction of love that presents itself as timeless and universal, adding 
that “what is extraordinary about the version of familial and personal relations – of desire and 
identity and their relation to power – endorsed by Romeo and Juliet is that they are in our time so 
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fully naturalized as to seem universal.”351  In many ways these personal relations – though 
perhaps not the familial ones – drew upon ideas that came to prominence in the twelfth century 
and became naturalized by the time of Romeo and Juliet.  Jonathan Goldberg warns against 
reading the lovers’ enactment of naturalized ideas as “a unique manifestation, the locus of all 
kinds of intensities and transcendentalities.”352  In fact, Shakespeare drew on a long tradition of 
remarkable communications between lovers when constructing Romeo and Juliet’s exchanges.  
This tradition – and audience’s previously held notions that remarkable communication helps to 
define lovers compatibility – allows the play in nineteen lines to elevate the lovers’ budding 
relationship.    
 One literary device to illustrate lovers’ mutual consent and compatibility is to show them 
either creating spontaneously intricate codes and/or making interpretive leaps that defy direct – 
referential – decoding.  In the absence of a clear code, the lovers appear to share one set of 
preconceptions unavailable to other characters in the work and often unavailable to readers as 
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well, and the relational semantics inherent in their communications justify and exalt the lovers’ 
relationship.   
 The sonnet’s exchanges are seemingly easy to decode according to the pilgrim conceit, 
even though each exchange redefines one component of the previous line by considering the 
word in a new context.  Romeo’s gambit to change the holding of hands into a kiss is reversed by 
Juliet when she takes his mention of “pilgrims” and returns it to the context of hands, matching it 
to “holy palmers’ kiss.”  Romeo moves from hands to lips once again and she responds by 
mentioning hands’ proper usage in prayer.  He finally builds on her reference to saints, placing 
the kiss within an innocent, spiritual context.  This final context places the kiss both within the 
secular, Petrarchan, neo-Platonic world of love and within sanctified world of pilgrimage.  
 The end point of the first sonnet therefore embodies the two worlds reconciled within the 
wedding ceremony:  an institution that includes both religious and secular components.  The play 
thus blurs boundaries between things potentially perceived as distinct:  the secular and the 
religious, as well as sex and death, as noted by Colin G. MacKenzie.
353
  Lines of communication 
that suggest a transcendental connection fit precisely within this pattern. 
Mentioning marriage also provides an acceptable context for the desired kisses.  The 
emphasis on hands converts the sonnet additionally into a kind of hand-fasting, an official 
declaration of intent to marry usually performed in public.  The private quality of what is usually 
a public gesture raises both the issue of the conflict between public and private pressures and the 
relational – or contextual – quality of communication.   
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 More remarkable than the embedded marital component of the sonnet is that the creation 
of this code is spontaneous.  Their joint composition of the sonnet – a “shared activity”354 – 
reflects further the sixteenth century wedding ceremony’s marital ideal of “one mind.”  Their 
joint leap to a kind of marriage involves more than a superficial reworking of accepted conceits.  
It relies on associations and implications rather than simple decoding and therefore reveals to the 
audience a truly special interpretive connection.     
 Composing spontaneously a sonnet by oneself is difficult enough without having to 
respond to another person’s lines.  While apparently some poets were able to spontaneously 
compose sonnets, Romeo would not seem to be one of them.  Mercutio describes the poor quality 
of Romeo’s poetry about Rosalind as “groaning for love.”355  The key moment, however, in their 
mutual composition occurs at the start of a second sonnet when Juliet takes over for Romeo in 
the middle of the line.
356
  The remarkable quality of this instinctual communication in the sonnet 
serves to highlight how compatible the two lovers are.
357
  Making their connection even more 
unique is the fact that the sonnet as a form traditionally voices the inner workings of one mind – 
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here one mind that the two characters share.  Both lovers also share the same goal: a kiss; this 
shared goal shows how like-minded they are.  The sonnet explores different contexts for this 
kiss, ending on marriage in a way that echoes the sense that marriage unites two people into a 
larger collective person.     
 The ideal of one mind shown in Romeo and Juliet echoes elements in the Prayer Book of 
1552’s wedding ceremony emphasizing the unity of the wedded couple.  The wedding ceremony 
in the Prayer Book of 1552 – approved by Elizabeth I – describes a “misticall union” 358 and 
“unitie”359 between the husband and wife parallel to that “betwixte Chryste and hys Churche.”360   
The husband and wife are “made one”361 and he is exhorted to “loue his owne wife, euen as 
himselfe.”362   The language of this ceremony equates the two spouses by elevating the woman’s 
status to that of the man.   
 In Marriage and Violence: The Early Modern Legacy,
363
 Frances Dolan traces the 
development of what became the dominant discursive interpretation of the ceremony, with the 
man as the head and the woman in a subservient role.  As Dolan notes, the marital ideal of 
equality doesn’t match well with Puritans ideal of masculine leadership.  Lines of 
communication in this relationship would place all meaning and authority in the man’s hands 
                                                          
358
 The First and Second Prayer Books of Edward VI.  (London:  J.M. Dent, 1949), 410. 
359
 Ibid., 415. 
360
 Ibid., 410. 
361
 Ibid., 414. 
362
 Ibid., 415. 
363
 Frances Dolan, Marriage and Violence: The Early Modern Legacy (Philadelphia:  U of Penn 
P, 2009). 
Eggers Misticall Unions 159 
with the role of consultant the only one open to women.   Dolan then notes how this inherent 
contradiction leads to potential conflict and then both violence and the discourse of violence 
associated with marriage.  Here Dolan expands upon Anthony Fletcher’s observation that the 
“puritan notion of marriage as a deep union of bodies and souls [in] Robert Snawsel” serves to 
justify marital violence.
364
 In contrast, the marital/love ideal presented in romantic tales like 
Romeo and Juliet, the poetry of Donne, and earlier medieval romances, posits a relationship 
outside language, societal constraints, and inequalities of class and gender.   
 
The everyday realities of wives in the Renaissance did not live up to the marital ideal of a 
husband loving his wife even as himself, in part because this ideal was promoted by the church 
more than by secular authorities and in part because the church itself held conflicting views on 
the subject of women’s role in marriage.  These everyday realities did nothing, however, to 
prevent the circulation of an ideal that women and men could share one mind.  The wedding 
ceremony’s language attempts to serve as a corrective to two components of the marital process 
that disempowers women.  First, it suggests – despite the wide range of misogynous conduct 
books to the contrary – that husbands should consider their wives as a part of themselves and 
therefore worthy of equal consideration.  Second, it places a greater importance on the spouses’ 
consent; while young male suitors benefit from this as well, the impact on young women is 
greater due to their vulnerability in a patriarchal culture such as Renaissance England.  
 Romeo and Juliet’s sonnet carries all of these undertones into its composition.  First, the 
poem embodies this marital “unity” perfectly; the lovers are so truly one that they can finish not 
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only each others’ thoughts but their own lines of iambic pentameter.  Second, the nurse’s 
interruption for Juliet’s mother suggests at a micro level the play’s larger theme of young lovers 
set apart from larger society by their remarkable connection.  The nurse’s interruption reflects 
the resistance of parents and society to consensually but privately chosen spouses, a resistance 
predicated on society’s inability to understand as well as the lovers.  In this way, we see an 
example in Shakespeare’s play of lovers that are as misunderstood by the dull, sublunary people 
around them as Donne’s lover claims to be.   
 
The language of the wedding ceremony used widely in England at the time of Romeo and 
Juliet comes largely unchanged from the Old Sarum Missal wedding ceremony in use since the 
Norman conquest.
365
  This wedding ceremony – and the changing political climate under 
William I’s reign – reflects the greater emphasis on a woman’s consent in twelfth-century 
England.
366
  Roman law and patristic writers both included the idea that spouses share one body 
and one mind – those of the husband.  Twelfth-century England, however, expands this 
definition to include a more important role for women.  Jennifer Ward challenges the previously 
held notion of a “Golden Age for late Anglo-Saxon women,” noting that “in reality, women 
benefitted from the long-term changes in the years between 1000 and 1200 over the formation of 
marriage.” 367  For the purposes of my study, the key element is one that Ward implies but does 
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not state, that this improvement occurs in relation to men, in contrast to the relative 
independence seen in late Anglo-Saxon England.  The expanded role for women comes from a 
greater emphasis on a woman’s consent.368  As noted by J.M. Anderson, Béroul’s Romance of 
Tristan brings together Abelard’s definition of intention with consent law in a way that portrays 
romantic love as a natural right.
369
   
Many romances from the twelfth century give more autonomy to their heroines as a result 
of the greater power they potentially hold in refusing their consent.  In particular, remarkable 
communicative leaps between lovers serve to illustrate the lovers’ consent – or shared mind – 
and therefore justify relationships that are often outside traditional moral boundaries.
370
   
The tradition of Tristan and Isolde
371
 – built upon the Anglo-Norman Thomas’ Tristram – 
uses remarkable communication as both the foundation of and the justification for their 
relationship, even going so far in the Norse version to state, 
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Svá var mikil kraptr ástar þeirar sem þau hefði bæði einn hug  
ok hjarta (my emphasis). 
[Such was the great power of their love that they both possessed one heart and  
one mind]” (my emphasis).372  
Romeo and Juliet have been connected with their medieval predecessors Tristan and 
Isolde at least since Denis de Rougemont’s Love in the Western World.  Julia Kristeva builds on 
this correlation in “Romeo and Juliet:  Love-Hatred in the Couple,” replacing societal pressures 
with the Superego and highlighting the importance of opposition to the lovers’ desires.373  I 
expand on Kristeva’s idea by adding that, in addition to identifying society’s opposition to the 
lovers, one should also consider non-lovers’ inability to understand the lovers.  This inability 
allows the lovers to define themselves as a unit separate from society, the most extreme form of 
which is as one collective person.  It is important to note that the adulterous love of Tristan and 
Isolde is more transgressive than the familial defiance seen in Romeo and Juliet.  The need for 
secrecy, however, is similar, and leads to a similar need for clandestine communications.   
Much like Romeo and Juliet, Thomas’ Tristran and Isond – and their analogs in versions 
by Gottfried van Strassburg and the Norse Brother Robert– seem to create extremely intricate 
codes on the spot.  Thomas’ version survives only in fragments, but two loose translations 
composed relatively soon after Thomas’ Gottfried von Strassburg’s Middle High German 
                                                          
372
 Brother Robert, Norse Romance I:  The Tristan Legend. Ed. and Trans Marianne Kalinke.  
(Cambridge:  D.S. Brewer, 2012), 132.  The complete phrase is “Svá var mikil kraptr ástar þeirar 
sem þau hefði bæði einn hug ok hjarta, allt til þess kom á o aðrir undruðu.”   
373
 Kristeva, Julia.  “Romeo and Juliet:  Love-Hatred in the Couple.”  Tales of Love.  (New York:  
Columbia, 1987). 
Eggers Misticall Unions 163 
version and Brother Robert’s Norse version are so similar in details of plot – though not in 
incidental commentary – that they highlight the remarkable communication at the center of 
Thomas’s lovers’ relationship.  Even Tristan tales not directly derivative of Thomas’s version – 
including Beroul’s, which seems to be composed parallel to Thomas’s – include amazing feats of 
interpretation by the lovers.  Tristram and Isond’s coded messages to each other are even more 
resistant to simple decoding than Romeo and Juliet’s sonnet; the seemingly arbitrary nature of 
their communications suggests that only by sharing one set of preconceptions – sharing one mind 
– could the two understand each other.  Different versions within both the courtly and non-
courtly traditions vary in specifics, but the core plot shows the lovers making remarkable 
interpretive leaps correctly even as these same communications mislead those around them.  In 
these cases, Tristan and Isolde approach these communications with a single dominant prejudice 
that sets them apart; they consistently read every sign first through the lens – or prejudice – of 
their love.  
Matilda Tomaryn Bruckner observes that the lovers conceive of themselves as one, 
noting that “shared experience furnishes knowledge of self and other that leads to oneness, the 
identity of the couple as a unit.”374  Whenever the lovers notice a difference in their experiences, 
they attempt to regain that unity by copying each other’s experiences. Extending Bruckner’s 
observation makes clear how this conception of unity appears in the lovers’ communications.  
Perhaps the most remarkable symptom of this collective individualism is that the lovers are able 
to overcome the randomness of language and understand one another when such communication 
seems unlikely.   
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Of the various versions of the tale, Gottfried van Strassburg’s Tristan announces most 
explicitly the centrality of the lovers’ communication in defining the unity of their relationship.  
Gottfried emphasizes the relational hermeneutics at the heart of Tristan and Isolde’s 
communications.  The lovers are able to communicate secretly  
  in er menege under under liuten   
  Dâ blicke sullen tiuten 
  Und wehlselmære meinen.
375
 
  [in the crowd and in the presence of others,  
where glances are full of significance and  
mean whole conversations].
376
 
In addition, they are able to do so without danger of observation.  In addition, the lovers 
embroidered their public conversation “mit klebeworten und erweben”377  [… with words that 
were meant to stick].”378  Meanwhile,  
Es gedâhte aber nieman niht 
   Daz ir wort und ir geschiht 
An liebe hæten keine kraft 
Wan eine von der mâcschaft, 
Die man sô grôz erkande 
Under Marke und Tristande.
379
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  [nobody had any idea that their words  
and actions hid any force such as love,  
were inspired by anything other  
than Tristan and Mark’s kinship].380   
In this section, Gottfried highlights the possible disparities between the public and private 
meanings of the same words and gestures.  The lovers’ knowledge of more potential meanings 
sets them apart and seemingly above other characters in the poem. 
In addition to the explicit description of relational semantics above, Gottfried’s Tristan 
includes several examples of single, important words that carry several meanings, given the fact 
that multiple contexts for interpreting these words are equally applicable.  In an effort to retain 
the multiplicity of meanings, Gottfried retains the original Anglo-Norman words from his source, 
Thomas d’Angleterre.   
Within Gottfried and presumably in Thomas’ version, the first declaration of love from 
Isolde is built upon a multiplicity of meanings and relies upon Tristan’s application of relational 
semantics.  On the boat to marry Mark, Isolde suffers once she has taken the potion and fallen in 
love with Tristan.  When Tristan asks her what troubles her, Isolde replies, “Lameir.”381  As 
Tristan recalls to himself, “l’ameir meant ‘Love’, l’ameir ‘bitter’, la meir the sea.”382  Tristan 
avoids the first definition of love and probes her for clarification of whether she means 
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something bitter or the sea.  This conscious evasion reveals his preconception as much as it 
highlights her feelings.  In fact, all three definitions apply for Isolde, depending on the 
perspective one wishes to emphasize.  When Isolde chooses to emphasize the definition “love,” 
she does not openly state the object of her love.  Instead, she relies upon him to fill in this gap.  
Tristan’s ability to do so correctly carries several implications.  The primary implication is that 
Tristan understands her correctly but wants confirmation of her consent.  A contrary implication 
is that he is filling in this interpretive gap incorrectly by imagining the response he desires; for 
more on this interpretation, see the chapter on imagination and interpretation.   
Gottfried retains the ambiguity of the Anglo-Norman word for potion from Thomas.  At 
the heart of the potion is also a semantic ambiguity that reflects the tale’s moral ambiguity.  In 
Anglo-Norman, the word “potion” means both “potion” and “poison.”383  Not only does poison 
play an important role in bringing the lovers together – her mother must heal Tristan of a 
poisoned wound – but also suggests that the potion has poisoned their minds.  This linguistic 
gesture has led to a wide range of scholarly responses to the lovers, each response choosing to 
highlight a particularly context as the primary one.  While there seems to be little doubt that all 
of the versions express some sympathy for the lovers, one can never escape their 
transgressions.
384
  Even when Susan Crane emphasizes the lovers’ “repugnant behavior – 
subterfuge, murder, betrayal, faithlessness,” she adds that “their legendary devotion to each other 
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is striking [and…] invites poetic idealization.”385  Crane’s judgment relies on the assumption that 
the judgments of the broader social context take precedence over the private context the lovers 
attempt to establish.  Thomas reinforces the primacy of the lovers’ interior realm by turning 
“from the objective realm of events to the subjective, interior realm of thought and feeling.”386  
Crane depicts as a repugnant subterfuge the very interpretive gesture that establishes that the 
lovers share one mind.   
The conflict at the heart of these ambiguities – between private and public judgments – 
also appears at a linguistic level when Thomas and Gottfried use a “mystical vocabulary” 387 to 
describe the lovers’ relationship.  Sarah Kay points out that “Gottfried represents love as in 
conflict with the demands of the outside world, but in accord with the dictates of a higher, more 
mysterious power.”388  While Kay describes a careful balance between lay and clerical values in 
Gottfried, she does link the lovers to a higher power, suggesting an eventual bias in favor of the 
lovers – a bias that privileges the lovers’ understanding over the non-lovers’ understandings.  
Linking the lovers’ interpretations to a higher power, however, erases the relational semantics at 
the core of the lovers’ relationship, tying interpretation instead to a neo-Platonic certainty.  After 
all, communications with God suggest an imbalance not seen in descriptions of these literary 
lovers.  Given the mystic nature of the relationship as described by Gottfried and noted by Sarah 
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Kay, it is surprising to note that the no mystic vocabulary is deployed to describe the 
communications themselves.   
 
All of the courtly versions of Tristan emphasize the fact that the lovers share one set of 
assumptions and desires.  Tristrams Saga ok Ísöndar – Brother Robert’s 1226 translation into 
Norse of Thomas’ c.1173 Anglo-Norman version – makes the idea that the lovers share 
assumptions and desires explicit, stating that the “power of their love was such that they 
possessed one heart and one mind.”389  Gottfried von Strassburg’s translation of Thomas’ Tristan 
emphasizes the shared mind even more frequently than the Brother Robert’s Norse version.390  
As soon as the lovers admit and “perceive” their l’ameir – “love”, they understand that they have 
“one mind, one heart, and but a single will between them.”391  Tristan even refers explicitly to 
Isolde as “his other self.”392  Gottfried repeats this later in the stylistically virtuosic idea that 
“their thoughts and wishes were in concord:  it was ‘yes’ and ‘yes’ and ‘no’ and no’ with them 
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[…] Yea or nay, they were both of one mind.” 393  Gottfried repeats and extends this idea of a 
mutual consent later, noting 
…in beiden 
   nie mê wan ein herze unde ein muot; 
   ir beider übel, ir beider guot, 
ir beider tôt, ir beider leben 
diu wâren alse in ein geweben; 
swaz ir dewederem gewar 
des wart daz ander gewar; 
swaz sô dem einem sanfte tete, 
ses des empfant daz ander an der stete. 
sie wâren beide under in zwein 
mir übele und mit guote al ein.
394
 
[The two of them now shared 
One heart and one mind 
Both their ill and their weal 
Both their death and their life 
Was but one single texture. 
Whatever afflicted one of them 
Equally hurt the other. 
When one obtained some soothing,  
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The other at once enjoyed relief. 
The two of them, sharing all, 
For ill and weal were united.]  
Gottfried’s description of the lovers here blurs the line between physical pleasure or pain and 
emotional ones.  Gottfried’s blurring of body and mind here makes a connection between the 
wedding ceremony’s inclusion of the shared body but does not explicitly mention one mind.   
The idea of sharing one heart, one mind, and one body is central to the medieval idea of 
marriage, building on St. Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians, which states that “they shall be two in 
one flesh.”395  The traditional understanding of this phrase is that the shared body also has only 
one mind, that of the man, who is “the head of the wife.”396  Tristram and Isond provide an 
alternative to this, a merging into one mind, one that defines the collective mind as less 
dependent on male domination than it is on perfect compatibility.  The lovers’ compatibility 
shows in their shared assumptions and interpretations.  In contrast, the king’s inability to 
interpret correctly the messages and signs he sees indicates, at the very least, his incompatibility 
with Isond.  Such an incompatibility raises the possibility that Isond has refused her inner 
consent.   
In both Robert and Gottfried – and by extension their source in Thomas – the lovers’ 
astonishing communication can be traced to a shared set of preconceptions, allowing them to 
interpret perfectly any linguistic ambiguity in messages to one another.  Brother Robert’s Norse 
version presents the definitive example of Tristram and Isond spontaneously composing and 
understanding a message that defies simple decoding.  In this exchange, the ring that Tristram 
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and Isond pass back and forth changes the content of any message they exchange, but even with 
this signal, their interpretive leaps are difficult enough to escape the others.
397
   
Isond immediately recognizes her beloved Tristram when he approaches her caravan.  
Worried that her husband, King Markis, will also recognize Tristram, she tosses on the ground to 
her beloved the ring they exchanged between them. 
Ok þegar jafnskjótt tók hún þat sama gull, sem jafnan hafði þeira ímilli farit með 
sendiboðum, ok kastaði til Tristrams, svá ti hans talandi:  Rið braut héðan, þú 
ókunni riddari,” segir hún, “ok fá þér  
herbergi ok dvel ekki vára ferð.”  En sem Tristram sá gullit,  
kendi hann ok undirsoóð.
398
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Shach notes a lost fifteenth-century manuscript of the Norse.  Some of the emendations may be 
later and by an Icelandic redactor, but despite this, the translation is considered faithful because 
of its similarities to Gottfried’s translation; in fact, the Norse version seems to have fewer 
additions than Gottfried’s.   
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[And just as quickly she took that same gold ring that had always traveled 
between them by messengers and threw it to Tristram:  ‘Ride off strange knight,’ 
she said, find yourself lodging and stop holding up our journey.’  But when 
Tristram saw the ring, he recognized it and understood her words].
399
  
 While Kalinke understandably translates this last line to say that Tristram “understood her words 
(orð),” adopting the secondary meaning for “orð” as “message”400 seems more specific.401  After 
all, the message Isond offers Tristram does not rely on lexical ambiguity, but on contextual clues 
that the king and his men lack.  As such, this exchange embodies the relational hermeneutic 
quality of the lovers’ communication that allows for private meaning to be conveyed secretly in a 
public forum.  In this case, the ring carries the most important content in the communication:  
that he should take anything she says with the knowledge that she loves him. The public, literal 
(and referential) meaning of her words is dismissive, ordering him away so that he will no longer 
delay them.  To throw money or other objects on the ground humiliates the one expected to pick 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
398
 Robert, 200. 
399
 Robert, 201.   A longer selection: “Ok þegar jafnskjótt tók hún þat sama gull, sem jafnan 
hafði þiera ímillli farit með sendiboðum, ok kastaði til Tristrams, svá ti hans talandi:  “Rið braut 
héðan, þú ókunni riddari,” segir hún, “ok fá þér herbergi ok dvel ekki vára ferð.” 
“En sem Tristram sá gullit, kendi hann ok undirsoóð orð dróttningar ok veik sér aptr til sinna 
skalaldsveina ok báðir þeir Kardin” (200). 
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them up.
402
  In Tristrams Saga ok Ísöndar, Isond takes advantage of the tradition that superiors 
such as the queen often offer alms to those less fortunate, such as this “strange knight.” Earlier in 
the saga, in fact, at the trial where she convinces the king and his counselors of her innocence, 
she offers up a wide variety of alms: 
gulli ok silfri, klæðum ok kerum, gaf hún mikkinn part fátækun sakir guðs 
ástsemda, einnig sjúkum ok sáru, föðr lausim ok fátækum ekkjum.
403
   
[gold and silver, cups and clothing […] to the poor as well  
as to the sick and the wounded, to the fatherless and to  
poor widows] .
404
    
Here is a model for the alms that she appears to offer the disguised Tristram.  These gifts include 
objects (cups and clothing) and materials (gold and silver) reminiscent of the ring, suggesting an 
                                                          
402
 The humiliating nature of bending over to pick up valuable items is so strong in the Norse 
tradition that such a gesture becomes linked to cowardice.  In the tale of Hrolfs saga kraki King 
Hrolf and his band of warriors cast gold behind them to slow the pursuit of the Swedish man of 
King Adils. Adils ignores most of the gold, but is finally overcome with greed when he sees the 
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saga, where the Njalssons toss the repayment for Hoskuld Hvitaness-priest’s death on the 
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obvious alternate reading for observers.  In addition, the gesture of offering him alms contributes 
to the demeaning quality of the gesture, clearly establishing his inferiority.  Her actions and 
message, within this public context, are perfectly innocent, if dismissive.   
Adding the ring that they had previously exchanged, however, provides Tristram with a 
more private context within which to consider her words, allowing an almost incredible 
understanding of her message.  Tristram’s – correct – interpretation of Isond’s message escapes 
simple decoding.  After all, she does want him to “ride off” so that he will not be caught, so the 
literal definition of these words stands.  Following the order to go away (braut) and the rude 
throwing of the “gift,” a reasonable public interpretation of her statement would be for the 
strange knight to get as far away as possible and stay there.  Tristram, however, understands that 
she does mean for him to find lodging, but to search for a site near hers.  Making the interpretive 
leap even more remarkable is the fact that he understands they should meet at this location, an 
understanding shown to be correct by their assignation later.  This decoding is not a simple 
reversal – saying I reject you to mean I love you – and so depends not just on his contextual 
knowledge of the ring but on the preconceptions that Tristram brings into his interpretation.  In a 
way, Tristram and Isond do not merely play a game of misdirection but share a completely 
distinct language.  Tristram chooses to read the ring according to the meaning Isond assigned to 
it when they parted.  When they part, she gives him the ring, saying,  
Nú ekki at síðr skaltu þiggja þetta fingrgull, ok varðveit vel fyrir mínar sakir.  
Þetta skal vera bréf ok innsigli, handsöl ok huggan áminningar ástar okkarrar ok 
þessa skilnaðar.
405
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[Now you shall have nothing less than this ring; take good care of it for my sake.  
It shall be the written deed and its seal, the promise and the comfort of the 
remembrance of our love and separation].
406
 
The ring is not merely a symbol of their love; it is their love’s “written deed and its seal.”407  
Interestingly, she chooses legal, public language to establish a “written” meaning that only she 
and Tristram can “read” privately.  According to those who believed that consent – more than 
consummation – provided the primary means of defining marriage, the exchange echoes the 
language of betrothal shared by the lovers from the moment they take the potion.
408
  Felicity 
Riddy discusses a similar incident in King Horn, noting that the language in that scene, as in this 
one, sounds remarkably like “consent which, if followed by intercourse, constituted a legal 
marriage according to medieval canon law – even if the declaration is private.”409   
Gottfried’s Isolde expresses a similar private marital sentiment when she gives Tristan 
the ring as  
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407
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408
 See Irven M. Resnick “Marriage in Medieval Culture:  Consent theory and The Case of 
Joseph and Mary,” (Church History, June 2000) 350 ff.  This tradition continues into the 
Renaissance under the term “hand-fasting.”  
409
 Riddy, Felicity.  “Middle English Romance:  Family, Marriage, Intimacy.”  The Cambridge 
Companion to Medieval Romance.  Ed. Roberta L. Kreuger.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 
2000), 241.  Riddy draws on James Bridgage’s Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval 
Europe. (Chicago and London:  U of Chicago P, 1987)  and Neil Cartlidge’s Medieval Marriage:  
Literary Approaches to 1100-1300.  (Woodbridge:  Boydell and Brewer, 1997). 
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…ein urkünde sîn 
der triuwen unde der mine.
410
  
 [witness to [their] love and devotion].
411
   
Isolde continues to present herself and Tristan as one, telling him  
  …iewer lip  
…daz lît an mîr.   
Eîn lîp und ein leben”412   
[your life is one with mine.  We are one life and one love].
413
   
Isolde concludes, 
  Tristan und Îsôt, ir und ich, 
  Wir zwwei sîn iemer beide 
  Ein ding âne underscheide. 
  Dirre kus sol ein insigil sîn 
  Daz ich iuwer under ir mîn 
  Belîben stæte unz an den tôt, 
Niwan ein Tristan un ein Îsôt.
414
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[You and I, Tristan and Isolde, shall both forever remain one thing without 
division (or difference)!  Let this kiss be a seal upon it that I am yours, that you 
are mine, steadfast till death, but one Tristan and one Isolde]!
415
 
This declaration includes important elements in the wedding ceremony: a commitment until 
death, the exchange of a ring, the sacramental language of a “seal.”  Isolde even attempts to 
represent the ring as a “witness” to their private exchange.  This exchange indicates that Isolde 
thinks of her relationship with Tristan using marital language.  Tristan’s acceptance of the ring 
shows his acceptance of her definition as much as all of the language centered on how the lovers 
share one mind.  Equally important, Isolde uses the present tense, which matches the church 
liturgy for marriage.   
  The sharing of secret codes in the Tristan tales resembles scenes in Ovid’s Amores, where 
one referential meaning has been assigned to a non-linguistic gesture.
416
  Ovid’s text provides an 
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 Ibid., 282. 
416
 Beroul, “Tristran.”  Early Tristan Poems, Vol.1. (Cambridge:  Brewer, 1998), 2707-2732.  
Beroul shows the lovers more explicitly establishing the ring as an indicator of continued 
affection.  Beroul’s description also echoes the exchange of betrothal gifts seen in other versions 
of the tale.  She defines the ring’s meaning more explicitly, stating “if you do no send me the 
ring on your finger,/ so that I see it with my own eyes,/ I will not believe what is said to me./  But 
as soon as I see the ring,/ no tower or wall or castle/ could prevent me from immediately doing/ 
the bidding of my lover” (2794-2800).  As in the Norse, however, other signals in their 
communications could conceivably alter this meaning.  The French is as follows: “Se cel anel de 
vostre doi/  Ne m’envoiez, si que jel voie,/ Rien qu’il deist ge ne croiroie./ Mais, des que reverrai 
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example of privileged communication between lovers and may have provided a foundation for 
medieval authors.  In Amores, the narrator establishes a code with his lover so that he can “sine 
voce loquentia dicam” [speak fluid speech without any voice].417  These messages allow the 
narrator to understand his beloved’s inner state.   
cum tibi succurret Veneris lascivia nostrae, 
    purpureas tenero pollice tange genas.  
siquid erit, de me tacita quod mente queraris, 
    pendeat extrema mollis ab aure manus.
418
  
[When the wantonness of our love comes into your mind, 
    With tender thumb touch your blushing cheeks; 
If you shall complain about me in the silence of your mind, 
    Your soft hand should hang from the end of your ear.] 
When she touches her cheek, she is thinking about the last time they made love while pinching 
her earlobe indicates she is unhappy with him.  As seen in Gottfried’s version, Tristan and Isolde 
also seem to have established a code with one another, to be discussed soon.
419
  
Occasionally, however, the Tristan texts do not show the code being defined.  More 
importantly, the Tristan tales emphasize the importance of how messages are received, by 
representing the lovers decoding correctly their beloved’s messages.  Codes such as these also 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
;’anl,/ Net or ne mur ne fort chastel/ Ne me tendra ne face errant/ Le mandemant de mon amant” 
(2794-2800). 
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depend on contextual clues such as gesture or tone.  Returning to the Norse Tristrams Saga ok 
Ísöndar, we see complications that place a greater importance on such contextual clues.  Isond 
provides Tristram (and others) with signals that might indicate an alternate reading of the ring.
420
  
The medieval tale’s emphasis on the potentially different meanings offered in different contexts 
and receivers represents an awareness of relational semantics not described in Ovid.   
Tristram’s correct decoding of these messages reflects lovers’ unique ability to 
understand one another.  Tristram could easily have interpreted her throwing of the ring as a 
rejection – a “throwing away” – of his love as well.  In addition, they have been apart for some 
time; in the meantime, Tristram has fought in numerous countries
421
 and married another 
woman, Isodd.  Considering the rudeness, their separation, and his marriage, even one with the 
knowledge of the ring’s original meaning might read her gesture as rejection.  Despite these 
public clues, Tristram chooses to read the ring’s meaning – and Isond’s affection – as constant.  
His ability to correctly identify which of Isond’s signals are to be read privately and which 
publicly is astonishing and must find its roots outside the original meaning Isond assigned.  
                                                          
420
 In Gottfried’s rendition, Ysolt recognizes Tristran because of a mazer-cup the queen had 
given him earlier.  She tries to pass her ring into the cup but Brengvein interrupts the exchange.  
Interestingly, she does not expose Tristran.  She merely uses relational semantics to criticize the 
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lovers’ relationship (332-3).  By couching the message this way, the king does not understand 
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Tristram reads with the assumption that whatever she says is an expression of love and that every 
message conveys loyalty, affection, and a desire to meet, even when the words or gestures say 
otherwise.   
The Norse version’s representation of how Tristram communicates with Isond using 
wood shavings only makes sense if the two share some preconceived desires.  After all, in this 
version, the lovers are not shown establishing the meaning of such shavings.   
En þeim sinnum, sem Trisram vildi ræða við Ísönd,  
þá kastaði hann spánnum út á ána, er rann hjá turninum  
ok fyrir svefnhús dróttningar, ok vissi þegar dróttning  
ok fann af þessum velum vilja hans ok vitjan”422  
 [Every time Tristram wanted to talk with Isond, he flung  
the shavings out into the river that ran past the tower and  
below the queen’s bedroom.  Immediately the queen  
understood and learned by this ruse of his desire to visit].
423
 
 Without Isond’s reception, these shavings carry no linguistic weight and therefore mean 
nothing.  It is entirely possible for her to have seen the shavings and thought that Tristram was 
merely whittling to pass the time.  Despite this, Isond reads his unstated intent “immediately” 
and correctly while others would see nothing.  The use of “immediately” implies that Isond’s 
insight is remarkable, but the phrase “every time” shows habitual meaning and suggests a 
mutually agreed-upon content.  Other things mitigate the unlikely quality of this message.  First, 
Isond recognizes Tristram’s shavings from any others because “no man had ever seen their 
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equal” and because he was so skillful that they “didn’t sink […] and no current could destroy 
them.”424   Second – and possibly more useful – Tristram seems to always want to meet with 
Isond, and therefore any gesture from him to Isond carries this message.  Key to this discussion 
is the fact that the Icelandic tale does not show the lovers coming to a prearranged code so her 
interpretation seems to indicate a privileged unity with Tristan.  Even so, the fact remains that the 
whittlings carry one meaning for the lovers while meaning nothing to almost everyone else.   
Gottfried, in contrast to Brother Robert, includes a scene whereby the meaning of 
Tristan’s whittlings is established.  Brangene defines the means of communication for the lovers, 
instructing Tristan, 
  Sô nemet ein oleboumes rîs 
  Und snîdet spæne in lange wîs 
  Und zeichent die mit nihte mê, 
  Wan machete einhalp ein T 
   Und machete anderhalp ein I,
425
 
   …  
   Als wir in danne ersehen dâ 
   Dâ bekennen wir iesâ 
   Daz ir dâ bî dem brunnen sît
426
 
   … 
   Diu senede gât iezuo dar.
427
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[So, take a twig of olive, cut some slivers lengthwise,  
and just engrave them with a “T” on one side and  
“I” on the other […] When we see the shaving we  
shall at once know you are by the brook […] and  
come to meet you].
428
   
Here, the whittlings are not merely finely crafted, but identifiable by the initials which seem to 
symbolize how the lovers are two sides of one whole.  In addition, because the shavings’ 
meaning is predetermined, the communication in Gottfried’s version is less arbitrary.  The fact 
that Brangane – not the lovers – establishes the code makes it even more comprehensible. 
Looking closely at these two descriptions of Tristan’s whittling offers insight into a hotly 
contested debate over the meaning of Tristan’s carvings in Marie de France’s lai Chevrefoil.  The 
only word we know for sure that appears on the wood is Tristan’s name, as he  
 Quand il ad pare ke bastun,  
De sun cutel escrit sun nun.  
[When he had prepared this staff, 
He wrote his name on it with his knife].
429
   
The message that Ysolt receives, however, includes sixteen lines paralleling their love to that of 
the honeysuckle and hazelwood, ending  
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Eggers Misticall Unions 183 
  Bele amie si et de nus:   
Ne vuz sanz mei, ne mei sanz vus. 
430
  
[Sweet love, so it is with us: You cannot live  
without me, nor I without you].  
Referring to the extended message, Marie states,  
  “Ceo fu la summe de l’escrit  
Qu’il li aveit mandeé e dit.431 
[This was the message [“summe’] of the writing  
that he had sent to her].   
“Summe” can mean either “resumé” or “l’essence” but, as Robert Sturges points out, “whether 
this gist or meaning was written out or meant to be divined […] is impossible to tell.”432 What 
makes this communication so interesting is that none of her companions understand any part of 
the message.  Three possibilities draw the most attention.  The first is that he sent a message to 
her before she arrived in the forest, which Robert Hanning sees as the least likely because “it is 
not otherwise mentioned” in the lai.”433  The second theory, proposed by M. Cagnon, is that the 
message is in runic inscriptions that only the lovers know.
434
  The third alternative is that his 
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name alone conveys all this because of the “understanding that existed between them.”435 Sturges 
builds insightfully on the third alternative, suggesting that the “medium here is clearly the 
message […as] Tristan has combined a written text with a physical signifier” to encourage 
interpretation in his target audience, Isolde.
436
   Tristan’s name is linked both physically and 
symbolically to the tree.  Sturges’s reading does a wonderful job of fleshing out how the 
specifics of the message are arrived at, but he doesn’t account for the message that Tristram 
sends via shavings in Gottfried’s and Brother Robert’s versions.437  The one part of the message 
that Marie implies but does not state openly is their desire to meet, the precise message of the 
shavings in the other versions and the result of her correctly reading his message.
438
 Regardless 
of one’s speculation about the precise method of transmission, it is clear that understanding is 
contextual and therefore referential.  Equally important is the fact that this message – regardless 
of its transmission – accurately reflects the preconceived desires of both lovers, once again 
showing that they share one set of desires.    Kkeeping in mind the idea that these ideal 
communications reveal a shared mind eliminates the problem of whether Tristan intended to 
send this message or Isolde supplied a meaning to it.  Being as one, they share one intent or one 
mind.   
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 Donne’s  “A Valediction: of my Name, in the Window” seems to follow the conventions 
established by the shavings in the Tristan tales.
439
  The entirety of the message is the narrator’s 
“name engrav’d” in a window.440  Like the Tristan shaving and carving, the only linguistic 
content is a name.  The blurring of the two lovers when she sees her reflection and the name 
come together; the culmination of this fusion is when the narrator constructs himself and his 
beloved as one, saying to her “I am you.”441  Donne’s visual blurring resembles the shavings as 
well in that both lovers appear in the one object.  Like Chevrefoil and other Tristan episodes, a 
limited message carries substantially greater content than the words might suggest.  As in 
Chevrefoil, the medium contributes to the message, as Donne emphasizes the permanence of the 
engraving.
442
  The narrator inscribes in the poem as well not one ideal response to his engraved 
name, but several, depending on the context.  One has her “more loving, as more sad” until the 
narrator returns.
443
  Another, as mentioned before relies upon the medium to contribute to the 
message; the narrator acknowledges, however, that his may be “too hard and deepe.”444 The 
narrator even constructs a potential narrative where the beloved reader takes a lover and the 
engraving potentially “step[s] in”445 to prevent it.  Should she act on her passion, the engraving 
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will lead her to “remembrest right” the narrator in an act of “fancy.”446  The poem seems to open 
with the assumption of a shared mind and move toward a mental separation that parallels the 
narrator’s absence.  The poem expands upon conventions of clandestine communications 
established in the Tristan tales, but no longer is communication presented as skeptically or with 
as many clues to the lovers’ interpretation.  The skeptical generic conventions associated with 
lovers – discussed in the chapters on obscure senders, constructing senders, and coerced consent 
– appear less prominently, if at all, in the Renaissance works.  Without these skeptical 
counterpoints to the “one mind” convention, the lovers’ communications appear more mystical. 
    
Remarkable communication, in fact, can be seen as the central defining characteristic of 
Tristan and Isolde’s love in all of its versions.447  In Tristan Rossignol (Tristan the Nightingale), 
Tristan  
  “Humain lanuage de[g]uisa 
 Cum cil que l’aprist de peça: 
Il cuntrefetle russinol, 
La papingai, le oriol…, 
E les oiseals de la gaudine.
448
   
[disguised his human language  
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With a skill he had lead long ago 
… imitat[ing] the nightingale,  
the parrot, the oriole.]  
Amazingly, Iseult  
Mes par cel chant ben entendi 
Ke pres de luec ot sun ami.”449   
[understood clearly from this song  
that her lover was nearby].
450
   
This example provides the most explicit description of the lovers’ communication as completely 
different from “human language” and once again shows Iseult’s understanding, even though this 
tale does not show or mention any previously established code.  Later, Tristan, disguised as a 
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from this song/ that her lover was nearby.]” 
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one-eyed minstrel, plays on his pipe the Lay of the Honeysuckle
451
 in order to let Iseult know it 
is he.  When she hears it, she “thinks” it is her love452 even though “Tristan has two eyes/ and 
this man has lost his left one.”453  Hearing the lay makes her suspicious that Tristan has shared 
the song that they “composed together.”454  Even though she acknowledges to herself that 
“Tristan is not [hers] anymore,”455 Iseult’s faith and the fact that “he has never lied” to her456 
finally helps her to overcome her suspicions.  Later, “thanks to the lay that he played on his 
pipes,/ She led him to her room.”457  Just as in Chevrefoil – a version of the lai of the 
honeysuckle, recognition by the lovers of each other calls to mind a much wider range of 
meaning than appears in the words: here, as in Marie’s version, that the lovers should meet.458  
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The shared, private quality of the information enhances the sense that the two share their lives in 
a meaningful way.
459
   
While medieval linguistic theories do not explicitly account for relational semantics, 
Jerome’s ideas address the need for contextual interpretation.  As noted, Tristan and Isolde’s 
communication does not match well with a simple substitution code.  Jerome’s ideas on 
translation focus on “word-for-word” and “sense-for-sense” translations; only in Scripture are 
both possible at once.  As is obvious from the discussion of codes, a word-for-word translation 
would often present a message completely at odds with the sender’s intent.  Jerome includes the 
idea of a far more flexible sense-for-sense translation in order to account for idiomatic 
expressions and other difficult passages, stating that a good translation “render[s] sense for sense 
and not word for word.”460  Once again, however, the lovers’ words often carry a sense that is 
outside – not merely the opposite of – the message that they exchange.  Their interpretations are 
not driven by fancy, as the sensory data – words – do not seem to matter in the formation of a 
correct understanding.  On the other hand, the lovers’ interpretations are not determined entirely 
by their imaginations.  After all, the lovers are able to interpret correctly one another’s 
misleading messages.  Somehow, then, the lovers are able to correctly ascertain the intent of their 
beloveds, as though the two share one collective intent.
461
  Such an understanding can be best 
                                                          
459
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460
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the philosophical debate over intent and sin came to the fore at the same time as the marital 
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understood when considering relational semantics, particularly the extra-linguistic elements that 
provide different contexts for particular statements. 
In the seventeenth century, Donne’s “Natures Lay Ideot” builds upon the notion that the 
most meaningful communication between lovers occurs in a language that is not limited to the 
words spoken.  Donne speaks of understanding the “mystique language of the eye [and] hand.”462  
This communication includes the idea of a mystical connection central to the tradition of 
collective individuals.  In addition, the poem provides details of expression to make clearer the 
importance of contextual details such as “sighs” and “sounds” in determining meaning.463  
Objects that have potential meaning are included as well when the narrator mentions  
…the Alphabet  
of flowers, how they devisefully being set 
And bound up, might with speechlesse secrecie 
Deliver arrands mutely, and mutually.
464
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
debate over consent.  In particular, Abelard’s idea that sin is defined by inward consent places 
definitive judgments of people’s behavior beyond human perception.  The connection between 
Tristan and Isolde, however, allows them to access one another’s intent even when the signs are 
either not clear or contradictory.  An ideal love such as theirs offers one response to anxieties 
regarding the uncertainty of relational semantics.  Abelard.  “What Sin and Vice Consist in 
(From Know Thyself or Ethics.).” Trans. D.E. Luscombe.  Ed. Richard Bosley and Martin 
Tweedale.  (Peterborough, Ont.:  Broadview, 1998).   (Scito te ipsum).  549-559. 
462
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Here we see one alphabet that makes possible the mystical communication between lovers.  
Many codes of flowers were employed widely but in this case, a potentially private code has 
been “devisefully… set” by the lovers.  Such a private code resembles what Basil Bernstein calls 
a restricted code, one designed for use within a particular community, in this case a community 
of two.
465
  As noted by Wardaugh, language is used as much to establish identity and exclude 
outsiders as it is used to communicate.
466
  As though sharing one mind, understanding is mutual.  
Using the word mutual here implies the exclusion of others from comprehending the lovers’ 
secret message.  The message does remain in “secrecie,” after all.     
The presence of subtle clues of expression and gesture might explain the lovers’ amazing 
interpretive leaps.  Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking467 
suggests that people are able to make correct snap judgments based on an excellent familiarity 
with the topic at hand.  Applying this to Tristan and Isolde, one could argue that the incredible 
familiarity the lovers have for one another would allow them to isolate any subtle shift in each 
other, allowing for a form of non-verbal communication outside of any verbal clues offered.  
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Such awareness would offer an explanation that allows for the lovers to be in what Gadamer 
would call an open conversation; rather than being open merely to the words, the participants are 
open to each others’ emotions via these almost unidentifiable clues.  Once again, however, it is 
the lovers’ compatibility – their familiarity – that allows such uncanny understanding to occur.  
Within the context of the romances, the distinction between snap judgments and a shared mind 
seems negligible, as both suggest mutual consent. 
One important component of the one mind tradition – from its earliest to its latest 
versions – sets in contrast the lovers’ privileged communication and consent against the others’ 
inability to understand.  At the start of the tradition, the lovers’ codes are occasionally 
understood by others, but by the end, the lovers’ codes communicate uniquely between the 
lovers.  The consent indicated by their communications, therefore, becomes even more private.   
Tristan and Isolde’s remarkable communication is a product of anxieties regarding the 
future spouses’ power to choose – their consent – by setting the lovers’ compatibility in contrast 
with the arranged nature of her marriage to King Mark.  Contrasting the modes of 
communication between Isolde and Tristan on the one hand and Mark on this other establishes 
how much better Tristan embodies Isolde’s marital ideal than Mark.  In fact, by the standards of 
consent theory and consummation, Tristram and Isond could be seen as married.  Both clearly 
indicate interest and consent on the ship. The language in both Brother Robert’s and Gottfried’s 
translations consciously echo the wedding ceremony, with Brother Robert’s stating that “the 
power of their love was such that they possessed one heart and one mind”468 and Gottfried 
stating the lovers understand that they have “one mind, one heart, and but a single will between 
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 Robert 133.  “Svá var mikill kraptr ástar þeirar sem þau hefði bæði einn hug ok hjarta” (132). 
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them.”469  The second standard of establishing marriage – consummation – occurs immediately 
following.  Brother Robert’s version only hints at the sexual encounter, suggesting that “there 
was nothing they could do about it,” followed by Isond’s need for the bed-trick with Bringvet 
because the servant “was an unspoiled maiden, but [Isond] could not say the same thing of 
herself”470  Gottfried states that they “reach the goal of their desire”471 – consummate their love – 
and Isond then worries about her “lost virginity.”472   Isond’s marriage to Mark, then, can be read 
as preceded by a clandestine, private marriage to Tristram.  Only the public ceremonies are 
missing from Tristram and Isond’s marriage.  One could argue that the entire plot establishes 
Tristan’s prior claim, as their declarations of love – a form of betrothal – and their consummation 
occur prior to her marriage to Mark.
473
  As such, the Tristram tale seems to redefine Tristram and 
Isond’s relationship as chaste adultery – adultery in a public realm but clearly chaste in a private 
one – and the debate continues to circle around the question about consent.  Even the primary 
argument against the lovers’ consent – that they were coerced by the potion – is a response to 
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anxieties regarding coerced consent.
474
  Far more damning is the description in Gottfried that 
Isond is “to be given to one whom she did not wish to be given.”475   As a final note, Mark’s loss 
of Isond to the harpist further illustrates their incompatibility and his negligence as a husband, an 
observation made explicitly by Tristram himself.
476
  
Romeo and Juliet’s courtship and marriage suffer from their privacy in a manner that 
resembles Tristan and Isolde’s relationship.  There is no doubt as to the lovers’ status as they 
show consent, marry before a priest, and consummate their marriage.  The secrecy propelling the 
action, however, relies on a debate similar to the one at the heart of the Tristan story: whether 
lovers have self-determination over themselves or whether marriage is primarily a public 
relationship to be determined by those with seniority.  This debate is enacted linguistically, with 
the two sides each seeking to control the meaning of the lovers’ statement. 
The story of Tristan and Isolde shares another characteristic with Romeo and Juliet; the 
privileged communication shared by each pair of lovers is broken apart when their messages 
have to be transmitted by others.  Some meaningful, often non-linguistic essence, allows error to 
creep into the message.  Many times, this miscommunication leads to the collapse of the lovers’ 
relationship.  Romeo would never have killed himself had he received the message telling him of 
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the Friar’s plan.  In fact, the tragedy of the death scene is magnified when considered in relation 
to the lovers’ perfect communication at the start of the play.    
Similarly, Tristran’s death – which among the early texts appears only in Thomas – 
occurs because he receives the incorrect message that his beloved Yseut will not return to heal 
him and his conclusion that she does not love him any more.  Tristran asks Kaherdin to go to 
Yseut with his ring  
 Ço sunt enseingnes entre nus
477
  
[which are signs between us,] 
and ask his lover to come and heal the wounds no one else can heal.
478
  If she is to return with 
him, Kaherdin is to “Del blanc siglez al revenir” [return under a white sail];479 if not, a “del neir 
siglë idunc siglez” [travel under a black sail].480  When Yseut returns with Kaherdin, they do 
unfurl a white sail. Unfortunately, Yseut aux Blanche Mains has overheard Tristran’s 
instructions to Kaherdin,  
  Les diz Tristran excute e ot 
  Ben ad entendu chaüm mot.
481
 
  […and listened to Tristran’s words, hearing all 
  And understanding each.]  
                                                          
477
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When Tristran – who cannot rise from his bed – asks her what kind of sail flies above the ship, 
Yseut aux blanche mains concocts a “grand engin” [cunning scheme],482  telling him “le sigle est 
tut near” [the sail is completely black].483  Yseut’s message of love, therefore, is transmitted to 
Tristran as a rejection, leading to his death.  The impediments to their communication presented 
by the public sphere finally succeed because the communication is too removed from the lovers.   
The same concern is raised within the text when Yseut moans, “s’a vus parlé eüsse” [if only I 
had spoken with you].
484
  Here, she seeks the certainty that immediate communication with her 
lover would offer.
485
 
Although seemingly miraculous, the communications of Tristan and Isolde are built 
around a private code that is decipherable.  We don’t see the code defined or explained in every 
version of the tale; Marie’s Chevrefoil and sections of the Norse Tristan come to mind.  
However, it becomes clear in other episodes and versions of the tale that the lovers have 
established a code wherein they have a private meaning for particular signals.  Even though 
Gottfried represents the lovers’ communications more mystically than the other versions of 
Tristan, he includes enough detail for non-lovers to discover the code, as well as the most 
explicit definitions of some of the lovers’ codes.  Gottfried’s version of the tale is the only extant 
version that includes an explicit definition of the wood shavings, as discussed earlier in the 
chapter.   
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The fact that non-lovers are occasionally able to break the lovers’ code suggests that the 
lovers’ messages rely on contextual interpretation – a characteristic of relational semantics.  The 
Norse Tristan includes several instances where non-lovers are able to correctly interpret the 
lovers’ seemingly clandestine signals.  Perhaps the most obvious case of the lovers’ code being 
potentially understood by others appears when Isolde of the White Hands overhears Tristan 
explaining that a white sail will indicate Isolde’s willingness to heal him while a black one 
indicates her refusal.  Isolde of the White Hands is able to understand the code well enough to 
substitute an alternate message.  In the Norse Tristram saga, an “illa dvergs” [evil dwarf]486 is 
able to correctly interpret the shavings Tristram sends into the river below Isond’s window to set 
up a meeting.  The dwarf tells Markis,  
“Ek sá, <at> hann telgði spánuna, er ahnn var vanr at  
kasta á ána at lokka ok stefna Ísönd til sín.”487  
[“I have seen that he whittled wood shavings, which he  
was accustomed to cast into the river, in order to entice  
Ísönd and summon her to him”.]  
The dwarf’s understanding in this case is even more unlikely than the lovers’ understanding; he 
did not help to establish code, nor does he share a particular intimacy that would allow him 
privileged access to the lovers’ assumptions.  
While communication is still central to the other strand of Tristan tales – called the 
common tradition – the lovers’ codes in these tales are even more easily decoded than those of 
the courtly – or Thomas-based – tales.  In Beroul’s version, not generally considered a 
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descendant of Thomas’, the lovers share a communication privileged by information rather than 
a more metaphysically shared mind.
488
  As many – including Norris Lacy – have noted, Beroul’s 
lovers often adopt a private meaning that has sexual undertones.  This is particularly noteworthy 
when Tristran is posing as a beggar in order to carry Iseut across the water and fall between her 
legs, thereby offering her the chance to offer up a truthful, but misleading assertion that “no man 
has ever been between my thighs,/ except the leper who made himself a beast of burden/ and 
carried me over the ford/ and my husband King Mark.”489  When she states she has a 
“proposition” for him, this can mean a job or a sexual activity.490  Similarly, when Iseut 
describes him as “large”491 and presses against his “crutch,” 492 Beroul emphasizes the sexual 
quality of these comments, with observers taking only her literal meaning while she, Tristran, 
and Dinas understand the sexual undertones.  The entire plan does not require any feats of 
interpretation on Tristran’s part.  First, Dinas hints that Iseult needs someone to carry her over 
the ford.  Iseult then looks at Tristran with a “wink.”493  Beroul presents to readers, then, the 
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subtle clues that allow Tristran to unpack her messages.  The fact that the messages are sexual 
rather than elevated also undermines the remarkable quality of the lovers’ communications.   
The communications in Beroul, then, highlight relational semantics as much as the 
courtly versions, but do so in a slightly less elevating and mystical manner.  Lovers in the 
common tradition do not seem to require any special interpretive connection beyond their private 
knowledge.  Making these communications more easily decoded lowers the standard of consent 
at the heart of the Tristan and Isolde tales.  The lovers no longer share “one mind”; instead, they 
share knowledge.  This change accounts for the widely noted difference of opinions regarding 
how readers should judge the lovers in the different traditions.  E. Jane Burns even uses the legal 
subterfuge in Beroul to condemn Tristran and Iseult, stating “the lover’s defense, like the socially 
deviant act of adultery, rests entirely on linguistically deviant forms of discourse [and that 
they…] subvert the legality of God’s Truth.”494   Burns describes the lovers’ use of relational 
semantics in order to emphasize, even more than Crane, the importance of searching for 
“unequivocal Truth.”495  While adultery is certainly a socially deviant act, the tale presents 
enough evidence – in the form of consensual consummation prior with Tristan – to make 
problematic Isolde’s marriage to Mark.  A determinate meaning such as Burns proposes 
suppresses not only this ambiguity, but the central importance in the Tristan tales of relational 
semantics and therefore multiple meanings.  After all, the poem seems at the very least to 
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question the notion of an unequivocal Truth.  The poem may even lionize the lovers by using 
religious language to describe them.   
  
 Though I have been emphasizing the continuities between medieval and Renaissance 
depictions of lovers united in one consciousness, there are some significant differences.  Lovers 
who choose to adopt a collective individuality are represented more favorably in the Renaissance 
texts than in the medieval ones.  First, the lovers’ transgressions are emphasized more in the 
medieval texts.  Second, greater understanding by non-lovers in the Renaissance texts almost 
always leads to greater approval, while in the medieval texts greater understanding by non-lovers 
produces either approval or disapproval.  Medieval texts tend to represent the lovers as 
understandably or even nobly transgressive of society’s rules, while Renaissance texts tend 
toward the idea that society’s rules should change.  
While the medieval texts certainly portray Tristan and Isolde as having a special love, the 
lovers’ societal transgressions are not glossed over.  The fact that both Tristan and Isolde choose 
to ignore their public marriage vows in favor of their private relationship is always presented as a 
serious transgression.  King Mark, even in the prose Tristan where Blachard and Quéreuil 
describe his portrayal as “irrémédiablement vil,” 496 has a legitimate complaint, as Isolde is 
cheating on him.  Despite being portrayed sympathetically, the lovers – and particularly their 
privacy – are portrayed in a manner that is “très réaliste, et semble peu influence par the doctrine 
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de l’amour courtois” [very realistic, and show little influence from the doctrine of courtly 
love].
497
  As such, the lovers are seen as at least as much of the problem as the societal institution 
of marriage itself.     
Romeo and Juliet, however, suggests that the problem lies not in the lovers but in the 
society that keeps them apart.  Unlike Tristan and Isolde, Romeo and Juliet are not committing 
adultery, because they are legally, if privately, married.  Romeo and Juliet’s transgression is 
disobedience in failing to perpetuate their families’ feud.  Because reason for the feud is never 
clearly stated, the feud seems less well motivated than the lovers’ affection.  Romeo and Juliet’s 
disobedience to a seemingly unmotivated feud therefore appears justified within the context of 
the lovers’ seemingly mystical connection with one another.  In comparison, the transgression of 
the lovers’ families – here representing society at large – is to obstruct a legally binding 
marriage, admittedly one that they do not know has occurred.  The feud seems particularly 
artificial in relation to the lovers’ natural love for one another.  On balance, Romeo and Juliet – 
and their collective individualism – are presented more favorably than their families.   
Donne’s poetry extends the trend of presenting the lovers more favorably by describing 
those who oppose lovers as completely in the wrong.  As mentioned in the previous discussion of 
“A Valediction:  Forbidding Mourning,” non-lovers are described as “dull, sublunary,” and 
referred to as “the laity” in relation to the lovers’ divine love.498   “The Canonization” is directed 
at one who would “chide” his love, asking to be criticized for his palsy or gout instead.  Chiding 
the narrator’s love is compared to “soldiers [who] find wars [and] lawyers [who] find out … 
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litigious men”499 – those who seek out quarrels where others are hurt – suggesting that the 
chiding likewise hurts the narrator.  In comparison, the narrator asks “who’s injured by [his] 
love,”500 setting himself apart from those who truly do hurt others.  The narrator suggests the 
trivial nature of whatever harm his love might cause by considering this minimal harm within the 
broader context of death, seasons, and war.    
Approval of the lovers in these Renaissance works is often linked to understanding as 
much or as well as the lovers do.  Once non-lovers who had previously opposed the lovers 
understand the “mystical” consent the lovers share, these non-lovers who had previously 
opposed the lovers now offer their approval.  Donne’s poetry presents the clearest example of 
understanding leading to approval.     
In Donne’s “The Canonization,” upon gaining greater understanding, those non-lovers 
who initially opposed and chided the lovers eventually approve of the love.  The one who 
previously would not “hold [his] tongue, and let [the narrator] love”501 ends the poem 
recognizing in the lovers as a “pattern of… love” from above, much like a neo-Platonic form or 
ideal.  Eventually, “all shall approve/ [the lovers] canonized for love” (my emphasis).502  The 
kind of the love embodied by the lovers becomes understood to be the Platonic ideal, which 
leads to universal approval. 
Medieval texts show some non-lovers who understand Tristan and Isolde and approve, 
but this approval is not universal.  In the Norse Tristram Saga, Kaherdin confronts Tristram 
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about the fact that Tristram’s marriage to Isond of the White Hands has not been consummated.  
Kaherdin asks to see the beauty that prevents Tristram.  Tristram’s response is to show Kaherdin 
the hall of statues and more specifically the statue of Isond.  Kaherdin understands and approves 
once he has seen the statues, withdrawing his complaint and asking to be introduced to Bringvet.  
Others, however, are not so understanding once they discover the lovers.  The evil dwarf who 
correctly interprets the shavings, for instance, continues to oppose Tristram and Isond whenever 
possible.  Marjadoc, as well, sees the lovers together and plots to ruin their love.  Admittedly, 
those who do not approve upon understanding the lovers are generally presented as selfish and 
spiteful.  The lovers’ privileged, private union remains transgressive, only ennobled by the purity 
of their feelings.  
Regardless of the version, communication is central to defining the relationship of Tristan 
and Isolde.  Many medieval literary representations of lovers after Thomas’ Tristran use 
communication as the litmus test of relationships, often upholding the ideal even as they critique 
it.  Parallel to the literary constructions of lovers, the same marriage ceremony – with its 
emphasis on unity and consent – also perpetuates the importance of a shared understanding.  
Shakespeare responds to anxieties of self-determination in love inherited from the romance 
tradition and places them in the context of a society where the power was shifting from the 
traditional aristocracy toward more mercantile interests, where marital self-determination held 
greater threat to the status quo.  The shared sonnet embodies perfectly the lovers’ unity even as 
its interruption highlights the societal intrusions upon their emotional self-determination.   
Examined alone, the one mind tradition suggests continuity in attitudes toward language 
from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance.  Despite this continuity, medieval texts generally 
balance the lovers’ privileged communications with episodes that lead one to question the lovers’ 
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insights.  Renaissance texts, on the other hand, often minimize or eliminate these episodes, 
leading to an impression that, with enough compatibility, the contingency inherent in language 
can be overcome.   
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CRITIQUE OF SELF-ABSORPTION 
CONSTRUCTING SENDERS, CONSTRUCING MEANINGS 
 
I don't ever dream about you and me 
I don't ever make up stuff about us 
that would be considered insanity 
 -Kate Nash We Get On
503
  
 
Robert:  How can you love someone you don’t even know? 
Giselle:  I know what’s in his heart. 
Enchanted  (2007)
504
 
 
 
 Earlier chapters explore how medieval anxieties about language and marriage come 
together in the literary convention that lovers had an interpretive connection so close that these 
lovers shared one mind.  As noted before, the early romances such as Tristan et Yseut combined 
– in the same lovers – the ideal with elements that destabilized this ideal.  Within this ideal, 
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lovers have the ability to correctly add content that did not appear in messages they send to one 
another, thus bypassing the uncertainties of traditional semantics.  The chapter on obscure 
senders discussed the instability at the heart of communications that relied on a hidden or even 
absent intent.  While originally presented as one element in a larger construction – one that 
included the ideal of one mind – later texts deploy this instability only in communications where 
the lovers are improper in some way.  Because of this limitation, what was initially an element 
undermining the ideal of one mind ends up expanding the idea of privileged communication 
between lovers to suggest that any lovers who do not share one mind are not truly in love. 
This chapter will discuss the specifics of how literary works within the tradition of lovers 
sharing one mind represent lovers constructing meaning when faced with messages – as 
discussed in a previous chapter– that have no clear intent.  Since the method of isolating intent 
from a reader in these romances is to isolate knowledge of the sender, the response to lacking a 
sender is to mentally construct a substitute sender.   
 In the absence of clear codes or non-verbal clues, interpretation must stem from an act of 
imagining the intended message of the beloved.  The foundation for this act of imagination is, as 
noted in the first chapter, that the lovers do indeed share one mind; the mind of the beloved is the 
mind of the lover; therefore, what the lover imagines the beloved meant must equal the beloved’s 
intention.  While this act of imagination may embody an ideal of embracing the beloved, it 
empties out the role of the sender, replacing it with an imagined sender.  Regardless of how 
closely this cognitive act matches the sender’s wishes and/or intentions, the entire 
communicative act – if it can correctly be called that – occurs solely within the mind of the 
receiver; the connection between the sender’s intent is severed from its eventual meaning.   
Eggers Misticall Unions 207 
 Particularly important in this shift is the movement of consent described in the pervious 
chapter.  If the beloved has offered consent prior to a particular message, the lover has at least 
one connection – however tenuous – to the perceived world.  Without a previously established 
consent, obscure messages are understood by imagining a sender to establish intent.  Given the 
self-contained quality of these interpretations, correctly ascertaining consent leaves one with 
three explanations:  a miraculous connection like the one described in chapter one, luck, or 
destiny.  All three, and particularly the last, still play an important role in defining how 
“successful” relationships.   
 
Marie de France’s Chevrefoil presents a clear portrait of how even the most successful of 
collective individual communications erases the sending beloved from the communication.  As 
noted in the first chapter, the only clear evidence of text we have is the name Tristan.  From this 
one word, the queen (presumably Isolde) unpacks a message seventeen lines long.  Even if one 
adopts Hanning’s position that the medium is the message – that hazelwood and chevrefoil 
symbolize all of these elements – the fact remains that the queen assumes a message, with an 
intent, directed toward her.  She incorporates the one word, its placement in her path, and the 
medium of the tree into her understanding.  Even if one includes the element of whittling – even 
though it is not shown in the lai but is included in other Tristan tales – she must imagine what he 
is trying to tell her.  The added content in this message has been supplied entirely by her, not 
grounded in physical signals.  While the possibility exists that the message was sent by a Tristan 
seeking desperately to warn her away, the queen constructs a Tristan desperate to be with her and 
make love in the forest.  Despite having some concrete evidence – in the form of consent – that 
the beloved approximates the lover’s constructed ideal, most of the this message is imagined by 
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Isolde.  Marie does not offer other signals to destabilize the lovers, so this sequence does not 
actively undermine their communication.  Rather, as noted in the first chapter, the unlikelihood 
of the imagined message matching the actual intent emphasizes the remarkable unity of the 
lovers.   
The communication, therefore, is between the lover and an image in the lover’s head.  
Even though Marie does not gesture toward this theme, many works within this tradition show a 
remarkable awareness of the importance imagination plays in these “communications.”  In fact, 
these works often incorporate language that shows an awareness of imagination’s role in 
cognition, according to models shared by medieval and Renaissance England.  Such 
explorations, by pointing out how these messages’ added contents stem from the mind and not 
the words, often suggest that the love is also in the mind alone and therefore not reciprocated. 
 
CONSTRUCTING A SENDER   
As in so many other ways, Thomas’ Tristan helps to establish the conventions for 
emphasizing the importance of the imagination when texts’ intentions are unclear.  When 
Tristran uses his statue as a substitute for the absent Yseut, Tristran enacts this portion of the 
“relationship” entirely in his imagination, with the imagined message coming from inside 
Tristran.  In fact, Tristran “became angry with it when he himself was in anger,/ whether brought 
on by his thoughts or dreams,” 505 dreams formed entirely in his mind. His relationship with the 
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statue mirrors the one he has with Yseut; in both cases, he receives her responses largely through 
imagining a sender that shares one mind with himself.   
By providing a physical substitute for Yseut, Thomas raises the possibility that Tristran’s 
interpretation involves him creating an image of the sender –Yseut – to substitute for the real 
sender in order to establish intent.  Given Tristran’s uncanny ability to communicate with Yseut, 
one must assume that others – lacking the lovers’ privileged interpretive connection – also use 
some mental creation to imagine a sender’s intent.  Thomas shows an awareness that intent may 
be beyond the reach of a receiver.  In addition, the need to create an image of the sender to 
establish intent indicates an awareness that the same words from a different sender – a different 
context – may mean something different; such awareness shows a working knowledge of 
relational semantics.  It even raises the more disturbing specter that all human understanding has 
no firm basis outside our minds. 
A second anxiety – epistemological in nature and more deeply seated than concerns about 
a collective identity – appears in Tristran’s relationship to the statue.  How is one to know 
anything when it is difficult to tell if something is imaginary?  How is one to distinguish between 
things that are imaginary and things that have a basis in a commonly accepted reality?  Thomas’ 
concerns echo a growing consciousness of an inner reality within the mind and its potentially 
uncertain relationship to the “outer,” commonly shared world.    
Thomas’ exploration of this epistemological anxiety incorporates language central to 
medieval cognitive models.  As seen in the Tristran’s long exploration of his motives for 
marrying Yseut aux Blanche Mains at the start of the Bodleian fragment, Thomas is clearly 
concerned with Tristran’s psychological and cognitive state.  The fragment opens by stating that 
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“his mind was ever changing,”506 suggesting the importance of Tristan’s psychological state.   
Tristan creates a statue to stand in for his beloved Yseut just as he constructs an image of her in 
his head.  Returning to the statue sequences in the Turin fragment, Thomas keeps repeating 
various forms of “penser” six times in forty-nine lines.507  Thomas describes Tristan’s 
conversations with the statue as “thoughts or dreams,”508 both things contained within his own 
mind.  Tristran’s “thinking induced false beliefs”509 that Yseut loved another.510  Tristran has no 
evidence to support these beliefs, so he must have imagined it.  Tristran’s imaginings are 
consistently described as false.  These imaginings are called “misconceptions”511 once and 
“errors”512 four times in this short section.  Pointing out that any other character in the poem 
would identify these imaginings as false emphasizes that these things exist only in Tristran’s 
mind.
513
  Making the connection even clearer to Tristran’s imagination, Thomas highlights the 
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importance of Tristran’s imagination by referring to the statue consistently as an “image,”514 a 
word sharing the same linguistic root as the imagination.  In the statue section, therefore, Thomas 
emphasizes the fact that Tristran constructs both mental and physical images of Yseut, 
constructions that lead to error because they erase or replace the real Yseut.   
Both the statue of Yseut and the imagined construction Tristran uses to “animate” her are 
divorced from the real Yseut.  Because of her absence, these “images” clearly come from 
Tristran’s imagination.  Like his relationship with the real Yseut, his relationship with the statue 
is divorced from any outside context.  This lack of a context outside Tristran’s mind parallels the 
lack of a social context for the lovers’ relationship.  How is one to tell whether the lovers’ love is 
merely imagined?  By questioning the truth of their communication, Thomas undermines the 
very foundation that legitimizes the lovers’ transgressions.   
The fact that these communications are imaginary in Thomas does not necessarily force 
one to conclude that the text should be read as an attack on the lovers.  Given the lack of other 
judgmental signals and the frequency with which the lovers’ imaginations match their beloved’s 
feelings, the poem does not seem to work on an error-based model, one where interpretive error 
equals inappropriate love.  Rather, balancing error and correctness leaves open the uncertain 
dialogue between fancy and imagination, introducing skepticism into what is presented primarily 
as a positive ideal for relationships. 
Setting the imaginary quality of these communications in balance with the idea of 
privileged lovers communications becomes an important element in many of these medieval 
romances.  Marie sets the unrealistic but correct imaginary communication in Chevrefoil against 
the fantasy-based uncertainty of Guilladun in Eliduc.  Guilladun carefully avoids self-delusion, 
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staying firmly in the realm of the observable.  Eliduc has erased himself fully from the 
communications, and she refuses to let the intent she imagines for him control the message.  Her 
decision to go with Eliduc is not based on self-delusion but conscious, skeptical choice.  As 
discussed before, however, her relationship is presented less favorably than Isolde’s in the 
companion lai.  
Chaucer raises this same question in Troilus and Criseyde, having Troilus confront 
ambiguous messages from Criseyde.  Chaucer, however, complicates the issue by placing an 
even greater emphasis on the imaginary qualities of Troilus’ communications with Criseyde than 
Thomas does on Tristran’s communications with Yseut.  The emphases on communications 
between lovers, the societal pressures against the lovers, and Troilus’ desire to share a privileged 
understanding of Criseyde place the poem firmly within the tradition of collective individualism.  
Troilus faces social pressures against his love that are seemingly addressed by the depth of their 
love and compatibility.  Their compatibility is seemingly established – at least in part – by their 
communications, though many of these communications are romanticized by Pandarus in 
transmission.  These communications are characterized by relational semantics and the 
importance of reception in interpretation.  Chaucer emphasizes Troilus’ delusional qualities, 
suggesting that their love – and through extension the concept of lovers sharing one mind – is an 
illusion.  Chaucer emphasizes aggressively the imaginary quality of the lovers’ relationship by 
showing Troilus’ misinterpretations, thereby critiquing the lover specifically and, by extension, 
collective individualism generally.  
Chaucer presents the potentially delusional quality of collective individualism in the 
inner workings of Troilus’ mind as he interprets an ambiguous letter from Criseyde.   
But ofte gan the herte glade and quake   
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  Of Troilus, whil that he gan it rede, 
  So as the wordes yave hym hope or drede. 
 
  But finally, he took al for the beste 
  That she hym wroot, for somwhat he byheld 
  On which hym thoughte he myghte his herte reste, 
  Al covered she tho wordes under sheld.    
  Thus to the more worthi part he held, 
  That what for hope and Pandarus byheste, 
  His grete wo foryede he at the leste.
515
     
Troilus eventually takes what Criseyde writes “al for the beste,” deciding to set aside his woe 
and continue to pursue Criseyde.  Despite this, it is easy to see how another reader might take 
Criseyde’s lukewarm or at least vague response as conflicted feelings or even as a polite 
rejection.  How does Troilus negotiate the meaning of Criseyde’s letter?  Chaucer makes it clear 
that Troilus fills in the gaps where unambiguous signals might be – mentioned above – by 
emphasizing “somwhat […] On which hym thoughte he myghte his herte reste – the words [that] 
yave hym hope”516 – over those words that caused him to “drede.”517  Chaucer makes it clear that 
Troilus emphasizes the positive elements of the letter as “more worthi,” filling the interpretive 
gaps with hints he has gleaned from the words that gladdened him.  Troilus actually forms two 
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patterns of meaning for the letter, one that causes his heart to “glade” and one that causes his 
heart to “drede.”  Faced with two equally compelling interpretations, Troilus must fill in the 
important detail of emphasis that knowledge of Criseyde’s intent would answer. 
 Troilus’ search for intent runs the fine line between fancy and imagination.  While 
Chaucer does not use medieval medical terminology to discuss Troilus’ interpretation in this 
sequence, Chaucer refers to the process of thinking or interpretation – including words such as 
thoughte, byhelde, and took –  three times in this short sequence.  Doing so, Chaucer raises the 
question of just how much of this interpretation has Troilus supplied.  The significant portion of 
the letter – the emphasis on words indicating intent – is imagined by Troilus.  In effect, Troilus 
imagines a substitute Criseyde who writes the letter, pointing the words that indicate love.  The 
communication, therefore, would seem to be between Troilus and an image of Criseyde in 
Troilus’ head.   
 Chaucer reintroduces the idea of creating an imaginary Criseyde to supply missing 
information in the scenes where Troilus fruitlessly awaits Criseyde’s return.  Futher emphasizing 
the connection, Chaucer echoes the precise phrase, noting that, after ten days, Troilus’ heart lay 
between “hope and drede.”518 Just like the first time, Troilus chooses to emphasize his hope.  
This time, however, Troilus has more evidence to support his hopes; her promises, the “hestes 
olde”519 that she fails eventually to fulfill, as well as their time together.  The poem mentions her 
consent/promise in four consecutive stanzas.
520
  This repetition shows how Troilus’ hope has 
some basis outside his mind.   
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 In the scene that indicates Troilus has finally accepted that Criseyde will not return, 
Troilus addresses an absent Criseyde.  Rather than substitute an imagined receiver or even 
construct an “image” or statue as did Tristan, Troilus does not imagine her responses.  In fact, six 
of the seven sentences he calls out are questions that are never answered while the seventh is his 
declaration – perhaps more of a self-accusation – that he took her word as “gospel.”521  At this 
point, Troilus most clearly admits the disparity between the real Criseyde and his idealized 
image of her – the one he constructed/imagined in his mind.  Not surprisingly, the image of her 
he has created centers around what may be thought of as Troilus’ own central trait – 
steadfastness.  Note that he still acts as though watched by this idealized image, what might be 
called his ego ideal.   
 Like Thomas, Chaucer emphasizes the workings of the lovers’ minds, particularly how 
forming an image in one’s mind of a person informs one’s interpretation.  Chaucer presents a 
prolonged description of how the lovers form images of one another during their initial 
seduction.  Criseyde wishes for her image to be made “faste” in Troilus’ “mynde” and cautions 
Troilus that “non other fantasie” creeps into his “brayn.”522  Given Criseyde’s later choice of 
Diomede, Chaucer may be presenting Criseyde’s concern about memory as ironic.  Using 
cognitive terminology – even imprecisely – allows Chaucer to express a concern whether a 
fantasy can intrude upon the “real” image of another in one’s mind.  The emphasis on the mind is 
continued thirty lines later when Troilus  
in his thought gan up and down to wynde  
Hires wordes all, and every countenance, 
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And fermely impressen in his mynde  
The leeste point that to him was plesaunce.
523
 
This longer sequence makes explicit the connection between “wordes” and the image (or, 
perhaps more accurately, the fantasy) impressed within his “mynde.”  In addition to establishing 
the importance of the mind in interpretation, this example highlights the selective nature of how 
this image is formed.  Similar to when Troilus reads Criseyde’s first letter, Troilus here chooses 
to remember only the points that are pleasant to him.  More specifically, Troilus links her words 
to this image of her – an image formed when she is freshly in love with him.   
Chaucer then introduces the role of memory into Troilus’ interpretations.  When Criseyde 
goes to the Greeks, Troilus keeps this image of her in his mind.   
The lettres ek that she of olde tyme  
Hadde hym ysent, he wolde allone rede 
An hondred sithe atwixen noon and prime, 
Refiguring hire shap, hire wommanhede, 
Withinne his herte.
524
 
Here, Troilus uses the letters to reinforce this image within his heart – an image that resembles 
the one that he created himself while reading her first letter.  The act is solitary, rather than 
social, and has a circular quality:  Troilus reads the letters with an image of Criseyde in his mind 
– in order to reinforce or even remake – “refigur[e]” – that image.  This is the image that Troilus 
uses as a stand-in for the absent Criseyde when she sends him ambivalent letters later in the 
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poem.
525
  Troilus’ image of Criseyde stays the same even as Criseyde changes.  When Troilus 
uses the same model of imaginative interpretation after Criseyde has been sent to the Greeks, 
Criseyde’s actions highlight the disparity between herself and the image of her that Troilus has 
created.  Troilus’ “hope alwey hym blente,”526 making him blind to the possibility that she will 
never come back.  Troilus’ hope stems from his image of Criseyde as pining in love as deeply as 
he himself pines.  While Troilus’ idea makes sense within the tradition of sharing one mind, 
Chaucer emphasizes the absence of Criseyde and how Troilus seems to narcissistically substitute 
himself for her.   
 Even the moment where Troilus finally acknowledges that Criseyde may no longer love 
him is presented as erasing or expelling an image from Criseyde’s mind.  Troilus concludes – to 
an absent Criseyde – that “clene out of youre mynde / ye han me cast.”527 While Troilus 
considers that, in a meaningful way, he previously resided in Crideyde’s mind, this phrase also 
acknowledges that the connection – if it wasn’t entirely imaginary – has been severed when 
Criseyde’s image of him is deleted from her memory. 
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 Evidence that the reception of Chaucer’s poem included an awareness of cognitive 
models can be found in Henryson’s fifteenth century Testament of Cresseid.528  Henryson’s 
Testament was conceived as an episode that Chaucer chose not to include in his romance, where 
the lovers see but do not recognize each other.  By pointing out the difference between the 
lovers’ idealized images of one another and the reality upon which these lovers are based, 
Henryson suggests that Troilus’ love, even when involved with Criseyde, may have been equally 
faulty.  Henryson’s language, even more explicitly than Chaucer’s, emphasizes the importance 
and error of the fancy in the lovers’ memories.   
Henryson’s poem presents an episode between Troilus’ discovery of Criseyde’s possible 
change of affections and Troilus’ death, where neither lover recognizes the other.  When Troilus 
saw Cresseid among the lepers, he “knew [Cresseid] nocht.”529  Henyrson does not represent 
disfiguring leprosy as the cause of Troilus’ lack of recognition; in fact, Henryson makes no 
mention of the disease afflicting her.  Rather, Henryson identifies the cause as Troilus’ fancy.  
 Na wonder was, suppois in mynd that he 
Tuik hir figure sa sone, an lo! Now quhy; 
The idole of ane thing in cace may be  
Sa deip imprentit in the fantasy, 
That it deludes the wittis outwardly 
And sa appeiris in forme and lyke estait 
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Within the mynd as it was figurait.
530
 
This short section, contained within an envelope pattern marked by “mynd” on both ends, shows 
how the image or “idole” formed in the “fantasy” can overwhelm the “wittes.”  The “idole” of 
Cresseid as he perceived her when they were in love is so deeply imprinted in Troilus’ fancy 
(“fantasy”) and so entirely different than her current state that Troilus’ mind cannot make a 
connection between the fancy’s image (from his sight) and the memory’s.  Another possible and 
potentially overlapping cognitive construction would set the fancy’s image – now in memory – 
against the imagination’s image of what Cresseid might now be like, an image built from the 
memory and kept the same because Troilus wishes for her to remain beautiful.  Both of these 
possible cognitive progressions show the role of a “reader’s” desire in making meaning; Troilus’ 
desire in this case – a prejudgment on his part – is that Cresseid remains the ideal of love and 
beauty that he remembers.
531
  The “idole” itself, due to being “figurait” by the mind, is 
potentially unreliable in the first place; this image is formed or figured by the receiver, in this 
case, Troilus.  The passage of time increases the likelihood that the image is inaccurate, as 
changes to the person increase differences enough to make any connection to the original person 
unlikely.  In fact, the original Cresseid is erased entirely in favor of Troilus’ image; the entire 
process is contained in Troilus’ mind and isolated from the world around him.   
 Returning to Chaucer’s version, it is difficult to see clearly the target of his critique, but 
more evidence suggests that it destabilizes the idea of sharing one mind more than it suggests 
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Troilus is unworthy as a suitor.  Even though Troilus is often a figure of ridicule, lolling about in 
bed, climbing in privies, and swooning, he is attentive to Criseyde’s wishes and more steadfast in 
his affection than wise.  Chaucer, then, directs the critique of self-absorption at the idea of 
collective individualism. 
 
CONSTRUCTING CONSENT 
 As noted in the previous chapter, one of the key shifts in these lines of communication 
during the period in question is that sharing one mind is assumed not to be brought about by 
consent, but the indication of compatibility and consent.  Put more simply, consent “moves” 
from input to output.   
This linguistic shift mirrors literary lovers’ increasing – but certainly not complete – self-
determination in marriage and the need to establish compatibility and consent rather than 
concealing these very things from people who could separate the lovers.  The goal of the 
communications is no longer to communicate two levels of information, one of which is hidden.  
The goal of these communications is to test whether the lovers are compatible.  The Renaissance 
texts, having inherited the generic convention that lovers share privileged communications, use 
this as the litmus test for compatibility and consent.  As seen in the previous chapter, however, 
these same conventions erase the sender from the interpretation, leaving only an imagined (rather 
than fantasized) sender.  If the imagined sender matches the real sender, then the lovers must 
share one mind.   
The shift of consent means that the lover has even less evidence to activate private 
lovers’ secondary meanings.  In medieval cognitive terms, the fantasy has even less of a role to 
play and the imagination takes an even more prominent role.  Later in the period, the self-
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involved critique becomes increasingly directed at individuals rather than at the generic 
expectations of sharing one mind.  In order to be worthy, one must correctly construct an 
imaginary sender that matches with the real beloved even though the beloved has not yet 
indicated interest.  Those who imagine incorrectly are shown to be unworthy, too reliant on their 
own perspective of the world.  In contrast, those who imagine correctly despite the greater 
difficulty are shown to be even more remarkable.  By romanticizing even more this interpretive 
connection, the critique of self-absorption, much like the unintentional critique, comes to 
reinforce the ideal of sharing one mind.   
 King Horn, like Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, provides a medieval example of 
exploring the idea of constructing a sender within the context of courtship.  King Horn’s 
Rymenhild provides one of the earliest examples of an error-based critique of self-absorption.  
Looking closely at the cognitive elements in the wider tradition suggests that she places too 
much emphasis on her senses and forms improper patterns from the information taken in by her 
common senses.  Lacan’s terminology clarifies the issue.  In both scenes where she 
misrecognizes Horn, her idealized self-image – Horn – is tied to his superiority.  In the bedroom 
scene where she mistkes Athulf for Horn, Rymenhild is blinded both by her desire (senses) and 
by the idea that the most beautiful man in her world desires her (an imaginary figure – her ego 
ideal).  In the recognition scene, it is in part Rymenhild’s inability to consider Horn outside her 
preconceptions – particularly class boundaries – that prevents her from imagining that he is the 
beggar.
532
  In both cases, the romance shows Rymenhild to be wrong, or at least to miss an entire 
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layer of meaning to which she should have access.  She also, as noted in the previous chapter, 
falls into the very traps she hopes the ring will prevent in Horn.  Despite this, Rymenhild’s 
overabundant appetite and imagination seem to be balanced by her steadfast devotion during 
Horn’s long absence.  Her character, then, seems to be a mix of positive and negative traits, both 
linked to her preconceptions, but she does not come across as unworthy.  She does come across 
as unrealistically idealistic, but this characteristic can best be explained by the expectations 
drawn from other romances.  As such, the critique of self-absorption in King Horn follows 
medieval tradition by having the critique directed at the lead lovers, thereby critiquing the ideal 
rather than the character.  However, King Horn anticipates the Renaissance tradition by 
presenting the inability to ascertain a hidden message as an error.   
 Sidney’s Old Arcadia 533presents a range of entertaining but baffling interpretive 
situations between prospective lovers that become clearer within the framework of the critique of 
self-absorption.  Sidney brings together the key elements of this tradition:  absent senders whose 
absence makes interpretation problematic, the construction of imaginary senders to determine 
intent, and cognitive terminology to describe this construction.  The key cognitive capacity in 
these musings is the frequently mentioned “fancy.”  OA may be seen as one of the earliest texts 
to incorporate an error-based model of the critique of self-absorption, whereby, despite being 
prior to consent, lovers are able to make interpretive leaps that suggest they share privileged 
connections with their beloveds.  In contrast, other lovers are shown to be inappropriate because 
their imagined senders do not match the people they are trying to imagine.  While Sidney’s 
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princesses are too skeptical of their insights to seem as though they share one mind with the 
princes, the princesses do share a connection with the princes that sees through gender and class.   
Much like Thomas’ Tristan, Sidney’s Old Arcadia shows a clear concern with characters’ 
psychological states, suggesting that these states play an important role in constructing the 
meaning of statements they have heard; more specifically, the construction of meaning involves 
constructing a potential sender.  Long sections of the poem are devoted to describing the 
characters’ internal monologues and musings.  Presenting the lovers thinking in isolation about 
their beloveds suggests the self-involved quality of such musings.  Sidney’s Old Arcadia 
transmits the medieval convention of using cognitive terminology to represent lovers’ self-
involved interpretations, particularly when meaning is difficult to determine due to an uncertain 
sender.  Sidney’s OA, like Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, does not deploy cognitive 
terminology as precisely as Henryson’s Testament of Cresseid.  Sidney uses the term “fancy” 
indiscriminately to describe all things needing the fancy or imagination, perhaps because fancy 
also carries the secondary meaning of affection.  One of the earliest references to fancy occurs 
when Sidney’s narrator addresses his readers, describing a shepherd “in order that you may take 
[this shepherd] the better into your fancies” (27).  A more precise cognitive description would be 
for the readers to use their imaginations, as the shepherd is not physically present.  While 
Sidney’s confusion of fancy and imagination is almost certainly due to an incomplete knowledge 
of the medical terms, this linguistic blurring supports – perhaps unintentionally – his blurring of 
whether ones understanding is accurate. 
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 Musidorus, dressed as Dorus, also emphasizes cognition when he creates a poem 
describing how he creates an image of his beloved Pamela.
534
  Musidorus describes his musings 
as the “books of a fancy,”535 though clearly the imagination plays the greater role.  Similar to the 
statue scene in Thomas’ Tristan, Musidorus takes inanimate objects and imagines them as his 
beloved.   
But to the cedar, queen of the woods, when I lift my beteared eyes, 
Then do I shape to myself that form which reigns so within me, 
And think there she do dwell and hear what plaints I do utter: 
When that noble top doth nod, I believe she salutes me; 
When by the wind it maketh noise, I do think she doth answer.
536
 
Musidorus externalizes the image of Pamela and superimposes them on the trees.  Even though 
the sounds have no meaning on their own, Musidorus creates meaning where there is none.  
Sidney’s language emphasizes the interiority of this experience, pointing out that the form exists 
“within [him].”  As with Tristan, an entire conversation is carried on with an imagined lover.  
This scene differs from Tristan in that Musidorus, by including it in a poem and being so self-
aware of his process, seems to be able to ascertain the difference between this imagined 
conversation and a real one.  The poem takes the idea of “form” and converts it into a Neo-
Platonic conceit common to many similar love poems.  Furthermore, Musidorus recites this 
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poem in the presence of his beloved Pamela, making it an indirect declaration of his love to her.  
Sidney does not offer her response to the poem immediately, but soon after, describes her as 
“having had no small stirring of her mind toward him” but, due to his class, “sought to overcome 
it.”537 Pamela’s response indicates her interior feelings, feelings that will prove more accurate 
than a construction of him based primarily on his class.  Musidorus then composes a poem with 
Mopsa as its ostensible object but containing a “second meaning” directed at Pamela.538  Once 
again, he returns to the idea of his beloved within his mind, her “image lives in [him].”539   
 In addition to emphasizing the imaginary, this sequence includes erroneous interpretation 
by the unworthy Mopsa.  Mopsa continues to see herself as the object of the Musidorus’ poetry, 
even though Pamela notes that only “great ignorance” could allow anyone to miss Musidorus’ 
second, and true, meaning.  Then, when Pamela questions his worth, Musidorus asks Pamela to 
deliver a fine jewel to Mopsa.  Once again, Pamela shows her sensitivity to this secret message, 
noting his worth before passing the jewel on to the shepherdess.  Unlike the communications 
between Tristan and Isolde, where his messages are equally true on both levels, both as a servant 
and as a lover, in each of these examples, one interpretation is clearly wrong.  Mopsa’s inability 
to interpret this correctly indicates that she is not right for him, even as Pamela’s ability to do so 
indicates her compatibility. 
 Philoclea’s response to the Amazon-disguised Pyrocles also indicates that her inner, 
perhaps subconscious, emotional response is more accurate than one based on solely on her 
senses.  Her communis sensus, through her fancy, tells her Pyrocles is a woman, but some insight 
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allows her to secretly form an image of Pyrocles as a man.  As noted in the previous chapter, 
Philoclea actually imagines him a man or, at the very least, being changed from a woman into a 
man.
540
  First, she has come up with an entire scenario entirely in her mind.  Second, she does 
not know his feelings (consent).  Third, the lack of any real connection to her reality is clear 
because of the impossibility of a sex change.  Because of these two things, it is clear Philoclea 
has constructed a version of Pyrocles in her imagination (as opposed to her fancy).  Despite the 
fact that the scenario is completely unrealistic in a literal sense, her imaginary construct of 
Pyrocles is more accurate than one based primarily on the senses.  Philoclea’s wishes reflect in 
her an inner consent she has not yet admitted to herself, a subconscious consent that matches 
well with Abelard’s definition of sin, as discussed in the previous chapter.541  Sidney’s 
presentation of the recognition motif both satirizes and romanticizes the idea an imaginative 
connection between lovers.   
 Sidney’s version of the error-based model makes a clear distinction between imaginative 
compatibility and consent, particularly when highlighting inappropriate suitors.  While the 
female leads show their worth by accurately constructing images of their suitors, inappropriate 
suitors such as Mopsa, King Basilius, or Gynecia refuse to let the fact that their beloveds 
withhold consent change the image in their head.  Because they will not change the image in 
their head to account for the feelings of their beloveds, these characters are shown to be 
unworthy.  In cognitive terms, the improper lovers place greater value on their imagined 
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beloveds than on reality and can safely be labeled self-involved.  Gynecia, in fact, works to force 
Pyrocles to fit her image of him. 
 The issues of compatibility, consent, and imagination come together in the scene where 
Pyrocles overhears Gynecia in the cave.  As discussed in the previous chapter, Pyrolces has no 
way to determine Gynecia is the poet/sender, which makes the poem lack a specific intent other 
than a general declaration of love.  When he hears the poem, Pyrocles asks “who can it be that 
can make so lively a portraiture of my miseries”?542  This kind of language echoes the “one 
mind” mentality seen in Philoclea’s lament that Pyrocles has spoken “words which she thought 
might with more cause have been spoken by her own mouth”.543  Both situations indicate 
compatibility of sentiment, but Philoclea’s connection with Pyrocles indicates something more 
than Pyrocles’ temporary connection with Gynecia.  Philoclea does, after all, know the source of 
her poem.  Contrasting this, Sidney emphasizes the need for Pyrocles to bring his mental image 
into contact with the actual poet before offering consent.  Pyrocles mentions to himself the 
qualified quality of this connection, stating that he and the poet are “at the least hand fellow 
prentices to one master.”544  The shared emotion inspired in Pyrocles is merely one step in the 
process.  The next is to bring the image formed in his head by the poem into contact with the 
actual poet because, Sidney makes clear, general compatibility does not equal person-specific 
consent.  The other key difference is that consent is not mutual in the latter case; Pyrocles does 
not agree to love Gynecia.  The primary indicator of this – and reason for it – is that the image in 
Pyrocles’ does not match with the actual Gynecia.   
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 Sidney’s response in OA to the absence of a sender has two steps:  first, one constructs a 
sender largely in the imagination and second, one must compare that imaginary construct with 
observable evidence, the best of which would be a clear declaration of approval or rejection.  
Such a model places the burden on the lover to make this comparison correctly and only then to 
continue holding on to it.   The critique of self-absorption, in this case, is primarily directed not 
at the expectations of sharing one mind, but at the individual who has judged erroneously.   
 Sidney uses a similar model to undermine the narrator of Astrophil and Stella.   
Astrophil’s declarations of Stella’s love appear reliable even though she expresses reservations 
about kissing him, because such reservations fit with social and generic expectations.  However, 
through much of the sonnet cycle, Stella is silent.  Even when her words are present, Stella has 
been erased entirely from the message, as her words are merely a catalyst for a message from an 
image of her in his head to himself.  When Astrophil reports her speech in the Eighth Song, he 
adopts the position of a privileged interpreter of her words.   
…her speech was such, 
As not ears but heart did touch: 
While such wise she love denied, 
As yet love she signified.
545
   
Astrophil asserts that her public, literal meaning denying that she loves him is merely a cover for 
her true signified, that she loves him.  As the two meanings are mutually exclusive, one is in 
error, placing Astrophil’s construction firmly within the Renaissance conventions of sharing one 
mind.  In doing so, he follows the Renaissance convention of error-based communications, 
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where one meaning is right and the other wrong.
546
 Even the language approximates the 
cognitive ideas in OA, denying the sensory, phantasy-driven in favor of an image in his “heart.”  
If only there were evidence that Sidney followed the lesser-known Aristotelian cognitive model 
where the seat of cognition was the heart rather than the brain, the connection would be 
indisputable, but it seems more likely that Sidney is merely linking the interpretation to emotion.  
Lacking such definitive evidence, we have only the elements laid out before:  parallel meanings 
only one of which is correct with that same one available only to a true lover, described with an 
awareness of interiority.  Rather than following this model precisely, however, Sidney introduces 
the idea of error by emphasizing the disparity between the imagined intent linked to an image in 
Astrophil’s mind and the actual words.   
 While Astrophil works with the generic conventions of collective individualism, Sidney, 
by setting Astrophil’s imagined loving Stella as the sender against her words denying love, 
introduces the idea that this imaginary content may only be accepted conditionally.  The 
Eleventh Song serves to bring this point into clear focus when Stella repeatedly and almost 
rudely tells him to forget her and Astrophil stubbornly holds on to his image of a loving Stella.
547
  
Clearly, Astrophil’s self-definition is so deeply vested in the idea of Stella’s loving gaze as the 
perspective from which he wants to be observed.  Sidney seems to split his satire equally 
between the unrealistic expectations of collective individualism and Astrophil himself.  Given 
OA, however, one suspects that the primary issue is that Astrophil refuses to see any disparities.  
Sidney, then, maintains the notion of a privileged connection between lovers, but introduces the 
notion that this connection needs to be set in dialogue with the fantasy.   
                                                          
546
 As opposed to the medieval model where both meanings coexist simultaneously. 
547
 Sidney,  AS, Eleventh Song. 
Eggers Misticall Unions 230 
 These Renaissance texts seem to address the issue of the potential unreliability of the 
imagination through a process of comparing images constructed with the imagination and 
phantasy.  Essentially, given an absent sender and therefore absent intent, one must start the 
process with by imagining a sender.  As most of the literary examples from later in the periods at 
hand focus on courtship, consent cannot be assumed and therefore factored into the construct.  
The first the step is to take the text and imagine a sender.  This sender may take a form similar to 
the receiver’s idealized self, and therefore likely includes an element of wishful thinking.  The 
key step, however, is when the character is shown to make an open-minded comparison between 
this imaginary construct and the next encounter with the beloved.  If the image and the fantasy 
match, then the character is shown to be correct, moving the lovers into the tradition of the 
collective individual, as discussed in the first chapter.  If, however, there is a disparity between 
the image and the phantasy, the character is shown to be inappropriate and therefore subject to 
the critique of self-absorption.   
 After indicating to the reader or audience a disparity between the imagined construct and 
the sensory ones, writers using this comparative method indicate the critique of self-absorption 
in two ways.  First, the character can fail to notice the disparity.  The character’s ability to form 
patterns is clearly isolated from reality, the character’s judgments are shown to be unreliable.  
The second method is to have the character notice the disparity and refuse to allow the beloved 
to refuse consent.  This second method incorporates a different set of conventions than the 
critique of self-absorption and will therefore be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  The 
first method, following conventions established in Sidney, provides the means to highlight 
inappropriate suitors for the rest of the period. 
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 Shakespeare incorporates the conventions of the critique of self-absorption to highlight 
Malvolio’s transgressions as a lover in Twelfth Night.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
modern response to Malvolio is conflicted due to shifts since the Renaissance in values regarding 
class and self-determination.  Because of this, modern productions often take care to perform 
Malvolio as self-involved as soon as he receives the letter he thinks comes from Olivia.  The 
previous chapter discussed the letter in detail, but the scene that more clearly indicates 
Malvolio’s self-involvement is when he approaches Olivia with his encoded acceptance of her 
love – the wearing of stockings and smiling.548   
 For these communications, Malvolio has substituted a constructed Olivia whose message 
consistently indicates the same preconceived meaning; whatever she says signifies her love for 
Malvolio.  Having made this substitution, Malvolio has erased the real Olivia from the 
communications entirely.  Even though Olivia responds to his encoded declaration with nine 
questions and three exclamations of confused alarm, Malvolio never perceives any confusion in 
her.  He interprets her suggestion that he go to bed as a sexual innuendo.  In so doing, he 
substitutes his image of her, ignoring any confusion indicated in her voice or in the rest of her 
responses.  As such, he never sets his image in a meaningful relation to the real Olivia, to the 
commonly agreed upon perception of her responses. 
 Several other moments in the play suggest that interpretation, rather than class, should be 
the primary lens through which we judge Malvolio.  Language and interpretation are at the heart 
of the troubling scene in the coal cellar.  When confronted with Feste’s assertion that the room is 
light, Malvolio doesn’t even consider the possibility that his own perceptions might not be 
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correct.  The problem is not that he is wrong, but that he is unwilling to consider things from 
another perspective.  The same can be said of his attitudes toward morality, as pointed out by 
Toby, who points out that Malvolio’s personal condemnation of cakes and ale will not 
necessarily prevent others from partaking.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
COERCED CONSENT 
WILLFUL MISREADING 
 
Loving in trueth, and fayne in verse my loue to show, 
That she, deare Shee, might take som pleasure of my paine, 
Pleasure might cause her reade, reading might make her know, 
Knowledge might pittie winne, and pity grace obtaine,… 
 Sir Philip Sidney, Astrophil and Stella #1 (1591)
549
 
 
I would you were as I would have you be! 
Olivia in Twelfth Night 3.1.123
550
 
 
These quotes from Twelfth Night and Astrophil and Stella may not seem to have much in 
common, but both show characters acting on a desired response, rather than respectfully 
accepting rejections from those they love.  Erasing a clear intent from the beloved and 
substituting instead one’s own desires seems to go contrary to the tradition of sharing one mind 
as identified in the previous chapters, but it does build on the critique of self-absorption, moving 
from self-delusion to conscious coercion.  Deploy these generic conventions in isolation and 
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such coercion makes no sense; deployed together, however, these conventions can lead to a 
consent more coerced than earned.  This chapter will trace the development of a form of 
controlling a young person’s consent that stems not from self-deception or paternal authority but 
from a more insidious place, the assumption that one knows better than the beloved what he or 
she “really” wants.   
These quotations suggest that the beloved should surrender control to the person who 
knows them better than they know themselves, thus placing the beloved’s consent in the hands of 
the suitors who love/desire them.  Within the medieval context, the control over consent has 
merely been transferred from the family to the suitor.  The key, however, is that the beloved must 
be made to understand that the lover has this greater knowledge; often the lover uses persuasion 
that blurs the lines into coercion, ignoring a clearly stated rejection and adopting a position in 
relation to the beloved much like that of a litigant in a legal case.   
The logic behind the first sonnet in Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella includes a logical 
progression based upon similar assumptions.  Astrophil describes the emotional response that he 
hopes Stella will follow as she reads his poetry, with her greater knowledge of his suffering 
leading to “grace.”551  For the purposes of my argument, the key element in this progression is 
knowledge.  Astrophil’s implied assertion to Stella is “I know you would love me if you really 
knew me.”  This implication is founded upon the idea that Astrophil believes he knows her 
feelings better than she knows her own and that his love provides him with this insight.
552
  Stella 
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is erased from the process, with Astrophil’s imagined – and desired – responses substituted for 
any of her own.
553
   
Stella’s absence from the poem might not seem remarkable, given the monologic quality 
of most lyric poetry; we only hear the poet’s voice.  Sidney, however, emphasizes throughout 
this sonnet cycle the frequent disconnect between Astrophil’s ideas of Stella and the “actual” 
Stella.
554
  The Eleventh Song, for instance, uses dialogue between Stella and Astrophil to make 
clear the disparity between Astrophil’s representation of Stella’s feelings and what she says for 
herself.  When Astrophil appears at her window in the night, the best greeting she can offer is 
“’Why, alas, and are you he?/ Be not yet those fancies changed?’”555  In a series of exchanges, 
Stella indicates her growing impatience with Astrophil’s use of the language of courtly love 
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while refusing to accept her rejections. She proceeds to state that “in absence will [his love] 
die,”556 that “time will these thoughts remove,”557 and finishes with a frustrated “Come no more, 
lest I get anger.”558  Astrophil responds “Absence sure will help, if I/ Can learn how myself to 
sunder,/ From what in my heart doth lie,”559 followed by “Time doth as the subject prove;/ With 
time still th’ affection growth/ In the faithful turtledove,”560 and concluding “Bliss, I will my 
bliss forbear,/ Fearing, sweet, you to endanger,/ But my soul shall harbor there.”561  Astrophil 
works in the first example on the assumption that he shares one mind with Stella; in the second, 
on the assumption that he knows better than she does; and in the third, once again, on the 
assumption that the two are soul-mates.  Astrophil’s self-absorption is more narcissistically 
willful than the ignorance of Malvolio; after all, Olivia does not reject her steward directly.
562
    
 Scenes like this one between Astrophil and Stella build on the notion that the lover knows 
his beloved better than she knows herself, taking the idea of one mind into dangerously coercive 
realms.  Refusal to hear a rejection can enforce a silent “consent.”  Taken outside the context of 
consensual lovers, the quotations listed at the beginning of the chapter on lovers sharing one 
mind take on a more disturbing air. 
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 Previous chapters have explored the role of relational semantics in lovers who seem to 
share one mind, the importance of recognition in interpretation, and difficulties in establishing 
intent.  At the heart of all of these chapters would seem to be attempts to truly understand the 
other speaker; desires that intrude upon the process are quickly resolved when that intention is 
made clear.  Occasionally, however, a rejected potential lover is unwilling to accept the meaning 
of a message that has a clear intention to reject.  In these cases, the reader willfully misreads a 
message to match with his or her desires, adopting a legalistic discourse in a romantic setting.  In 
some cases, this type of reading is literal, following the specific words rather than the intention 
behind the words. The combative nature of this discourse runs contrary to the ideal of one mind 
seen in romances where mutual consent is central, as one lover attempts to impose his or her will 
– desires and/or definitions – on the other.  These attempts at coercion are described as for the 
beloved’s own good and revealing the beloved’s hidden, unknown love.  The beloved is talked 
into loving another person in a manner best described as coerced consent.   
 This chapter will explore how the tradition of one mind – identified in chapter four, 
combines with the tradition of self-absorption – identified in chapter five, leading to a new trend.  
This new trend shows unworthy lovers assuming they know those they love better than the 
beloved characters know themselves.  This late development, of coerced consent, differs from 
earlier texts, which consistently condemns the practice.  In contrast, the idea of coerced consent 
becomes presented in a positive light, leading eventually to the tradition of the “reformed rake.” 
As seen in previous chapters, early texts in the romance tradition contrast coercion and consent.  
This chapter will briefly discuss earlier condemnations of coerced consent before exploring 
positive representations of it.  Fikenhild’s attempts in King Horn to force Rymenhild to marry 
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him are described in terms that modern readers would identify as rape.
563
  Later versions of 
Tristan import this discourse of dominance into King Mark’s behavior toward Isolde but do not 
include the idea that he is trying to convince her to love him.  Poems such as Chaucer’s Troilus 
and Criseyde introduce ambiguity into these coercions but do not abandon the idea that such 
force is troubling.  It is in Sidney’s Old Arcadia that the princes’ attempts to woo the princesses 
are finally presented as indicating the women’s true feelings, therefore justifying the deception 
and coercion in courtship.
564
  The bulk of this chapter will focus on how Shakespeare then picks 
up on this theme in All’s Well That Ends Well.   
 
 The idea of coerced consent is a late development even though the components at its 
heart – discussed in the previous chapters – appear in the earliest romances.  These components, 
when taken together, work as a syllogism justifying how one lover may convince another to love 
him or her.  By the time of Sidney, the romantic ideal of one mind has wide circulation in 
canonical texts.  Consent is the key to determining marriage/love, but, building on Abelard’s 
notion of intent, it is possible that one may not know one’s own feelings or one’s own 
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willingness to consent.  Putting these ideas together, it is possible that a lover knows his 
beloved’s mind better than she knows herself.  In this case, convincing her to love is merely 
revealing her own “true” feelings to her.  As we will see, coercion is not limited to male lovers 
forcing themselves on women. 
Returning to earlier works, the use of literal, legalistic interpretations contrary to the 
spirit of the law and consent were criticized in the romances of the twelfth century.  The clearest 
example of this appears in a scene discussed in previous chapters, when Tristan disguises himself 
as a beggar and carries Isolde across a stream.  Tripping, his head lands in her lap.  When 
accused of infidelity, Isolde can then honestly say that no men other than her husband – and this 
beggar – have been between her thighs.  All those present including King Mark interpret this 
statement within the limited sense of the “beggar’s” apparent identity rather than his hidden 
identity as Tristan.
565
   
The legal situation in twelfth-century England was particularly unstable in relation to 
cases regarding secular marriage.  Early romances figuring Tristan and Horn were almost 
certainly composed before the large quantity of marital legislation of the thirteenth century but 
after “Venien ad nos,” which declared the church’s position in favor of consent.   
 Coercion also plays an important role in many of these romances.  Isolde faces implied 
but unstated political and societal pressures to marry Mark despite her love for Tristan.  As 
mentioned before, the marriages of Tristan and of Isolde put pressure upon the idea of 
subconscious consent, suggesting that adulterous love destabilizes the consent they offer 
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consciously to their respective spouses.
566
  King Horn even more explicitly explores the issue of 
coercion.  Rymenhild faces two unwanted marriages arranged by the upstart Fikenhild, the latter 
to himself.  In these cases, however, Rymehild would be an unwilling participant. 
 Fourteenth-century romances like Troilus and Criseyde blur the line between earning 
one’s love – essentially convincing one to consent – and coercion.  The romance convention of 
being ennobled by one’s love and performing heroic deeds in order to be worthy gradually take 
on the notion of earning that love.  Petrarch’s sonnets usually present this as gaining the 
beloved’s pity, as in Astrophil and Stella #1, which retains the beloved’s agency.567  These 
fourteenth-century romances, in contrast, capitalize on the notion of obligation. 
 The tradition of legalistic discourse and coercion within lovers’ communications is also 
considered in other fourteenth-century texts, perhaps the most famous of which is in Chaucer’s 
Franklin’s Tale when Aurelius takes Dorigen’s rejection as the condition upon which she will 
take him as lover.  When Dorigen states “in pleye”568 that she will grant to be his love when he 
removes all the rocks along the coast,
569
 it is clear that she means never, even if it is made “in 
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pleye.”570  Her rejection is made clear because she only sets this condition after stating clearly 
that “ne shal I neuere been vntrewe wyf.”571  Furthermore, Aurelius seems to understand her 
when he replies, “Is ther noon oother grace in yow?”572  His decision to take her words as a 
contractual obligation on her part only makes sense in a mercantile, legal discourse and runs 
contrary to the romantic discourse of a shared mind.
573
  Aurelius takes advantage of relational 
semantics to impose his meaning upon Dorigen’s words in order to establish a consent for her 
that is clearly false.  Chaucer ends the tale with Aurelius’ introduction into lovers’ discourse of 
submission by Arveragas’ submission to his wife’s words and Dorigen’s submission to her 
husband’s will.574  Following the previous tradition, Chaucer presents coercion as a transgressive 
act. 
                                                          
570
 Ibid., 280. 
571
 Ibid., 276. 
572
 Ibid., 291. 
573
 For more on mercantile misreading in Chaucer, see Ladd, Roger A.  “The Mercantile (Mis) 
Reader in "The Canterbury Tales."  (Studies in Philology, Winter, 2002), 17-32. 
574
 This reading matches well with Jill Mann’s observation in an informal, unpublished 
presentation at the Harvard Colloquium, in which she argued that Arveragas’ generosity inspires 
the others to other acts of generosity.  In my terms, what she describes as generosity can be 
described as acts of submission, submitting one’s own desires in favor of another’s.  For a 
published article that follows a similar argument to Mann’s, see Timothy H. Flake’s “Love, 
Trouthe, and the Happy Ending of The Franklin’s Tale.” (English Studies, 1996, 3), 209-226.  
Flake also discusses, on page 223, the difference between Dorigen becoming an adulteress in 
word versus spirit, implying the importance of inner consent.   
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 In contrast to medieval representations of coerced consent, Renaissance texts such as 
Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella introduce the idea that the privileged knowledge of a lover allows 
one to ignore clear rejections.  One of the clearest examples of a lover ignoring clear rejections 
appears in Shakespeare’s All’s Well That Ends Well.575  In the play, the low-born Helena lives as 
the ward of the Countess of Rousillon and loves Bertram,
576
 the countess’ son, who does not 
return her affection.  As the daughter of a deceased doctor, Helena has knowledge of medicines, 
a knowledge she uses to save the king.  In recompense for her healing, the king allows her to 
choose her husband.  Her choice, Bertram, flees immediately after the ceremony, saying he will 
never marry her until after they have consummated and she has worn his family ring.  Helena 
follows the rakish Bertram and concocts a scheme whereby, without his knowledge, she sleeps 
with him and gains his ring.  Helena does this by substituting herself for a woman Bertram seeks 
to seduce, Diana.  Once the Countess hears of Bertram’s behavior, she claims Helena as her 
daughter.   Once Helena fakes her own death and returns home, Bertram returns home as well.  
Helena announces before the court that she has met the conditions established by Bertram, and 
then Bertram agrees to the marriage.   
                                                          
575
 While not part of this dissertation, The Taming of the Shrew, with its coerced consent and 
submission to a husband’s will, might offer opportunities for future scholarship in this vein.   
576
 For a discussion of class conflict in All’s Well That Ends Well, see Erikson, Peter.  “The 
Political Effects of Gender and Class in All’s Well That Ends Well.”  Shakespeare’s Problem 
Plays.  (New York:  Palgrave, 2005), 54-73. 
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The conclusion of All’s Well That Ends Well builds on the same convention of offering 
consent as submission to the other’s will, but portrays this coercion in more positive light.577  
Helena’s willful misreading of Bertram’s message and the eventual imposition of her meaning 
upon his words involve intent, consent, misrecognition, submission, and the role of power in 
imposing meaning.   
When thou canst get the ring upon my  
finger, which never shall come off, and show me a 
child begotten of thy body that I am father to, then call 
me husband; but in such a ‘then’ I write a ‘never.’578  
 Little ambiguity as to intent creeps into Bertram’s rejection of Helena in All’s Well That 
Ends Well; clearly, the ‘conditions’ he places upon their marriage are impossibilia designed to 
                                                          
577
 Shakespeare inverts and subverts many of the generic expectations of characters that parallel 
Helena, such as Griselde in Chaucer’s Clerk’s Tale and and Gilette in Boccaccio.  Shakespeare’s 
inversion of the bed-trick brings to light the gendered nature of the scenario, with greater 
importance placed on a woman’s chastity.  Leah Scragg discusses many of these generic 
expectations, asserting a generational difference between a decaying, but noble culture and one, 
symbolized in Helena, that will reinvogorate it.  For more, see Scragg. Leah. “All’s Well That 
Ends Well and the Chivalric Quest.”  Shakespeare’s Problem Plays.  (New York:  Palgrave, 
2005), 29-53. 
578
 William Shakespeare, “All’s Well That Ends Well.”  The Complete Pelican Shakespeare.  Ed. 
Stephen Orgel and A.R. Braunmuller.  (New York:  Penguin, 2002), 3.2.57-60. 
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show the certainty of his position.
579
  Should his intent be unclear, however, Bertram specifically 
redefines “then” to mean “never.”  The terms of Bertram’s rejection, however, do more than 
show the depth of his feelings; these terms reject specifically Helena’s two primary legal claims 
to marriage.
580
  “Never” signals his lack of consent, leaving him room to contest the marriage on 
the grounds that it is coerced.  The ring symbolizes several things:  his status and family, the 
traditional symbol of betrothal, and, of course, sexual consummation as seen in the added 
comment about siring a child.  Even his gesture of hand-fasting is incomplete and shows his 
resistance.  When told by the king that he must “take her by the hand, and tell her she is 
thine,”581 Bertram seemingly withholds his consent, answering only “I take her hand.”582  
Bertram’s rejection is categorical, punctuated by his flight to the wars, but offers one possible 
                                                          
579
 Likewise, Helena is “driven by an overriding knowledge of what she truly desires.  She will 
get what she wants, whatever the cost, and whatever the effect on her reputation” (275).  
Edmondson, Paul.  “Comical and Tragical.”  Shakespeare:  An Oxford Guide.  Eds. Stanley 
Wells and Lena Cowen Orlin. (Oxford  Oxford UP, 2003), 267-278. 
580
 For more on the broken marriage vows, see Neely, Carol Thomas.  Broken Nuptials in 
Shakeseare’s Plays.  (New Haven:  Yale UP, 1985). 
581
 Ibid., 2.3.173-4. 
582
 Ibid., 2.3.176.  See earlier on consent in marriage.  Also, in Renaissance cognitive terms, 
Bertram says earlier to the king that he “must submit my fancy to your eyes” (2.3.167-8), 
suggesting the potential difference of opinion / interpretation due to perceptions and/or 
preconceptions, an idea confirmed by his sarcastic commentary upon Helena’s newfound status.   
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legal loophole to escape the match.
583
   Rather than submit to marrying Helena, Bertram flees to 
the wars in Florence, telling his mother in a letter that he “has wedded her, not bedded her, and 
sworn to make the ‘not’ eternal.”584  His refusal to consummate their marriage provides him with 
another argument nullifying the validity of the marriage, making clear his intention never to be a 
true husband to Helena.  Bertram makes his intention clear both in the letter to Helena and in the 
letter to his mother:  “never.”  These are impossible conditions meant to make the depth of his 
rejection clear.  Helena consciously chooses a favorable reading though it is at odds with the 
original intent.
585
 
Despite knowing his intent, Helena willfully – and consciously – misreads his message as 
a series of conditions to be met.
586
  By the end of the play, Helena successfully contests and 
redefines the meaning of the letter to suit her purposes, using the king and others as witnesses to 
                                                          
583
 See earlier on consent in marriage.  Also, in Renaissance cognitive terms, Bertram says earlier 
to the king that he “must submit my fancy to your eyes” (2.3.167-8), suggesting the potential 
difference of opinion / interpretation due to perceptions and/or preconceptions, an idea 
confirmed by his sarcastic commentary upon Helena’s newfound status.   
584
Ibid., 3.2.20-2. 
585
 For more on how the play explores the difference between words and deeds, see, Barton, Ann.  
The Riverside Shakespeare.  Ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J.J.M. Tobin .  (Boston:  Houghton 
Mifflin, 1997), 533-37. 
586
 Helena’s rereading of the letter could be seen in a more sinister light if one reads her 
interpretation as a contract that Bertram must fulfill should she meet its conditions. 
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confirm her position.  Since “Helena sees only in her fantasy” the worth of Bertram,587she fits in 
the tradition of lovers identified as unworthy in the self-absorbed tradition.  A key difference is, 
of course, that she will force her fantastical desires onto Bertram.
588
   
Helena’s control of the rings’ meanings in All’s Well That Ends Well hinges on her ability 
to control their transmission.  By controlling perceptions of who sends an item, Helena leads 
Bertram in particular to assume incorrectly the intent behind the gesture; likewise, by 
substituting herself for Diana, she ‘steals’ Bertram’s intended message – a contested one – from 
Diana and applies it to herself.  In this way, Helena meets Bertram’s ‘conditions.’  
Helena uses Bertram’s infatuation with Diana in order to gain possession of his ring and 
to bed him.  Bertram offer the family ring to Diana, first as an attempt to buy affections and then, 
when she insists, as a form of implied proposal,
 589
 one on which he will eventually renege.  
                                                          
587
 Asp, Carolyn.  “Subjectivity, Desire, and Femal Friendship in All’s Well That Ends Well.”  
Shakespeare’s Problem Plays.  Ed. Simon Barker.  (New York:  Palgrave, 2005), 83. 
588
 Another key difference is that Helena is a woman.  Erikson discusses the parallels between 
the power dynamics in All’s Well That Ends Well  and Queen Elizabeth’s relationship with 
Essex.  Many scholars have discussed Bertram in contrast with Shakespear’s Henry V.  For more 
on this historical conflict, see Dollimore, Jonathan and Alan Sinfield.  “History and Ideology:  
The Instance of Henry V.”  Alternative Shakespeares.´ Ed. John Drakakis. (London:  Routledge, 
1985).  206-27. 
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 Ibid., 4.2.51-3. 
Eggers Misticall Unions 247 
When Diana asserts, “A wife you have won of me,” 590 she confirms the idea of marriage, all the 
while keeping secret that Helena is the wife Bertram has won through substitution.  In a parallel 
act of substitution, Helena takes Diana’s place in the dark bed-room, fulfilling Bertram’s other 
condition.   
Helena is even able to anticipate that Bertram will “repent” giving the ring to Diana 
(3.7.26-8).  Helena’s intimate – almost miraculous – knowledge of Bertram’s heart – not only his 
innermost desires but how to manipulate them from a distance – places her in the long-standing 
tradition of lovers who have a miraculous understanding of their beloveds, such as Tristan and 
Isolde.  Diana transmits Helena’s words to Bertram – though pretending they are her own – and 
then transmits the ring to Helena once Bertram offers it.  As such, she is merely the vessel of 
delivery for the messages, even as Bertram perceives her as their recipient.  Bertram’s ignorance 
of Helena’s machinations allows her to ‘steal’ his message of proposal to another woman and 
claim it as her own.  Diana’s consent – her willingness to be merely an intermediary – allows 
Helena to hijack the ring and, in a way, claim the message for herself.   
Diana, on Helena’s coaching, offers Bertram a ring in return that Helena received as a 
reward for healing the king.   When the ring resurfaces in Bertram’s possession, the king grows 
suspicious.  The meaning he assumes is that which he defined for the ring when he offered it to 
her.  When he sees it, the king recalls his gift to Helena, stating,  
 The ring was mine, and when I gave it Helen 
 I bade her, if her fortunes ever stood  
                                                          
590
 Ibid., 4.2.64-5.  Bertram seems to tacitly agree to marry Diana, by not correcting her.  Parolles 
confirms that he did “go between them” and that he “knew of their going to bed, and of other 
motions, as promising her marriage” (5.3.259-66). 
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 Necessitied to help, that by this token  
 I would relieve her.
591
 
The king, then, sees the ring as a call to action but he is unclear as to what actions he should take.  
Unlike Bertram, the king is eager to act upon his obligation.
592
  Adding to his sense of 
foreboding is that Helena  
called the saints to surety  
that she would never put it from her finger 
Unless she gave it to yourself in bed, 
Where you have never come, or sent it us 
Upon her great disaster.
593
  
As the king sees it, only two conditions can determine the ring’s meaning:  Helena’s gift of the 
ring to Bertram in bed, which he sees as impossible, and disaster to her.  The king’s uncertainty 
stems from his ignorance as to how Bertram gained the ring and he even considers the possibility 
that Bertram attained it by “rough enforcement.”594  At this point, it is conceivable that the play 
would have ended with Bertram’s execution; for this and other reasons, All’s Well That Ends 
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 Ibid., 5.3.84-7. 
592
 In so doing, the King begins to reassert his patriarchal power.  For a psychological reading 
informed by Lacan of the play, particularly the exploration of how women adopt a subect 
position in the society of the play, see Asp, Carolyn.  “Subjectivity, Desire, and Female 
Friendship in All’s Well That Ends Well.”  Shakespeare’s Problem Plays.  Ed. Simon Barker.  
(New York:  Palgrave, 2005),  74-94.  
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 Ibid., 5.3.109-12 
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 Ibid., 5.3.108. 
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Well is often grouped with the problem plays.  The king refuses to accept Bertram’s knowingly 
false explanation of gaining the ring from the casement window and his unknowingly false one 
of receiving it from Diana.  The king’s knowledge of Helena’s virtue eliminates – for him – the 
possibility Helena’s other definition of the ring as proof she slept with Bertram.   
Just as with the first ring, however, Helena manages to control the eventual, contested 
meaning of the second ring.  By substituting herself for Diana in bed, Helena manages to meet 
the other ‘condition’ set forth in Bertram’s letter – to be got with his child – without his 
knowledge.
595
  Helena even orchestrates events such that her revelations save Bertram from the 
king’s potential wrath.  In addition to meeting his impossible – and unintended – ‘conditions,’ 
Helena creates one more reason – or obligation – for Bertram’s gratitude.  In the end, Helena 
asks the incredulous Bertram, “Will you be mine, now you are doubly won?”596  In a way, 
Helena ‘wins’ Bertram in ways reminiscent of medieval romances where the knight goes into the 
world and performs acts that earn him the hand and love of the maiden.  Helena wins Bertram 
once by gaining the patronage of the king and a second time by meeting his ‘conditions,’ but no 
reconciliation would be possible without Helena’s question.   
For the first time, Helena asks Bertram for his consent, allowing him to choose.
597
  
Throughout the play, Helena has forced Bertram into the uncomfortable position – usually 
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 For more on the bed-trick, see Adelman, Janet.  “Bed Tricks:  On Marriage as the End of 
Comedy in All’s Well That Ends Well.”  Shakespeare’s Personality.  Ed. Norman H. Holland, 
Sidney Homan, and Bernard J. Paris (Berkeley:  U of California P, 1990).151-74. 
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 Ibid., 5.3.315. 
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 At this moment, Bertram is given the chance to act on his newfound self-knoweldge, as noted 
by McEachern, Claire.  The Complete Pelican Shakespeare.  Ed. Stephen Orgel and A.R. 
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occupied by women – of being unable to withhold his consent; doing so allows Shakespeare to 
comment upon women’s position as he does in other plays.  Bertram’s response is important for 
two reasons.
598
  First, he is willing – if only conditionally – to accept her redefinition of his 
letter, allowing her to imprint her meaning upon him.
599
  Second, he does not merely accept her 
assertions; he wants her to explain it to him.  Such a dialogue parallels the newfound 
‘companionate’ ideal of marriage in conduct books of the time.600   
Considering the roots of the interpretive model seen in All’s Well That Ends Well directs 
the emphasis away from homosocial relations or explorations of how to address our fallen nature 
and onto the language of negotiation.  While some see the major issues of the play as unresolved, 
linguistically, the play has resolved both the issues of interpretation and consent with that one 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Braunmuller.  (London:  Pelican, 2002), 568.  Bertram’s self-knowledge and genuine consent 
can be questioned, making the resolution of the play problematic. 
598
 Robert D. Freidman in “Male Bonds and Marriage in ‘All’s Well’ and ‘Much Ado’ (Studies 
in English Literature, 1500-1900, Spring 1995, 231-50) argues that Bertram’s acceptance is 
merely to secure a homosocial relationship with the king.  If this were the entire case, however, 
the same opportunity presents itself at the start of the play.   
599
 Such ‘writing’ upon one another parallels the knots in Marie de France’s Guigemar. 
600
 Two tracts on marriage describing elements of the newfound ideal of ‘companionate’ 
marriage include Edmund Tilney’s A Brief and Pleasant Discourse of Duties in Marriage, called 
The Flower of Friendship and William Perkins’ Christian Economy; or A Short Survey of the 
Right Manner of Erecting and Ordering a Family, According to the Scriptures. 
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question and response.
601
  Focusing on interpretation within the play offers the chance not 
merely to understand more clearly the relational semantics in the play’s seemingly oxymoronic 
statements,
602
 but the relational hermeneutics used to interpret these words.
603
  Characters 
consistently consult their desires when interpreting tokens and texts, sometimes consciously and 
at others from ignorance.  Most importantly, these understandings are always provisional, facing 
challenges from the preconceived notions of others.  Finally, the resolution of the play becomes 
clearer when one sees the conflict as interpretive; only when both Helena and Bertram are 
willing to truly listen – or enter into what Gadamer calls an ‘open’ conversation – is 
reconciliation possible.
604
 
                                                          
601
 Barton suggests that the resolution belongs to the “same world of fairy-tale and romance as 
the first.  In terms of psychological truth, there is no more reason of Bertram to accept Helena 
because of the bed-trick than because of the miraculous healing of the king.  This second clash 
between realism and fable, the old world and the new, is suggested but comes to no issue” (502).  
Her reading, however, ignores the importance of the fact that Helena asks Bertram and he 
questions her in return.  No longer is language a tool of power but a means of truly listening. 
602
 Shakespeare All’s Well That Ends Well, 3.7.45. 
603
 Barton argues that the play seems to be driving for the truth beneath words when she states 
that “language has become an empty and often a lying substitute for deeds” (501) and then 
describing how the virtuous characters perceive correctly.   
604
 This contrasts with the widely accepted notion that the last speech “lack weight:  three lines in 
all to accomplish recompense, reconciliation, and assurance of love” (Gerard J. Gross “The 
Conclusion to All’s Well That Ends Well” SEL 1500-1900 23 (Spring 1983). 270.   
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 Bertram’s position would seem to be one more familiar to Renaissance English women 
than men; he attempts to reserve for himself the right to say no.  Helena’s manipulation of his 
response redefines his “no” to mean “yes” by ignoring his clear intent and adopting the 
impossibilia as true conditions to be met.  Pushing the idea that Bertram defines the letter as a 
kind of legal defense, Helena can be seen as adopting a legal standpoint as well, treating the text 
as a contract.  Bertram’s linguistic position in the letter is a traditionally patriarchal one:  he 
adopts the subject position and expects Helena to passively accept his statement.  As we have 
seen in previous romances, however, clandestine communications between lovers offer the 
potential for a woman to adopt an interpretive position equal to a man.
605
   
 Perhaps the most subversive outcome of a wider trend of the relational semantics in 
lovers’ communications is that both sender and receiver adopt a subject position in the message, 
rather than the receiver serving merely as object.  At a linguistic level, then, the woman can 
assume a position of equality with her suitor, defining rather than merely accepting the meaning 
of their messages.  While this is also true of her suitor, the subject position is certainly more 
familiar to men in Renaissance England.  This expanded linguistic control for women can be 
traced to ideas central to the medieval romance tradition:  consent, one mind, first generation 
nominalism, and mistaken identities.   
 
 
 
                                                          
605
 David Bevington asserts that Helena’s goal, perhaps accomplished, is to have Bertram 
understand “that sexuality and deep friendship can and should exist in a single relationship.”  
Bevington, David.  The Complete Works of Shakespeare. (New York:  Longman, 1997), 364.  
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CONCLUSION 
I wish that you knew that when I said two sugars  
I actually meant three. 
– Kate Nash “Nicest Thing” (2007)606 
 
Rið braut héðan, þú ókunni riddari,” segir hún, “ok fá þér herbergi  
ok dvel ekki vára ferð.”  En sem Tristram sá gullit,  
kendi hann ok undirstóð. 
– Brother Robert Tristan (13c.) 607 
 
[‘Ride off strange knight,’ she said, find yourself lodging  
and stop holding up our journey.’  But when Tristram saw the ring,  
he recognized it and understood her meaning.] 
 
 Earlier, I used these quotations to illustrate how a lover could understand his beloved so 
well that he knew what she wanted even when she asked for something else.
608
  The previous 
discussion emphasized the concept that lovers shared a connection beyond language – or one 
mind – and relied upon his or her lover supplying an intent that was absent in words but did 
match what he or she really “meant.”  An alternate reading of this line suggests that Nash herself 
might not even know she wants three sugars, indicating that her lover knows her better than she 
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 Kate Nash, “Nicest Thing.”  Made of Bricks. Fiction record, Cherrytree Recods, and 
Universal Music Group.   Release date August 5, 2007. 
607
 Brother Robert. Norse Romance I:  The Tristan Legend. Ed. and Trans Marianne Kalinke.  
(Cambridge:  D.S. Brewer, 2012), 200.  Ok þegar jafnskjótt tók hún þat sama gull, sem jafnan 
hafði þiera ímillli farit með sendiboðum, ok kastaði til Tristrams, svá ti hans talandi:  “Rið braut 
héðan, þú ókunni riddari,” segir hún, “ok fá þér herbergi ok dvel ekki vára ferð.” 
“En sem Tristram sá gullit, kendi hann ok undirsoóð orð dróttningar ok veik sér aptr til 
sinna skalaldsveina ok báðir þeir Kardin.”   
608
 Please excuse the gender specific pronouns.  Nothing about this process is limited by gender.   
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knows herself.  Such a situation encourages her lover to ignore what she says in favor of what he 
thinks she wants.   
Two can mean three… No can mean yes. 
 Isolde’s response to Tristan, above, offers more clues that her meaning does not match 
her words.  Since Tristan knows that the context is public and that she needs to keep her 
relationship with him secret, he has one clue suggesting that he not take her words at face value.  
The second potential indicator that her words should not be taken literally appears when she 
draws attention to the ring that the two exchange to remind each other of their love.  However, as 
mentioned earlier, the gesture of throwing the ring to the ground could indicate a similar 
rejection of their relationship.  He is expected to know that this “no” means “yes.” 
 This dissertation has explored how anxieties toward language, particularly relational 
semantics, lead to a range of generic literary conventions about lovers that continue to circulate 
in twentieth and twenty-first century literary lovers.  Even the romanticized notion of lovers 
sharing privileged communications can create unrealistic expectations for modern flesh-and-
blood readers, while the notion of coerced consent discussed in this chapter suggests unhealthy 
power dynamics hidden in beautiful language.   
 The continuity between these medieval romances and modern literary lovers challenges 
scholarly assumptions about the radical differences between the Middle Ages and modern 
society and constructions of the self.  Most surprising might be the realization that medieval 
literary texts often worked with a far more radical sense of linguistic contingency than their 
Renaissance counterparts; as such, in this way at least, the Middle Ages might be considered 
more modern than the early modern period. 
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 When I started this topic, it seemed like a relatively contained one, exploring the 
transmission of messages between lovers.  In the end, the works dictated a larger claim than I 
anticipated.  The increased importance of consent in medieval marriage law led to the creation of 
widely circulating literary works that offered ways of thinking about language that anticipated – 
and perhaps helped to formulate – modern attitudes about communication as well as 
relationships.  The kind of secrecy in these communications mimics a kind of interiority, a 
characteristic associated with modern constructions of the self.     
 Once the terms of this argument became clear, examples from these generic conventions 
leapt out at me from a range of modern media, including movies, television shows, and music.  I 
even noticed once day, in myself, the unreasonable expectation that my wife would somehow 
know, without my mentioning it, that I needed her to take out the trash.   
 One area of future exploration might be to trace these generic conventions from the 
Renaissance to today.  The conditions of lovers in medieval and Renaissance England 
encountered relatively similar challenges, hiding their love from those in power who could 
prevent it.  What keeps lovers communicating secretly in Restoration comedies like The Man of 
Mode?  Self-determination in marriage has become the norm in twenty-first-century Anglo-
American society, so the question arises as to why these same conventions still circulate so 
widely. What are the conditions that keep them circulating? 
  Another area of future exploration might be to look for precursors to the eleventh 
century examples in this dissertation.  This project began in part from my skepticism about the 
idea that interiority did not exist before the Renaissance.  I am generally cautious about 
identifying with any certainty a radical change to any particular period.  Despite this, few 
examples leap out from either the early medieval insular tradition or the Classical one.  The 
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example of secret codes in Ovid’s Amores, for example, shows a code that this clearly defined 
beforehand, and therefore does not show a mystical sharing of one mind.  If few examples 
appear, then this dissertation may be far more radical than I ever anticipated. 
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APPENDIX:   
TRISTAN AND ISOLDE 
 
Title    Author    Date    
Tristran   Thomas d’Angleterre  ca. 1170   
Tristran   Béroul    ca. 1150 – 1190  
Chevrefoil   Marie de France  ca. 1190 
Tristan    Gottfried von Strassburg ca. 1211 
Tristrams Saga ok Ísöndar Brother Robert  ca. 1226 
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